scholarly journals The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause

1976 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 102 ◽  
Author(s):  
William W. Van Alstyne
Keyword(s):  
1975 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
Margaret G. Gold ◽  
Joseph F. Bruno

In the last several years, there has been a revolution in the field of personnel testing. The revolution is due to the fact that the federal courts have assumed the role of tester of testers in extending a series of challenges to civil service and other personnel examinations. The ramifications of this intervention by the federal courts into personnel testing have been far-reaching. Public and private employers can no longer casually select an examination or other personnel selection device without running the risk that a successful challenge will be made to the list resulting from the test, thereby preventing appointments from being made. The result has clearly been a more careful application of the principles of sound test construction by civil service commissions and personnel departments.


1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Larry Mays ◽  
Michelle Olszta

Prison litigation has been a critical issue for criminal justice and legal scholars, and for correctional practitioners for three decades. It generally is agreed that lawsuits filed by prison inmates and the attention given these suits by the federal courts have served to heighten the debate over the role of prisons in our society. Additionally, from an intergovernmental perspective, much concern has been expressed over the federal courts' role in supervising state prison operations. This article examines a number of legal and social issues that have been raised in prison litigation.


1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-473
Author(s):  
Jack B. Weinstein

This discussion covers some methods and institutions for changing procedures in the courts. More particularly, I refer to procedures for conducting litigations in courts of general jurisdiction, that is to say, civil procedure, criminal procedure and evidence.Since criminal procedure and evidence are controlled here by statutes, I realize that when the terms “rules” or “regulations” are used you would normally think only of civil procedure. I use the term “rules” in a broader sense since in federal courts in the United States, most procedure governing civil and criminal trials and appeals, including evidence, stems from rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, subject to modification by Congress.I shall describe briefly the history and present situation in the United States, making some reference to the British method, touch on the Israeli method, and then draw some general conclusions, raising some questions about the Israeli pattern as I understand it. These countries are comparable since each has a strong, independent judiciary and a tradition of freedom and the rule of law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradford C. Mank

In rare cases, a president refuses to defend a statute based upon a belief that the statute is unconstitutional. The law is unclear whether either House of Congress has Article III standing to defend a statute that the president refuses to defend. In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court in 2013 addressed the onstitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The Obama Administration took the middle position of declining to defend DOMA, but still enforcing it, despite its view that the statute was unconstitutional to assist federal courts in reviewing the constitutionality of the statute. It was unclear whether an appeal was proper in the case once a district court held the statute was unconstitutional, and the Executive Branch essentially agreed with that decision. Applying both prudential standing principles and mandatory Article III standing rules, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, recognized that the Executive Branch was an appropriate party on appeal because it continued to enforce the statute. Additionally, the majority acknowledged that briefs filed by House of Representatives leadership supporting the constitutionality of DOMA supplied the necessary adverseness in the case given the Executive's view that DOMA was unconstitutional. The majority did not fully resolve the thorny issue of Congressional standing in cases where a president refuses to enforce a federal statute. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, emphasized the almost exclusive role of the Executive Branch in defending federal laws under Article II, squarely rejected Congressional standing, and argued that no party had standing to appeal in Windsor because the Executive agreed with the district court's judgment holding Section 3 unconstitutional. By contrast, Justice Alito, in his dissent, would have expressly recognized the authority and standing of the leaders of either House to defend any federal statute that the president does not defend. Yet by acknowledging that Congressional participation could supply the necessary adverseness to litigate a case when the Executive Branch agrees with the challenger that a statute is unconstitutional, the Court's opinion in Windsor likely will pave the way for increased Congressional participation in unusual cases where the Executive Branch believes a statute is unconstitutional, but at least one House of Congress wishes to defend the statute's constitutionality.


2020 ◽  
pp. 231-250
Author(s):  
Chimène I. Keitner

This chapter addresses the contested role of U.S. courts in adjudicating disputes with foreign elements. As a matter of domestic law, the Due Process Clauses in the U.S. Constitution constrain the scope of adjudicatory jurisdiction that legislatures can confer on State and federal courts. The Fourth Restatement restates the U.S. law of personal jurisdiction in civil proceedings as requiring that “sufficient contacts” exist between the defendant and the forum, “and that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable.” These criteria limit the reach of U.S. courts’ personal jurisdiction. The chapter explores these limits and Congress’s ability to extend them. It also revisits the history and jurisprudence of Fifth Amendment due process limits on personal jurisdiction, considering the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA) and the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA).


Congress ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 261-289
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ginsberg ◽  
Kathryn Wagner Hill

This chapter turns to the relationship between the legislative and judiciary branches. It shows that in contemporary America, the judiciary has formed a de facto “union” with the executive and has in some respects helped to diminish the role of Congress in the American governmental system. This was not always the case, however, as the constitutional system of checks and balances assigns Congress a good deal of power over the judiciary. When they created the Constitution's system of separated powers and checks and balances, the framers had regarded the Congress as the branch most likely to seek to expand its power and the judiciary as the “least dangerous branch.” Since then, however, Americans have come to accept the idea that the federal courts can declare acts of Congress to be inconsistent with the Constitution and, therefore, null and void.


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