scholarly journals Constitutional Right to Jury Trial in Criminal Contempt Cases?: United States v. Barnett

1965 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 700
Author(s):  
V.V. Berch

The article is devoted to the consideration of the constitutional right to a trial by a jury, as well as the right to a speedy trial in accordance with the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution. It is noted that as of today in Ukraine there is a question of ensuring the actual (real) participation of the people in the administration of justice and the creation of an appropriate mechanism for the realization of such a right of the people. It is established that the permanent evolution of the jury trial in the world as a full-fledged element of participatory democracy allows us to assert the possibility of applying the best foreign experience in this area and for Ukraine. It is noted that the jury trial, which is typical for the United States, is undoubtedly a consequence of the borrowing of English legal customs, but has its own special features. It has been established that the right to a speedy trial should be distinguished from other constitutional rights, as it concerns the interests of society and the justice system more than the interests of the accused. The circumstances that suggest whether a trial is in fact "fast" are rather vague, as each such proceeding is to some extent unique. The requirements for members of the jury are set out in the Jury Selection Act. It is noted that the release of jurors varies depending on the state. One of the grounds for such dismissal is professional activity. For example, doctors, lawyers, public figures, police or firefighters. At the same time, this practice is gradually ceasing to be natural. It is concluded that the jury trial as a form of public participation in the administration of justice is undoubtedly a democratic legal institution. Direct democracy in the exercise of judicial power, which is carried out in compliance with the principles of publicity and adversarial proceedings promotes the establishment of citizens' faith in the fairness of judicial decisions.  


Interpreting ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly Mikkelson

Various federal and state statutes in the United States define the role of the court interpreter with clear and unequivocal rules. This definition is based on the underlying principles of the U.S. legal system, which is derived from the Anglo-Saxon common-law tradition. Consequently, the distinctive features of that system, including the jury trial and the concept of adversarial proceedings, make the function of the court interpreter quite different from that of his/her counterparts in other countries. In recent years, the judiciary has made an effort to enhance the public's access to the justice system, but at the same time, the latest wave of immigration comprises individuals from societies in which cultural norms differ greatly from those of the United States. Moreover, many of these immigrants have received little or no formal education. As a result, judiciary interpreters feel somewhat constrained by the rules that govern their profession when they strive to bridge the cultural and linguistic gap. This paper reexamines the function of the court interpreter in light of these circumstances and an analysis of prevailing practices in other countries, and proposes a new approach to the interpreter's role.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-204
Author(s):  
Richard W. Garnett

A crucial, but often overlooked, dimension of the human and constitutional right to religious freedom is the autonomy of religious institutions, associations and societies with respect to matters of governance, doctrine, formation and membership. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this autonomy in the context of American constitutional law, it is vulnerable, and even under threat, for a variety of reasons, including a general decline in the health of civil society and mediating associations and a crisis of confidence and authority caused by clerical sexual abuse and churches’ failure to respond to it.


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