Antitrust Law: Exemptions for Regulated Industries: Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to Stock Exchanges

1961 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Peter D. Byrnes
2021 ◽  
pp. 0003603X2110236
Author(s):  
Joshua P. Davis ◽  
Eric L. Cramer ◽  
Reginald L. Streater ◽  
Mark R. Suter

We usually think of antitrust law as addressing violations of free market norms, not equality norms. The two, however, may be related. Systemic racism (and other systemic “isms”) is about power and its abuse. So is antitrust law. Moreover, antitrust may be able to fill gaps left by antidiscrimination law. In particular, antitrust law can address: entire markets, not just individual firms or discrete actions; power imbalances from differences in capital, not just disparities in compensation; financial allocations between owners and workers, not just between workers; and legal violations that shrink total worker pay and do not just distort its allocation. Antitrust law also relies on centrist free market principles. Those may be less controversial than tackling issues of race directly. To be sure, in part for that reason, antitrust laws are limited. They can at best remedy a small portion of the potential wrongs caused by systemic racism. But antitrust may nevertheless contribute valuably to systemic racial equality. It also may provide a model for how antidiscrimination law might be reframed to make it more effective in that regard.


1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph F Brodley

Should innovation collaboration among high technology firms be subject to the antitrust laws? My own analysis concludes that innovation collaboration, particularly when it encompasses production and marketing, can create anticompetitive risks, and should be subject to the antitrust laws. It appears unlikely that actual antitrust enforcement inhibits technological collaboration in any direct way because government enforcement is extremely permissive and no successful private cases have been brought in recent years. To the extent that misguided perceptions of antitrust risk may have discouraged some types of innovation collaboration, a few narrowly targeted reforms are sufficient to correct the problem.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-117
Author(s):  
A. Spiridonova ◽  
E. Juchnevicius

The authors examine certain legal problems of antitrust regulation in the digital economy facing the international community, including BRICS member countries. This article focuses on the problems associated with the use of price algorithms by enterprises as a threat factor to competition. The concept of “price algorithm” and the goals of its use by enterprises are analyzed; it is concluded that the use of price algorithms is just one of the tools for conducting economic activity. At the same time, enterprises can pose a threat to competition by using price algorithms as an element of concluding anti-competitive agreements (concerted actions) between enterprises and illegal coordination of their activities. Restriction of competition through the use of price algorithms can harm consumers of goods, works, and services and should be controlled by antitrust authorities. Based on the analysis of the antitrust laws of the BRICS member countries, it is concluded that currently the concept of a “pricing algorithm” is not enshrined in the laws of any of the BRICS member states, however, there are prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements of enterprises and illegal coordination of economic activity. We refute the need to legally enshrine the concept of “price algorithm” in antitrust law. At the same time, it proves that enterprises should be held accountable for the use of the price algorithm as atool to limit competition. The paper proves that within the framework of interstate cooperation of the BRICS countries in the field of competition law, it is necessary to develop common approaches to antitrust regulation in the digital economy, including to ensure auniform approach to regulating and controlling the use of price algorithms by enterprises in the framework of economic activity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-387
Author(s):  
E. Shevchuk

The paper shows the features of the application of special knowledge when conducting forensic examinations in the field of antitrust laws. In particular, it is shown that such examinations require deep knowledge in various fields, therefore it is advisable to create competition in this market. To do this, it is necessary to give non-state experts the appropriate status, equating them to government agencies. And in state institutions to introduce judicial expertise in the sphere of violations of antitrust regulation. Only the appearance on the market of various institutions conducting examinations in the area of violations of antitrust laws will improve the quality of such examinations. In addition, it is necessary to make the procedure for appointing the examination by the antimonopoly authority more mobile. To this end, it is proposed to amend the legislation to the effect that the decision to confer the status of an expert and conduct an examination should be made in one definition.


1986 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-500
Author(s):  
Abby Brown Wayne

AbstractIn Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., the First Circuit held that Blue Shield's reimbursement practice known as the “ban on balance billing” did not constitute an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws. Underlying the First Circuit's decision was deference to what it viewed as efforts by Blue Shield and by the Commonwealth to promote cost containment.This Comment argues that, to the contrary, under an appropriate analysis of antitrust law, the practices employed by Blue Shield did constitute unreasonable restraints of trade on the physicians' service industry in Massachusetts, given Blue Shield's market dominance in the Commonwealth. The Comment also argues that such inhibition of the competitive functioning of this industry is unwise, and that costs should instead be contained by effectuating the antitrust laws and encouraging the development of competitive forces within this industry.


Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘The goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws’ evaluates the goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws. Competition laws seek to protect the competitive process in the marketplace from companies that seek to distort it. By safeguarding free and fair markets, competition laws promote consumer welfare as well as efficiencies in the marketplace. While key competition law principles are similar across the world, competition laws are not internationally uniform, but are instead customized by each jurisdiction. A comparison can be made between US Federal Antitrust Law and the EU competition law. There are also other jurisdictions that apply competition laws, including China, Japan, and South Korea.


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