1947-48 Term of the Supreme Court: Appointment of Counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment

1948 ◽  
Vol 48 (7) ◽  
pp. 1076
2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-213
Author(s):  
Nicholas S. Paliewicz

This essay analyzes how a rhetorical culture emerged in which the Supreme Court of the United States assumed corporations were constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Approaching rhetorical culture from a networked standpoint, I argue that corporate personhood emerged from Southern Pacific Railroad Co.’s networks and alliances with environmental preservationists, politicians, publics, lawyers, judges, and immigrants in the late 19th century. Contributing to literatures on rhetorical culture and agency, this study shows how Southern Pacific Railroad Co., through networks of influence and force, was a rhetorical subject that shaped a networked rhetorical culture that expanded the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the Supreme Court of the United States had not worked out the philosophical underpinnings of corporate personhood. Corporate personhood remains theoretically restrained by legal discourses that reduce subjectivity to a singular, speaking, human subject.


1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-688
Author(s):  
Seba Eldridge

That final legislative authority in this country is lodged in the letter of a constitution that is amended with the greatest difficulty, and with a supreme court which is entirely independent of electoral control has become a commonplace of political discussion.To quote Professor Goodnow: “Acts of congress and of state legislatures are declared to be unconstitutional ‥‥ because they cannot be made to conform to a conception of the organization and powers of government which we have inherited from the eighteenth century;” and Dr. Blaine F. Moore: “If we may judge from the decisions based on the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment and applying to the States, the court has it in its power to make the similar clause in the fifth amendment cover practically all federal legislation dealing with new problems concerning which there are few or no precedents. If the court does make this entirely possible extension of its power, then the legislation dealing with the more recent and pressing questions is under the control of the popularly inaccessible justices of the supreme court.”Both these quotations are from studies published before the adoption of the sixteenth and seventeenth amendments, but they are only a little less true now than then, as an analysis of the history of those amendments will show.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Margolin Cecka

This article explores deficits in the statute, in light of constitutional law, other Virginia adoption and termination of parental rights statutes, and other states' codes and jurisprudence. Part II describes the history and practice of the statute. Part III describes the flaws of the statute, including Fourteenth Amendment violations and inherent conflicts of interest. Part IV calls for the revision of section 1202(H) based on recent precedent in which the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the sanctity of the parent-child relationship and the state's interest in preserving it.


Author(s):  
Nancy Woloch

This chapter assesses Muller v. Oregon (1908), its significance, and the law it upheld: Oregon's ten-hour law of 1903. Convicted of violating Oregon's law of 1903 that barred the employment of women in factories and laundries for more than ten hours a day, Curt Muller—the owner of a Portland laundry—challenged the constitutionality of the law, which he claimed violated his right of freedom to contract under the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 24, 1908, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Oregon law. This decision marked a momentous triumph for progressive reformers and a turning point in the movement for protective laws. At the same time, by declaring woman “in a class by herself,” the Supreme Court embedded in constitutional law an axiom of female difference. The Muller decision thus pushed public policy forward toward modern labor standards and simultaneously distanced it from sexual equality.


Author(s):  
David S. Schwartz

After being buried by the late Marshall and Taney Courts, McCulloch v. Maryland experienced the beginnings of a revival during Reconstruction. McCulloch’s principles of nationalism, implied powers, and the capable Constitution seemed to have triumphed in the Civil War, offering potentially useful guidance in reconstructing the divided nation. A McCulloch revival occurred in Congress, but not, curiously, in the Supreme Court. After initial success, Reconstruction’s great experiment in integrating black citizens into the constitutional order ended with the slowly unfolding tragedy of abandonment of black Americans to their fate at the hands of white supremacist governments in the southern states. The Court in the Civil Rights Cases (1883) contributed to this abandonment when it ignored McCulloch, just as it had done under the Marshall and Taney Courts, by refusing to acknowledge Congress’s implied powers to legislate for racial equality under the Fourteenth Amendment and the other Reconstruction Amendments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Peter Irons

This chapter covers the years of Reconstruction from 1865 until its end in 1877. It discusses adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, President Lincoln’s assassination after praising the amendment’s granting of Black voting rights, adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, granting Blacks the “equal protection of the laws,” and adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869, providing federal enforcement of Black voting rights. Congress also established the Freedmen’s Bureau to assist newly freed Blacks, especially in setting up schools for Black children, although only one-fifth actually attended school. It also discusses the violent White resistance to Black voting, led by hooded nightriders of the Ku Klux Klan, and the massacre on Easter Sunday in 1873 of some two hundred Blacks in Colfax, Louisiana, murdered by Whites after Blacks were elected as sheriff and other officials. Three White men were convicted of participation in the massacre, but the Supreme Court reversed the convictions in United States v. Cruikshank in 1876, opening the door to the end of Reconstruction after the “stolen election” that year ended with Rutherford Hayes as a Republican president who capitulated to southern demands that federal troops withdraw from slave states, paving the way for Black disenfranchisement and restoration of White control.


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