Federal Jurisdiction. Remand by Supreme Court Because State Court Might Reverse Decision. Noncompliance with State Procedural Requirement as "Adequate Non-Federal Ground"

1935 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 941
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Court ◽  
Federal Jurisdiction ◽  
Procedural Requirement

scholarly journals In the Beginning There Was None: Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Prosecutions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin C. Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Structural Relationship ◽  
State Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Court System ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
Federal Jurisdiction ◽  
In The Beginning

This Article challenges the unquestioned assumption of all contemporary scholars of federal jurisdiction that section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized Supreme Court appellate review of state criminal prosecutions. Section 25 has long been thought to be one of the most important provisions of the most important jurisdictional statute enacted by Congress. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave concrete institutional shape to a federal judiciary only incompletely defined by Article III. And section 25 supplied a key piece of the structural relationship between the previously existing state court systems and the new federal court system that Congress constructed with the Act. It provided for Supreme Court appellate review of certain state court decisions denying the federal-law-based rights of certain litigants.

scholarly journals Ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for habeas corpus relief in post-conviction proceedings

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Barbara Zielińska-Rapacz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
The State ◽  
State Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Procedural Requirement

The doctrine of habeas corpus is that no one should be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land. The habeas corpus review is used as a form of inquiry issued to test whether a conviction or restraint is lawful. However, before having a chance to present their case before a federal forum, state prisoners have to fulfill the state’s gatekeeping requirements, such as the exhaustion of all available state remedies, requirements of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and the absence of procedural default. Procedural default arises when the state court declines to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner failed to meet a state procedural requirement. To overcome the procedural default the petitioner has to satisfy the “cause-and-prejudice test.” In many cases the fulfillment of the “cause” element is often based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has to satisfy the test consisting of two prongs: establishing the deficient performance of counsel and demonstrating that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In federal proceedings the rule is to raise the claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in the collateral review. However, the right to a counsel does not extend to collateral attacks upon conviction, including a post-conviction appeal. Moreover, the counsel’s deficient performance does not constitute a basis for a procedural default reversal in the post-conviction claim. The abovementioned assertation may pose a question: what happens when the defendant is eligible to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim only in the collateral proceeding and the counsel representing the defendant in such a proceeding does not raise the claim?The Supreme Court resolved this matter in the decision from the Martinez v. Ryan case. The Court allowed for treating inefficient assistance of post-conviction counsel as a cause that could reverse procedural default. Taking into consideration the amount of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas corpus review, the Martinez v. Ryan case may influence a fair amount of individuals seeking their constitutional rights and give them their last chance to contest unfair conviction.Nieefektywna pomoc obrońcy jako przesłanka wniosku o habeas corpus w postępowaniu po skazaniu Wniosek o habeas corpus jest środkiem, który umożliwia osobie pozbawionej wolności zbadanie przez sąd legalności jej skazania. Przed skorzystaniem z tej możliwości skazany powinien wyczerpać wszelkie możliwe środki służące ponownemu zbadaniu legalności skazania, przysługujące mu na podstawie prawa stanowego. Ponadto wnioskodawca powinien uczynić zadość wszelkim stanowym przepisom proceduralnym. W wypadku niezadośćuczynienia temu obowiązkowi sąd stanowy nie rozpozna wniosku, chyba że wnioskodawca udowodni, iż nie mógł spełnić wymogów proceduralnych z powodów, na które nie miał wpływu. Wnioskodawcy w takiej sytuacji bardzo często powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy. Zasadą jest, iż na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu przed sądem federalnym można powołać się poza postępowaniem głównym obejmującym rozpoznanie sprawy w I i II instancji. Prawo do obrony zagwarantowane w szóstej poprawce do Konstytucji Stanów Zjednoczonych nie rozciąga się jednak na postępowania poza postępowaniem głównym. Skazani nie mogą zatem powołać się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, aby odwrócić stan niezadośćuczynienia obowiązkom proceduralnym wynikającym z prawa stanowego. Taki stan rzeczy budził wiele wątpliwości. W wypadku gdy pełnomocnik wnioskodawcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym nie powoła się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, który reprezentował skazanego w postępowaniu w I lub II instancji, wnioskodawca nie będzie mógł później wnosić o habeas corpus na tejże podstawie, gdyż wymagania proceduralne prawa stanowego nie zostały spełnione.Do tego problemu odniósł się Sąd Najwyższy w orzeczeniu w sprawie Martinez v. Ryan. Sąd dopuścił możliwość powołania się przez wnioskodawcę na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym jako przesłankę niemożności zaspokojenia wymogów proceduralnych postępowania przed sądem stanowym. Biorąc pod uwagę, iż w ponad połowie postępowań związanych z wnioskiem o habeas corpus wnioskodawcy powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońców, orzeczenie to ma ogromny wpływ na doktrynę habeas corpus.

Der Wald im Lichte der neueren bundesgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung | Forest legislation in the recent jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court

2009 ◽  
Vol 160 (9) ◽  
pp. 263-274
Author(s):  
Alois Keel ◽  
Willi Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Large Scope ◽  
Forest Law ◽  
Federal Jurisdiction ◽  
Forest Legislation ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Forest Status ◽  
Area Planning ◽  
Federal Supreme

With the entry into force of the new Swiss Federal Law on Forests on the 1st of January 1993, the basis of decision-making for the Federal Supreme Court concerning forestry issues has, at least formally, fundamentally changed. This article depicts the development of the Federal Supreme Court's jurisdiction during 2000–2008 concerning the legislation on forests. The analysis of about 100 decisions reveals that the federal jurisdiction has, with regard to contents, barely changed in comparison to that of the federal law on supervision of the forest police of 1902. The most frequent causes of dispute are assessments of forest status, authorizations for deforestation, and forest distance regulations. The Federal Supreme Court merely refined the jurisdiction; it did not, or did not need to disclose fundamentally new lines [benchmarks]. It rather adheres to the restrictive definition of forest and the strict conservation of forests, while the cantons do not dispose of a large scope for the deforestation jurisdiction or the definition of the term “forest”. The Federal Supreme Court grants the cantons more freedom to regulate and implement the forest distance. Obvious changes can be observed concerning the number of forest law cases that have been dealt with by the Federal Supreme Court. Compared to the 1980ies and early 1990ies, they have decreased by more than half. Among others, reasons for this decrease are the cantons' obligation to appoint courts only as last cantonal resort, the improvement of the formal and material coordination of the proceedings, and the introduction of the “static forest term” with respect to building zones in the sense of the federal law on area planning.

scholarly journals How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, and Jurisdiction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Preis
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Sovereign Immunity ◽  
History Of ◽  
Federal Jurisdiction ◽  
The U.S

Time and again, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the federal cause of action is "analytically distinct" from rights, remedies, and jurisdiction. Yet, just pages away in the U.S. Reports are other cases in which rights, remedies, and jurisdiction all hinge on the existence of a cause of action. What, then, is the proper relationship between these concepts?The goal of this Article is to articulate that relationship. This Article traces the history of the cause of action from eighteenth-century England to its modem usage in the federal courts. This history demonstrates that the federal cause of action is largely distinct from rights, closely related to (and sometimes synonymous with) remedies, and distinct from jurisdiction except where Congress instructs otherwise or the case implicates sovereign immunity. Sorting out these relationships provides several benefits, including refining the doctrine of prudential standing, clarifying the grounds for federal jurisdiction, and dispelling claims that Congress lacks power over certain causes of action.

Law, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Religion

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek H. Davis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Church And State ◽  
Religion And Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
State Court ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence is typically analyzed based on whether a court’s decision emerges from an Establishment Clause analysis or a Free Exercise Clause analysis. While this method is useful, a more in-depth analysis can be undertaken by identifying various philosophical themes that describe the court’s varied approaches to deciding religion cases. The cases can be analyzed under at least four separate but interrelated themes: separation of church and state, cooperation between sacred and secular activities in religion-based contexts, equal treatment among religions, and the integration of religion and politics. This article examines the High Court’s often controversial decisions affecting religion through the lenses of these four themes. The term “separation of church and state” is frequently used to describe the American relationship between law and religion, but this term is far too simplistic a description of how church and state interact in the American system; the ways in which the system sometimes embraces separation but sometimes does not, are analyzed and explained. Consistent with the misconception that the Supreme Court always seeks to “separate” church and state, court analysts will sometimes describe the court’s strategy as giving “no aid” to religion. This also is a simplistic analysis, since it can clearly be shown that the court does not seek to “wall” off religion from government aid in all cases. Rather, the court tends to sanction state support of “secular” activities that arise in religion contexts while denying state aid to the “sacred” components of religious activity. “Equality” is a hallmark of American democracy. While the Founders did not earmark equality as a goal of the religion clauses, the concept has nevertheless emerged as a byproduct of deeper goals, namely sanctioning religious pluralism and providing equal access to government office. If separation of church and state were really the centerpiece of how religion and state activity interact in the United States, the Supreme Court would not sanction the involvement of religion in public debate and discourse, nor would it permit political candidates and officeholders to freely talk about religion in their personal lives and its role in American political life. But the court carefully crafts a jurisprudence that rarely intrudes on this kind of activity. In sum, looking at Supreme Court religion cases through a number of philosophical lenses is a fruitful guide to understanding court decisions that are otherwise often highly complex and confusing.

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