scholarly journals Public Choice Theory: A New Approach to Institutional Economics

1975 ◽  
Vol 57 (5) ◽  
pp. 844-850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Ostrom
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
New Approach

scholarly journals As abordagens teóricas da competição interjurisdicional e os percalços analíticos da dinâmica federativa: por uma perspectiva totalizante

Nova Economia ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 645-667
Author(s):  
Renato Luis Pinto Miranda ◽  
Heriberto Cairo Carou ◽  
Rosa de la Fuente Fernández
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Public Choice Theory

O presente trabalho se dedica a investigar os pressupostos analíticos utilizados pelas teorias hegemônicas da economia do setor público (a Welfare Economics, a Public Choice Theory e a New Institutional Economics) no estudo da competição interjurisdicional, identificando suas limitações e sugerindo, posteriormente, uma nova forma de concepção desse objeto, mediante sua abordagem histórico-concreta. A dinâmica federativa é concebida por essas teorias hegemônicas como produto de um "jogo", composto de agentes racionais maximizadores, desconsiderando-se a influência exercida pelas macroestruturas sociais na composição dos seus movimentos. Em face disso, propõe-se aqui a abordagem dos contornos assumidos pelo arranjo federativo com base nas contradições expressas na própria materialidade institucional, concebendo-o enquanto fenômeno constitutivamente interdependente à conformação das matrizes espaço-temporais do padrão de acumulação.

Government failure in transition process

1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Milan Žák
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
Special Regard

The paper deals with the problem of government failure in a market economy, with special regard to transition economies. It starts from a wider concept of social forces. It criticizes a narrowed view of transition, typical for transition scenarios, limited only to mainstream economics and not covering the latest contributions of public choice theory and institutional economics. The traditional view of government failure has been further widened with the concept of utilization of political capital.

Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Financial Indicators as Determinants of Mayoral Elections

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-53
Author(s):  
Serena Santis ◽  
Francesca Citro ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros ◽  
Marco Bisogno
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mayoral Elections ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Italian Context

The chapter seeks to contribute to the literature on determinants of local government election by adopting a different perspective focused on the effects of financial indicators on the elections of mayors. Using the agency and the public choice theory, this study implements a model where specific financial indicators—whose selection takes into account the increased autonomy and responsibility of local politicians—have been included to document their effect on mayoral re-election. Focusing on the Italian context, the chapter examines a sample of 129 municipalities during the period 2008-2014, where several elections were held. By using different estimators, findings indicate that the re-election of mayors is affected by the level of indebtedness and the current equilibrium. In addition, current spending is better valued by citizens/voters than capital expenditure, which increases the probability of being re-elected.

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