The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative History

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Drinan ◽  
Jennifer I. Huffman
1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 309-327
Author(s):  
Jack E. Call ◽  
Charles Samarkos

In November of 1993, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was signed into law by the President. Its purpose was to overrule a 1990 Supreme Court decision and require government to satisfy a compelling interest test when its laws or actions place a substantial burden on an individual's exercise of personal religious beliefs. This article explores the impact of RFRA on prisons and jails. Since there was a failed effort in Congress to exempt prisons and jails from the strictures of RFRA, there is no question that RFRA applies to these institutions. The article begins by explaining the law on the free exercise of religion prior to RFRA. Then the provisions of RFRA and its legislative history are explored briefly. An assessment is made of the likely effect of RFRA on prisons and jails and its constitutionality. The article concludes with a recommendation for amending RFRA designed to insure that the free exercise rights of inmates are adequately protected, while not unduly hampering the ability of corrections administrators to run their prisons and jails safely and efficiently.


Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier ◽  
Michael Weber

This chapter articulates and defends a “partially subjectivist” way of defining burdens on religious belief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On this view, courts should largely defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on their religious belief. There is only a minor requirement that the plaintiffs have to satisfy, which is to show that the government is doing something that pressures them to act in a way contrary to their beliefs—a relatively easy hurdle to clear. In general, courts are ill-equipped to determine what people’s religious beliefs really are, and this extends to determining when those beliefs are substantially burdened. More strongly, there is a tradition that says evaluating when people’s religious beliefs are burdened is really none of the court’s business. The partially subjectivist view honors these principles.


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