scholarly journals Conflict of Laws: Law Applicable in Federal Courts: Federal Law Applied to Contractual Relations of Admiralty Lawyer

1961 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 788
Author(s):  
Robert E. Thorne
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter analyzes and recommends federal corporate governance enhancements that should be implemented. These enhancements, which should be adopted in a measured and directed manner, are necessary to remediate certain deficiencies that currently exist. Consistent therewith, this chapter focuses on several important matters that merit attention, including the undue deference by federal courts to state law, the appropriate application of federal law to tactics undertaken in tender offers, the need for a federal statute encompassing insider trading, and the propriety of more vigorous oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (such as with respect to the “current” disclosure regime, the SEC’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, and the Commission’s neglecting at times to invoke its statutory resources). Thus, the analysis set forth in this chapter identifies significant deficiencies that currently exist and recommends measures that should be implemented on the federal level to enhance corporate governance standards.


Author(s):  
Elrifai Silke Noa

This chapter addresses Qatari perspectives on the Hague Principles. The State of Qatar has two legal frameworks: the onshore civil law system and the offshore common law-based the Qatar Financial Centre, established in 2005 and not covered in this chapter. In onshore Qatar, private international law is codified in Articles 10–38 of Subchapter 3 (conflict of laws in space) of Chapter 1 of the Qatar Civil Code (Federal Law No 22 of 2004). In comparison to its European counterparts, the Qatari private international law codification contains significant gaps. Though only promulgated in 2004, Articles 10–38 are near copies of the conflict of law rules contained in the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949, with a few differences. In accordance with Article 34 Civil Code, ‘the [general] principles of private international law’ shall apply in the case of a conflict of laws absent any statutory provision. The provision opens the doors for Qatari courts to refer to the Hague Principles.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Deer

AbstractExciting changes are happening in criminal jurisdiction in Indian country at the national level. Due in large part to activism on the part of Native women, Congress has attempted to improve criminal justice on tribal lands. The reforms do not go far enough, however, and many of the recent legal changes have not yet been challenged in the federal courts. This article will preview many of the legal issues likely to ignite a firestorm of litigation and lobbying around issues of crime in Indian country. This article will also wrestle with the difficult question of whether tribal nations should adopt or sustain the typical carceral law and order model used by Anglo-American governments. In an effort to take advantage of the changes in federal law, tribal nations are explicitly required to comply with certain Anglo-American norms. The risks and rewards of such adherence will also be explored.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin C. Walsh

Virginia v. Sebelius is a federal lawsuit in which Virginia has challenged President Obama's signature legislative initiative of health care reform. Virginia has sought declaratory and injunctive relief to vindicate a state statute declaring that no Virginia resident shall be required to buy health insurance. To defend this state law from the preemptive effect of federal law, Virginia has contended that the federal legislation's individual mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Virginia's lawsuit has been one of the most closely followed and politically salient federal cases in recent times. Yet the very features of the case that have contributed to its political salience also require its dismissal for lack of statutory subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has placed limits on statutory subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which a state seeks a declaration that a state statute is not preempted by federal law-precisely the relief sought in Virginia v. Sebelius. These statutory limits are a sea wall; they keep out, on statutory grounds, some suits that should otherwise be kept out on Article III grounds. The statutory and constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction over suits like Virginia v. Sebelius insulate federal courts from the strong political forces surrounding lawsuits that follow from state statutes designed to create federal jurisdiction over constitutional challenges by states to federal law. This Article identifies previously neglected jurisdictional limits, shows why they demand dismissal of Virginia v. Sebelius, and explains why it is appropriate for federal courts to be closed to suits of this type.


Author(s):  
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson

In this chapter, Kimberly Jenkins Robinson identifies the challenges and benefits of Congress adopting a federal right to education. She notes that the current backlash against the federal role in education and the lack of political will for greater federal involvement in education will forestall calls for a congressional right to education in the near future. Nevertheless, Congress possesses numerous strengths to recognizing a federal right to education over the federal courts that make it a forum worthy of serious consideration in the decades ahead. Robinson contends that Congress should adopt an incremental approach to recognizing a federal right to education that begins with incentives that set the stage for a federal right and that culminate with a federal law that requires states to provide equal access to an excellent education.


Author(s):  
James E. Pfander

Cases Without Controversies: Uncontested Adjudication in Article III Courts offers a new account of the power of federal courts in the United States to hear and determine uncontested applications to assert or register a claim of right. Familiar to lawyers in civil law countries as forms of voluntary or non-contentious jurisdiction, these uncontested applications fit uneasily with the commitment to adversary legalism in the United States. Indeed, modern accounts of federal judicial power often urge that the language of Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of concrete disputes between adverse parties and rules out all forms of non-contentious jurisdiction. Said to rest on the so-called “case-or-controversy” requirement of Article III, this requirement of party contestation threatens the power of federal courts to conduct a range of familiar proceedings, such as the oversight of bankruptcy proceedings, the issuance of warrants, and the adjudication of applications for mandamus and habeas corpus relief. By recounting the tradition of naturalization and other uncontested litigation in antebellum America and coupling that tradition with an account of the important difference between cases and controversies, this book challenges the prevailing understanding of Article III. In addition to defending the power of federal courts to hear uncontested matters of federal law, this book examines the way the Constitution’s meaning has changed over time and suggests an interpretive methodology that would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to take account of the old and the new in defining the contours of federal judicial power.


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