scholarly journals Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291

1981 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morton Rosenberg
2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua B. Kennedy

Abstract:The executive order process can be a long and complicated one, as directives may wind their way through various agencies before finding their way onto the president’s desk. Even after these orders have been issued, federal agencies will have a wide degree of latitude under certain conditions as it pertains to implementing them. In this article, I study the history of three separate presidential directives, two dealing specifically with environmental issues and one with general regulatory issues, in order to provide a picture of the process from inception to implementation. I consider three cases and explore the factors that drive presidents in choosing when or whether to issue an order and those that drive federal agencies to react as they do. This article encourages scholars to reconsider what they consider “unilateral,” pointing to the instances in which presidents must engage in bargaining within the executive branch they ostensibly head.


Author(s):  
Ingeborg Tömmel

Within the realm of multi-level systems, the European Union (EU) constitutes a unique case characterized by a compound executive order which might serve as a template for building similar systems worldwide. This chapter examines the literature on the EU executive. Theoretically inspired mainly by neo-institutionalism, this literature revolves around four basic themes: the institutional structure and the powers of the EU’s executive(s); the performance of and the interactions among executive institutions; the exercise of political leadership; the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the executive(s). Despite ongoing research and debate, scholars agree that EU executive power is widely dispersed among various institutions and that their performance and interactions are characterized by cooperation and conflict. Furthermore, they see leadership in this context faced with limited opportunities and multiple constraints and the democratic legitimacy and accountability of EU executives as poorly developed. The chapter concludes that many research lacunae remain.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Andrew Rudalevige

This chapter gives a brief background of how executive orders have been used by US presidents. As a way of implementing statute in ways that hew to presidential preference, executive orders have been utilized from the Washington administration forward as an implication of the constitutional “executive power” vested in the president. Any issued order reflects presidential preferences, more or less purely enacted into action. The chapter seeks to unpack this view substantively and theoretically. Presidential action can be bound not just by legislators or judges but also by actors within the executive branch itself. The ultimate form of a given executive order may reflect agency needs, or the outcome of intrabranch negotiation, rather than pure ex ante presidential preferences.


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