Federal Courts. Suits to Which a State Is a Party. Action by State to Enjoin Conspiracy in Restraint of Interstate Commerce Held to Present a Justiciable Controversy within Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court

1945 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 741
2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 989
Author(s):  
Georgia L. Holmes ◽  
Penny Herickhoff

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">On January 11, 2012 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School v. Equal Opportunity Commission, et al.</span></span><a name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> that the First Amendment free exercise of religion clause requires the recognition of a ministerial exception from the application of the discrimination provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Lower federal courts had long recognized such an exemption in federal anti-discrimination statutes, yet the U.S. Supreme Court had never formally done so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The decision of the Court was unanimous, although separate concurring opinions were filed by Justice Thomas and by Justice Alito, who was also joined by Justice Kagan.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, in its decision, the Court has mandated immunity for religious organizations from the laws that prohibit discrimination, and retaliation in the workplace.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Hosanna Tabor decision raises issues of how far such a ministerial exemption extends and to what extent it immunizes religious organizations from liability for other types of statutorily prohibited and tortious conduct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is concern in some sectors that too broad an exemption would immunize religious organizations under numerous neutral, generally applicable laws, such as those governing sexual abuse, unemployment compensation, employer social Security deductions, and sales taxes, all of which have previously been applied to religious organizations.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><br /><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> <hr size="1" /></span><div style="mso-element: footnote;" id="ftn1"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;" class="MsoFootnoteText"><a name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span><span style="font-size: 9pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">____ U.S. ____.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"></span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maggie Gardner

92 New York University Law Review 390 (2017)When it comes to transnational litigation in the federal courts, it is time to retire the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The doctrine, which allows judges to decline jurisdiction in cases they believe would be better heard in foreign courts, is meant to promote international comity and protect defendant fairness. But it is not well-designed for the former purpose, and given recent developments at the Supreme Court, it is dangerously redundant when it comes to the latter. This Article seeks to demythologize forum non conveniens, to question its continuing relevance, and to encourage the courts and Congress to narrow its scope of application so that, when the time is right, it may be fully interred.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Preis

Time and again, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the federal cause of action is "analytically distinct" from rights, remedies, and jurisdiction. Yet, just pages away in the U.S. Reports are other cases in which rights, remedies, and jurisdiction all hinge on the existence of a cause of action. What, then, is the proper relationship between these concepts?The goal of this Article is to articulate that relationship. This Article traces the history of the cause of action from eighteenth-century England to its modem usage in the federal courts. This history demonstrates that the federal cause of action is largely distinct from rights, closely related to (and sometimes synonymous with) remedies, and distinct from jurisdiction except where Congress instructs otherwise or the case implicates sovereign immunity. Sorting out these relationships provides several benefits, including refining the doctrine of prudential standing, clarifying the grounds for federal jurisdiction, and dispelling claims that Congress lacks power over certain causes of action.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 934-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary N. McAbee

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.


Author(s):  
David S. Schwartz

Post–Civil War nationalism meant a partial but significant reversion to prewar constitutionalism, recognizing federal legislative authority over “every foot of American soil” and implementing the antebellum Whig-nationalist economic agenda, but allowing states to retain, or regain control over race relations. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of internal improvements, but declined to embrace implied commerce powers, suggesting instead (as in Gibbons v. Ogden) that the question involved the definition of interstate commerce as an enumerated power. The Court seemed to want to confine McCulloch v. Maryland to taxation, banking, and currency matters. The Legal Tender Cases, which relied on McCulloch to uphold the federal power to issue paper money, were a watershed in the history of implied powers, and were recognized as such at the time by many commentators. Yet the Supreme Court over the ensuing decade and a half seemed unwilling to follow through on McCulloch’s full implications.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 622-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA ◽  
TOM S. CLARK

Principal-agent relations are replete in politics; politicians are agents of electorates, bureaucrats are agents of executives, lower courts are agents of upper courts, and much more. Commonly, principals are modeled as the rule-making body and agents as the rule-implementing body. However, principals often delegate the authority to make the rules themselves to their agents. The relationship between the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court is one such example; a considerable portion of the law (rules) is made in the lower federal courts with the Supreme Court serving primarily as the overseer of those lower courts’ decisions. In this article, we develop and test a principal-agent model of law (rule) creation in a judicial hierarchy. The model yields new insights about the relationship among various features of the judicial hierarchy that run against many existing perceptions. For example, we find a non-monotonic relationship between the divergence in upper and lower court preferences over rules and the likelihood of review and reversal by the Supreme Court. The empirical evidence supports these derived relationships. Wider implications for the principal-agent literature are also discussed.


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