Taxation. Ad Valorem Tax against Lessor Not Commuted by Payment of Lieu Tax by Lessee

1942 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 159
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-85
Author(s):  
William H. Black

ABSTRACT This is a story in two parts. The first describes the timber industry and the ad valorem tax structure in Mississippi during the first several decades of the 20th century. The second introduces Ran Batson, an entrepreneur and lumber mill operator, whose history illustrates the adverse consequences of the Mississippi ad valorem tax as it inspired extensive clear-cutting of forests and resulting devastation. Fortunately, the Mississippi tax structure has subsequently changed to a more favorable approach, and in the last several years of his life, Ran Batson learned the benefits possible from managing his land holdings in a more environmentally sensitive manner.


SERIEs ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 401-418
Author(s):  
Esra Durceylan

Abstract Efficiency comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes has been traditionally based on consumer welfare. However, if the tax instrument also affects the distribution of firms over their productivities, the policy maker may be concerned about the implications on aggregate productivity as well. This paper makes an efficiency comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes by allowing the distribution of firms to respond to changes in policy. First, I make an efficiency comparison in a model with monopolistically competitive firms that are homogenous with respect to their productivity levels. Consumer preferences exhibit love for variety and allow firms to adjust their markups. I find that ad valorem tax is more efficient. Allowing for firm heterogeneity overturns this result at high revenue requirements. As the tax rate increases, ad valorem tax causes excessive exit of firms which makes the market more competitive. Hence, few surviving firms price lower by decreasing their markups. Lower prices decrease the tax revenue collected. As a result under ad valorem tax regime, higher consumer surplus is dominated by lower tax revenue. On the other hand, production is concentrated among relatively more productive firms. Thus, aggregate productivity is higher under ad valorem tax regime.


2009 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
N.M. Hung ◽  
N.V. Quyen

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fenny Ama Pokuaa ◽  
Aba Obrumah Crentsil ◽  
Christian Kwaku Osei ◽  
Felix Ankomah Asante

This working paper predicts the fiscal and public health outcomes from a change in the excise tax structure for cigarettes in Ghana. More than 5,000 people are killed by diseases caused by tobacco every year in Ghana (Tobacco Atlas 2018). Currently the country has a unitary tax administration approach, with a uniform ad valorem tax structure on all excisable products, including tobacco. However, the ECOWAS directive on tobacco control, in line with the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO 2003), recommends a simple tax structure – using a mixed excise system with a minimum specific tax floor to overcome the limitations of an ad valorem system on tobacco products, especially cigarettes. The study therefore simulates mixed tax policy interventions, and assesses their effect on government revenue and public health relative to the current ad valorem tax system. Primary data collection of tobacco prices in three geographical zones of the country was conducted in February 2020, across both rural and urban localities. This was supported with secondary data from national and international databases. Based on the assumption that Ghana adopts a mixed tax structure, the simulation shows that, if the government imposes a specific excise tax of GH₵4.00 (US$0.80) per pack in addition to the current ad valorem rate of 175 per cent of the CIF value, the average retail price of a cigarette pack would increase by 128 per cent, cigarette consumption decrease by 27 per cent, tobacco excise tax revenue increase by 627 per cent, and overall tobacco-related government tax revenue increase by 201 per cent.1 Additionally, there would be significant declines in smoking prevalence (3.3%), smoking intensity (1,448 cigarettes per year), and 3,526 premature smoking-related deaths would be avoided. The paper advocates for a strong tax administration and technical capacity, with continuous commitment by the government to adjust the tax rate in line with the rate of inflation and per capita income growth.


1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey C. Stier ◽  
Daniel E. Moyle ◽  
John C. Bliss ◽  
Dan M. Pubanz

Abstract Wisconsin adopted a new optional yield tax for forestland in 1985. Analysis of a wide range of tax and forest management situations indicates that most landowners could realize substantial tax savings under the Managed Forest Law (MFL), but that the magnitude of the savings depends on the ad valorem tax levy, the specific forest management situation, and the owner's alternative rate of return. The MFL addresses some of the weaknesses of the previous yield tax law and provides landowners greater flexibility in their forest management decisions. North. J. Appl. For. 5:141-144, June 1988.


1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Rathke ◽  
Melvin J. Baughman

Abstract Minnesota currently offers property tax relief to private woodland owners through the 2b timberland class in the state's modified ad valorem tax system, and through the Tree Growth Tax Law (TGTL), a fixed rate, productivity tax. Enrollment in both these laws has dramatically increased in recent years, while the average tax payment has declined in both real and nominal dollars. A mail survey of nonindustrial private forest landowners found that participants in the TGTL generally pay much lower taxes than those in the ad valorem tax classes, and TGTL lands appear to be more intensively managed for timber. However, the TGTL's incentive for timber management may be its criteria for enrollment, not the tax rate. This study makes a strong case for requiring a management plan in order to be eligible for a lower tax rate. North. J. Appl. For. 13(1):30-36.


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