Descent and Distribution. Devolution of Charitable Trust Property on Termination of Trust

1909 ◽  
Vol 22 (8) ◽  
pp. 610
Keyword(s):  
Charitable Trust ◽  
Trust Property

5. Charitable Purpose Trusts

2019 ◽  
pp. 173-281
Author(s):  
Paul S Davies ◽  
Graham Virgo
Keyword(s):  
Public Trust ◽  
The Public ◽  
Charity Commission ◽  
Charitable Trust ◽  
Trust Property ◽  
The Law ◽  
Charitable Purpose ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the charitable trust — its definition and the consequences of its failure. A charitable trust is defined as a public trust for purposes that provide a benefit to the public or a section of the public and is a trust subject to supervision by the Charity Commission. A trust is only considered charitable if it is established for a purpose that the law regards as charitable. The purposes of the trust must be wholly and exclusively charitable otherwise the trust will be void. The consequences of the charitable trust failing depend on whether the failure occurs initially or subsequently. If the purpose fails initially and the settlor had a general charitable intention, the trust property can be applied for a similar charitable purpose through the application of a body of rules known as the cy-pres doctrine. If the purpose fails subsequently the cy-pres doctrine will apply automatically.

Trust Property

2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 31-32
Keyword(s):  
Trust Property

Overreaching, Trustees' Powers and the Reform of the 1925 Legislation

1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Harpum
Keyword(s):  
True Nature ◽  
Trust Property ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Actual Occupation

Overreaching, as the doctrine is now understood, is the process whereby a purchaser of property takes it free from any interests or powers, which attach instead to the proceeds of sale. Dispositions of trust property and conveyances by mortgagees, by personal representatives and under an order of the court may all overreach equitable interests. A lease granted by a mortgagor may overreach the rights of the mortgagee. This article is concerned primarily with dispositions of trust property and in particular those by trustees for sale of land. It seeks to demonstrate that the concept of overreaching is wider than is supposed. Two principal arguments are advanced. The first is that overreaching is a necessary concomitant of a power of disposition. A transaction made by a person within the dispositive powers conferred upon him will overreach equitable interests in that property, but ultra vires dispositions will not, and the transferee with notice will take the property subject to those interests. The second argument is that the draftsman of the 1925 property legislation fully appreciated the true nature of overreaching, and attempted to employ it as an essential part of his scheme for the facilitation of conveyancing. His intentions have not been appreciated in practice, and his carefully constructed scheme has been misapplied. The article considers critically recent proposals for reform from the Law Commission, and in particular the emphasis which those proposals give to the protection of the rights of persons in actual occupation. It will be suggested that reform might be more effectively achieved by employing the essentials of the scheme constructed by the draftsman of the 1925 legislation.

Enforcing charitable trusts: a study on the English necessary interest rule

Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Hui Jing
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Charitable Trust ◽  
Conceptual Nature ◽  
The Way

Abstract In England, Parliament introduced the ‘necessary interest rule’ through the enactment of section 115 of the Charities Act 2011 (England and Wales), allowing ‘any person interested’ in a charitable trust to initiate charity proceedings against defaulting trustees in their administration of charitable assets. Nevertheless, insufficient attention has been paid to this rule despite it being initially enacted in 1853. Parliament has refrained from clearly defining the rule, and the courts have long been grappling with its meaning in determining whether a person is eligible to sue. This paper studies the necessary interest rule by exploring the way in which the courts have interpreted it and the uncertainties surrounding its operation. It is shown that, in the context of charitable trusts, the concern of securing the due administration and execution of the trust lies at the heart of the rule. The final section of this paper discusses the significant theoretical implications of the necessary interest rule. It considers the beneficiary-enforcer debate concerning the conceptual nature of express trusts and highlights the insights that analysis of the rule can provide into this debate.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document