Constitutional Law: Schools and School Districts: Teachers' Tenure Legislation

1939 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 430
Author(s):  
Bertram H. Lebeis
Keyword(s):  
School Districts ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Law Schools

Linkages Between International Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law

1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-163
Author(s):  
Richard B. Lillich ◽  
Hurst Hannum
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
School Curriculum ◽  
Law School ◽  
Law Students ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Law Schools ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
International Human

While many law schools now offer separate courses or seminars on international human rights law, the number of students exposed to such specialized study remains relatively small. Human rights law is relevant to many other segments of the law school curriculum—in particular, to courses on constitutional law and individual rights—although little scholarly attention has been devoted to date to integrating appropriate human rights issues into the “bread and butter” courses that all law students take. To begin to address this lacuna, the Procedural Aspects of International Law (PAIL) Institute has undertaken to develop a human rights component or module designed to supplement leading constitutional law course books and present methods of teaching constitutional law.

The Muddled Distinction Between De Jure and De Facto Segregation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise C. Boddie
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
School Districts ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Community Schools ◽  
Jefferson County ◽  
Legal Narratives ◽  
De Jure Segregation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 declared unconstitutional voluntary, race-based plans to integrate public schools in Jefferson County, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington. The decisionrested on a critical distinction in constitutional law between “de jure” segregation—resulting from purposeful discrimination by the government—and “de facto” racial imbalance derived from unintentional or “fortuitous” actions by state and private entities. The Court held that de facto school districts could not voluntarily assign students to schools according to their race for purposes of promoting integration. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Breyer argued the “futility” of the de jure–de facto distinction, contending that both districts should have been afforded the constitutional flexibility to pursue voluntary remedies that address racial imbalance in their schools. This chapter takes up Justice Breyer’s dissent to explore the complicated origins of school segregation outside the South and the federal cases that adjudicated its constitutionality. Its central contribution is to recover the often confusing legal narratives about segregation in the period after Brown and how federal courts struggled to discern the constitutional boundaries between de jure and de facto discrimination. The chapter briefly describes the constitutional turns that facilitated the Court’s decision in Parents Involved, including the advent of the intent requirement in equal protection and “colorblindness” doctrine, which treats any use of race as presumptively unconstitutional, regardless of its integrative purpose.

Constitutional law of foreign countries

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marat Baglay
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
The State ◽  
Comprehensive Understanding ◽  
Law Schools ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
The Individual

The fifth, significantly revised edition of the textbook highlights the basic concepts and institutions of foreign constitutional law, reveals its subject, system, sources. The issues of the legal status of the individual, forms of the state, local self-government, etc. are comprehensively analyzed. In the interests of a more in-depth and integral, comprehensive understanding of the state system of the leading countries, the textbook includes chapters on the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Nordic countries, Japan, China, India, the Arab states, the EAEU countries, Uzbekistan. Special chapters contain regional reviews of the main constitutional and legal institutions. For students, postgraduates and teachers of law schools and faculties.

scholarly journals Constitution without a state: The formation of The Kingdom of SCS and "The Vidovdan" Constitution in The constitutional law curriculum in Yugoslavia's successor states

Pravni zapisi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-284
Author(s):  
Srđan Milošević
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
State System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional History ◽  
Law Schools ◽  
National Unity ◽  
History Of ◽  
National Borders ◽  
The Way

"The Vidovdan" Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, rendered on 28 June 1921, one hundred years after its adoption, remains an unavoidable topic and an occasion for discussions about the reasons for the failure of the Yugoslav state. The unitarian-centralist system unanimously criticized today as an inadequate constitutional form for the functioning of a complex community such as Yugoslavia was once legitimized by the concept of national unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The national conception, the type of state system, and the related disagreements are part of both the political and constitutional history of the states that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This paper analyses the content of textbooks of Constitutional Law that are in use at law schools in the successor states, which have existed continuously since the breakup of Yugoslavia until today and are used to educate the vast majority of lawyers in these states. The way in which the shared constitutional history from the first decade of Yugoslavia is presented after the collapse of the socialist paradigm (that mainly was unison) largely follows the national borders of the successor states in terms of its content and interpretation.

scholarly journals The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today

2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 847-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Mills
Keyword(s):  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Legal Education ◽  
Law Schools ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Indigenous Law ◽  
Recent Interest ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
Liberal Constitutionalism ◽  
Intensive Course

What ultimately counts as law and as the legitimate processes of its generation, adjustment, and destruction are both empowered and constrained by the constitutional order from which they derive life. A constitutional framework, in turn, reflects unique understandings about what there is and how one can know: a lifeworld. Reflecting on his own experience, the author emphasizes how legal education harms when it fails to acknowledge and to begin to articulate the lifeworld beneath any system of law it aims to impart. There are serious questions to be taken up in considering whether we may move law between constitutional contexts without subjugating the law of one community to the lifeworld of another. The author asserts this is particularly important with respect to Canadian law schools’ recent interest in teaching Indigenous peoples’ own systems of law. He argues that Canadian (liberal) and Indigenous (what he calls “rooted”) constitutionalisms are not only different, but different in kind. As such, efforts to articulate Indigenous law within the forms of liberal constitutionalism ignore or trivialize the ongoing significance of Indigenous lifeworlds to governance of Indigenous lives today. Many Indigenous legal scholars are adverting to this tension, moving on from simply making space for Indigenous law in the academy to asking whether and how this may be done. The author briefly canvasses Indigenous theorists (students, professors, lawyers, and elders) whose works present Indigenous systems of law within their own lifeworlds. Tracking the lifeworld-law relationship, he proposes three reforms to legal education in Canada: (1) teach that all law is storied; (2) teach that Canadian constitutional law is a species of liberal constitutionalism; (3) require students to enrol in a prerequisite on an Indigenous people’s constitutional order before enrolling in a course on their law. By way of example, he concludes with the syllabus for an intensive course he designed and taught on Anishinaabe constitutionalism.

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