scholarly journals Ascent and fallacy of semantic descent

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
Jelena Pavlicic

A substantial share of recent semantic and epistemological debates is focused on the description and analysis of ways to defend the thesis that changes in truth conditions of knowledge claims enfold on the back of subjective parameters. The broad popularity of this thesis - which runs contrary to the notion that variation in truth value is independent of informal factors - is a result of the belief that it offers a sustainable methodological framework for responding to the skeptic?s doubts. This paper begins by sketching the key points which serve to illustrate the nature of this antiskeptical strategy. Further on, the paper describes three problems the strategy faces, as well as attempts to address them by articulating a meta-linguistical thesis on truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences. The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the project of the meta-linguistical analysis, point to its specifics and flaws, and answer the question of what it achieves.

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-226
Author(s):  
LYDIA SÁNCHEZ ◽  
MANUEL CAMPOS

Puzzles concerning attitude reports are at the origin of traditional theories of content. According to most of these theories, content has to involve some sort of conceptual entities, like senses, which determine reference. Conceptual views, however, have been challenged by direct reference theories and informational perspectives on content. In this paper we lay down the central elements of the more relevant strategies for solving cognitive puzzles. We then argue that the best solution available to those who maintain a view of content as truth conditions is to abandon the idea that content is the only element of mental attitudes that can make a difference as to the truth value of attitude reports. We finally resort to means of recognition of objects as one obvious element that helps explain differences in attitudes.


Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Dinges

ABSTRACTEpistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by advocating the following, somewhat deflationary account of the bank case intuitions: Readers of the bank cases assign different truth-values to the knowledge claims in the bank cases because they interpret these scenarios such that the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between the high and the low standards case. To substantiate this account, I will argue, first, that the bank cases are underspecified even with respect to features that should uncontroversially be relevant for the epistemic position of the subject in question. Second, I will argue that readers of the bank cases will fill in these features differently in the low and the high standards case. In particular, I will argue that there is a variety of reasons to think that the fact that an error-possibility is mentioned in the high standards case will lead readers to assume that this error-possibility is supposed to be likely in the high standards case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 180
Author(s):  
Margaret Kroll ◽  
Amanda Rysling

The semantic and pragmatic contribution of appositives to their containing sentence is a subject of continuing debate. While unidimensional semantic accounts propose that appositives contribute their truth conditions to their containing sentence, multidimensional accounts predict that they do not. In three experiments, we directly compared judgments of the truth of sentences containing appositives and sentences containing conjunctions. Our findings contribute both a method- ological and a theoretical point. First, we show that no conclusions about the truth-conditional contributions of appositives can be drawn from experimental work without further investigation of how participants provide truth value judgments for complex sentences. Second, we show that while appositives appear to contribute truth values to their containing sentences, participants are highly sensitive to task features when they compute the truth value of sentences with appositives and also, crucially, with conjunctions. Specifically, we show that both sentences containing appositives and those containing conjunctions can be judged true even when the appositive or one conjunct is patently false. We conclude that it is unlikely that these results reflect semantic judgments, and suggest that they reflect truth only at the speech-act level.


2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-111
Author(s):  
Lei Ma

Abstract The paper presents a method of truth-graph by truth-tables. On the one hand, the truth-graph constituted by truth value coordinate and circumference displays a more visual representation of the different combinations of truth-values for the simple or complex propositions. Truth-graphs make sure that you don’t miss any of these combinations. On the other hand, they provide a more convenient tool to discern the validity of a complex proposition made up by simple compositions. The algorithm involving in setting up all the truth conditions is proposed to distinguish easily among tautologous, contradictory and consistent expressions. Furthermore, the paper discusses a certain connection between the truth graphs and the symbols for propositional connectives proposed by Stanisław Leśniewski.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 370-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terra L. Lasho ◽  
Mythri Mudireddy ◽  
Christy M. Finke ◽  
Curtis A. Hanson ◽  
Rhett P. Ketterling ◽  
...  

Key Points Mutation patterns in blast phase MPN, including paired sample analysis, point to specific mutations with potential pathogenetic relevance. RUNX1 mutations predict inferior survival in blast phase MPN, independent of specific treatment strategies.


1987 ◽  
Vol 19 (57) ◽  
pp. 3-42
Author(s):  
Christopher Peacocke

In this paper a question is asked about what the relation is between the acceptance conditions of what is believed and the conditions for what is believed to determine the truth value true. By an "acceptance condition" of a given content, it is meant a correct statement of a normative condition concerning that content, and it is argued in support of the conjeture that there is a conception of a content's acceptance conditions on which those acceptance conditions determine its truth conditions. The position towards which the arguments run is summarized as "manifestationism without verificationism" . It is argued for the conjeture first in the case of certain observational contents and next in connection with universally quantified contents.


Vivarium ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 184-213
Author(s):  
Ernesto Perini-Santos

AbstractThe solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ‘propositio est vera quia qualitercumque significat in rebus significatis ita est’, once amended, is a correct way to talk about the truth of a sentence. The second one is that he has a double indexing theory of truth: a sentence is true in a time about a time, and such times should be distinguished in the account of the truth-conditions of sentences. These two claims are connected in an important way: the Aristotelian formula indicates the time about which a sentence is true. Some interpreters of the Buridanian solution to the paradox, following the lead of Herzberger, have missed these points and have been led to postulate truth-values gaps, or surrogates of truth-value gaps, when there is nothing of this sort in his theory. I argue against this tradition of interpretation of Buridan and propose an interpretation of his solution to the Liar.


Author(s):  
Stephen Yablo

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book's main themes. This book makes subject matter an independent factor in meaning, constrained but not determined by truth-conditions. A sentence's meaning is to do with its truth-value in various possible scenarios, and the factors responsible for that truth-value. No new machinery is required to accommodate this. The proposition that S is made up of the scenarios where S is true; S's reasons for, or ways of, being true are just additional propositions. When Frost writes, The world will end in fire or in ice, the truth-conditional meaning of his statement is an undifferentiated set of scenarios. Its “enhanced” meaning is the same set, subdivided into fiery-end worlds and icy-end worlds.


2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (suppl 3) ◽  
pp. 1281-1289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle Lemos Querido ◽  
Marialda Moreira Christoffel ◽  
Viviane Saraiva de Almeida ◽  
Ana Paula Vieira dos Santos Esteves ◽  
Marilda Andrade ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Objective: To describe and discuss the process of developing a flowchart collectively constructed by the health team of a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit for the management of neonatal pain. Method: This is a descriptive and an exploratory study with a qualitative approach that used Problem-Based Learning as a theoretical-methodological framework in the process of developing the assistance flowchart for the management of neonatal pain. Results: Based on this methodology, there was training in service and the discussion of key points of pain management by the health team, which served as input for the construction of the flowchart. Final considerations: The assistance flowchart for pain management, based on scientific evidence, provided means to facilitate the decision-making of the health team regarding the pain of the newborn. It is suggested to use the flowchart frequently to promote the permanent education of the team and identify possible points to be adjusted.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clint G Graves ◽  
Leland G Spencer

Abstract Gaslighting is defined as a dysfunctional communication dynamic in which one interlocutor attempts to destabilize another’s sense of reality. In this article, we advance a model of gaslighting based in an epistemic rhetoric perspective. Our model directs attention to the rhetorics used to justify competing knowledge claims, as opposed to philosophical models that tend to rely on objective truth-value. We probe the discursive manifestations of gaslighting in logocentric, ethotic, or pathemic terms. We then apply our model to explain sexist and racist gaslighting that derives power from normatively instantiated discourses of rape culture and White supremacy. Specifically, our analysis identifies the appeal structures used to legitimate such gaslighting in response to disclosures of sexual violence and testimony about racial injustice.


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