Criminal Law: Mistake of Fact as a Defense: Criminal Intent

1921 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 109
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 254-263
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Ahadi

The present paper constitutes an attempt towards questioning the adequacy of the prevalent approached employed by Islamic jurisprudence and statute law in dealing with mens rea and its manifestations. It also provides a kind of reinterpretation of the concept since it attaches itself to the perspective that the concepts employed in criminal law need evolution in order to preserve their function and practicality; the conditions appertaining thereto necessitating adaptability of the concepts with the contextual conditions as well as the principles of the criminal law. Under criminal law, mens rea is referred to as ‘criminal intent or the state of mind indicating culpability which is required by statute as an element of a crime’ (see, for example, Staples v United States, 511 US 600 (1994)). Under Islamic jurisprudence it is defined as ‘rebellion intent’. These conceptualisations of the mens rea may be subject to evolution as well as the other concepts. The present paper provides a reformulation of these definitions wherein mens rea is considered to be ‘the culpable linkage of mind with the forbidden conduct’. Through this reformulation the author replaces the ‘state’ with ‘linkage’ presupposing that the interpretation of the term ‘culpable’, as an independent constituent, shall vary according to the provisions of common sense and the contextual conditions.


Criminology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Foster

Actus reus is an area of substantive criminal law and is an act by an individual that is deemed to be improper by societal laws. It is one of the elements of a crime and works in connection with mens rea or criminal intent. Illegal or immoral thoughts cannot be legally punished, but once those thoughts are put into action, there is a concurrence between the two elements. There are three types of actus reus, which include a voluntary act, possession, and omission. Within actus reus voluntariness is presumed on the part of the actor. If an accused party wishes to claim an action was involuntary, then an excuse defense would be necessary in criminal court. Possession is also a type of actus reus when an individual is in the possession of or has the possession of an item that is known by the individual to be illegal under the law. As an example, if a person is wearing a jacket that contains a bag of marijuana in the pocket and the person knows that the substance is illegal, then even if the marijuana is not the wearer’s marijuana, the action of possession is fulfilled due to the marijuana being an illegal substance. Omission is the third type of criminal act. Omission is satisfied when a person does not act when that person is required under law to do so. A person would be required to act when there is a contractual obligation to act or a duty to act, such as would be the case of a parent and a child. The parent has a duty to act to protect the child from harm. A defense to possession or omission is possible. Defenses include an alibi or an affirmative defense. A justification defense is one type of an affirmative defense where the accused party claims the action was not criminal given the circumstances of the situation such as duress, etc. An excuse defense is the second type of an affirmative defense in which the accused claims they should not be held accountable for the improper conduct for a reason such as age, intoxication, or insanity. Incomplete offenses, known as inchoate crimes, have their own section within criminal law but are treated similarly to completed offenses.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50
Author(s):  
Shachar Eldar

The article seeks to demonstrate that hypotheticals which depict collective criminality shed light on the contested issue of conceptualizing criminal intent. Since the formulation of the doctrine of transferred malice in the English Common Law, criminal law has been grappling with the question of framing intent as either object-specific or type-oriented. This question is particularly salient where the defendant caused harm to a different object than the one he had in mind, either by accidentally missing the target or as a result of mistaken identification. In such cases, an object-specific conceptualization does not permit conviction for the harm caused, whereas a type-oriented one does, as would the doctrine that transfers the defendant’s intent from the intended person or object to the one actually harmed. Utilizing a methodology of embedding instances of accidental miss-aim and mistaken identification into scenarios that involve multiple accomplices, the article argues that the object-specific conceptualization of intent has the advantage of being most suited for assigning liability to the participants in an offence. The analysis offered also supports equal treatment of accidents and mistaken identification.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malin Thunberg Schunke
Keyword(s):  

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