Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination under Title VII

1968 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 491 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. K.
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sachin S. Pandya ◽  
Marcia McCormick

This paper reviews the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). There, the Court held that by barring employer discrimination against any individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex,” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also bars employment discrimination because an individual is gay or transgender. The paper then speculates about how much Bostock will affect how likely lower court judges will read other “sex” discrimination prohibitions in the U.S. Code in the same way, in part based on a canvass of the text of about 150 of those prohibitions. The paper also discusses the religion-based defenses that defendants may raise in response under Title VII itself, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-81
Author(s):  
Kendall D. Isaac

The recent Supreme Court decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar has brought exposure to a prevalent problem in employment discrimination and retaliation cases: there is great discrepancy in how plaintiffs have to prove and courts have to assess these claims. Depending on whether the case is based on discrimination or retaliation pursuant to the ADA, ADEA, or Title VII, the standard that needs to be met might be that the plaintiff must prove that discrimination was “the” motivating-factor for the adverse employment action or that it was “a” motivating-factor for the action. Adding even greater confusion is the fact that, if an employee argues that they are the victim of discrimination (such as on the basis of national origin) and retaliation, the employee might have to prove that their national origin was “a” motivating-factor in the discrimination case and “the” motivating-factor in the retaliation aspect of the case. If this sounds confusing to scholars and attorneys, imagine how confusing these various standards within one case can be for potential litigants, judges unfamiliar with employment law, and a member of the jury! This Article delves into these muddy waters and attempts to highlight the issues, spotlight the statutes, and ultimately formulate a working motivating-factor standard that can be infused into all of the various employment discrimination statutes and thus result in a consistency in interpretation and application.


2019 ◽  
pp. 285-314
Author(s):  
Hope Brinn

Private litigation is the primary enforcement mechanism for employment discrimination laws like Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and many related state statutes. But the expansion of extrajudicial dispute resolution—including both arbitration and prelitigation settlement agreements—has compromised this means of enforcement. This Note argues that state-enacted qui tam laws can revitalize the enforcement capacity of private litigation and provides a roadmap for enacting such legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-334
Author(s):  
Kelli Rodriguez Currie

This article provides necessary context to adequately engage in a discussion about transgender and nonbinary individuals, including defined terms. It then provides a brief history of Title IX, articulates the requirements for compliance with the statute, and discusses its application to transgender athletes. Next, this article provides an overview of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the recent statutory analysis of its prohibition on employment discrimination because of sex in Bostock v. Clayton County extends that analysis to the statutory language of Title IX, and summarizes the recent interpretation by the Department of Education applying that analysis to Title IX. The article then discusses the implications of the persistent misgendering of transgender nonbinary athletes and argues that only by allowing all athletes to compete as their true gender will the inclusive goals of Title IX be realized. The article concludes that the requirements for Title IX compliance are not inclusive of transgender nonbinary athletes and contradictory to the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex articulated by the statute itself. The article proposes several necessary changes to the language of those requirements for compliance and argues that the Department of Education must make changes in its interpretation toward more inclusive language to truly achieve the goals of Title IX.


Author(s):  
Joni Hersch ◽  
Blair Druhan Bullock

The labor market is governed by a panoply of laws, regulating virtually all aspects of the employment relation, including hiring, firing, information exchange, privacy, workplace safety, work hours, minimum wages, and access to courts for redress of violations of rights. Antidiscrimination laws, especially Title VII, notably prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Court decisions and legislation have led to the extension of protection to a far wider range of classes and types of workplace behavior than Title VII originally covered. The workplace of the early 21st century is very different from the workplace when the major employment discrimination statutes were enacted, as these laws were conceived as regulating an employer–employee relationship in a predominantly white male labor market. Prior emphasis on employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex has been superseded by enhanced attention to sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, and religion. Concerns over the equity or efficiency of the employment-at-will doctrine recede in a workforce in which workers are increasingly categorized as independent contractors who are not covered by most equal employment laws. As the workplace has changed, the scholarship on the law and economics of employment law has been slow to follow.


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