scholarly journals Rousseauist foundations of Schmitt's concept of (total) state

Sociologija ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-236
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Molnar

In this paper the author discusses Carl Schmitt's concept of 'the political' (das Politische), and his constitutional teaching (Verfassungslehre). He is trying to explain that the logic of Schmitt's argument against liberal democracy and in favor of populist democracy follows all the important conclusions made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Social Contract, with only one exception. Schmitt was, namely, reluctant to accept that the social contract ever occurred in any historical society and he believed that it could not be used even as a methodological tool, because it has no meaning in the very foundations of political community. Rousseau's statements on 'general will', 'people', and immediate democracy Schmitt found more attractive for his purposes of designing the model of total state.

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-61
Author(s):  
Petar Jakopec

In this article the author problematizes Rousseau’s Discourse on Political Economy and his conception of government in the political community. Rousseau’s Discourse on Political Economy was chronologically written seven years before his major work The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. Regardless of the fact that the Discourse on Political Economy was published earlier, it left a remarkable trace in Rousseau‘s philosophical opus. In this work, which was published as part of the fifth volume of Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Rousseau indicated his direction in political philosophy. This philosophical and political direction began with the Discourse on Political Economy and culminated in the philosophical and political conception of republicanism, elaborated in detail in The Social Contract. In this article the author uses critical analysis and reconstruction to establish Rousseau‘s fundamental ideas about his political philosophy present in the Discourse on Political Economy, with a focus on observing and studying the role of a sovereign and the public economy in the function of the government by general will within the political community.


Sapere Aude ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 172-183
Author(s):  
José João Neves Barbosa Vicente

A vontade geral é um conceito fundamental no pensamento político de Rousseau; é através desse conceito que Rousseau pensa a comunidade política “legítima”, como descrita em Do contrato social, em que a liberdade de cada indivíduo é protegida e preservada. Arendt, no entanto, não compartilha dessa ideia e considera o conceito de vontade geral como descrito por Rousseau uma ameaça à política; ele a enfraquece e a destrói, uma vez que não permite a manifestação da liberdade através de ação e do debate de opiniões entre iguais. Não se pode admitir e nem aceitar ideias ou práticas políticas que tentam homogeneizar as formas de vida humana, que tentam excluir ou controlar a diversidade de opiniões. Defender a ideia de um povo homogêneo que compartilha de uma vontade geral como descrita em Do contrato social, não significa fortalecer a política, mas sim atentar contra a pluralidade humana que dá sentido à comunidade política. A proposta do presente artigo é discutir o posicionamento crítico de Arendt em relação ao conceito de vontade geral de RousseauPALAVRAS- CHAVE: Vontade geral. Rousseau. Pluralidade humana. Liberdade. Arendt. ABSTRACTThe general will is a fundamental concept in Rousseau's political thinking; It is through this concept that Rousseau thinks the "legitimate" political community, where each individual's freedom is protected and preserved. Arendt, however, does not share this idea and considers the concept of general will as described by Rousseau, a threat to politics; it weakens and destroys it, since it does not allow the manifestation of freedom through action and the debate of opinions between equals. Political ideas and practices that attempt to homogenize human life forms that try to exclude or control diversity of opinion can not be accepted or accepted. Defending the idea of a homogenous people that shares a general will as described in The social contract does not mean to strengthen politics, but to attack the human plurality that gives meaning to the political community. The proposal of this article is to discuss this critical positioning of Arendt in relation to the concept of general will of Rousseau.KEYWORDS: General will. Rousseau. Human plurality. Freedom.Arendt.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 125-133
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Savanović

This paper offers an analysis of an issue related to the social contract theory The issue concerned is disagreement in the form of tacit consent. Namely, if we accept the model of tacit consent, then an issue of costs of this disagreement is raised. These costs cannot be treated in the same way as in the case of express consent. The reason is that, in the case of tacit consent, a person does not have same chances and opportunities as others. This offers a possibility of claiming discrimination, especially if we accept the fact that these costs can be so high so that they deny the possibility of choice. At least in a practical sense and de facto. So, this topic must be understood properly if we want the social contract theory to function well. In this paper, we will try to do that through a logical and semantic analysis of basic terms: tacit consent, disagreement, and costs of contract.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 84
Author(s):  
Kathleen M. Gallagher

<em>This article explores how Rousseau’s gendered rendering of education prepares women for a life of slavery, primarily by holding them captive to the power of vanity. An understanding of the process of enslavement begins with an appreciation of Rousseau’s conceptualization of freedom and the general will in The Social Contract, followed by a discursive analysis of his guidelines for the proper and desired education of men and women in E?mile, including the pivotal role played by vanity in the inculcation of young women. The paper concludes by underscoring how Rousseau’s description of the ideal education for women not only contradicts his definition of what it means to be fully human, it also replaces women’s liberty and morality with vanity, thereby framing a woman’s role and purpose in life in language the political philosopher usually reserved for slavery, a practice Rousseau purportedly found illegitimate and detrimental to society as a whole.</em>


Author(s):  
Neiva Oliveira ◽  
Gomercindo Ghiggi ◽  
Avelino da Rosa Oliveira

O trabalho tem dois eixos articulados entre si: primeiro, apresenta Emílio e Do Contrato Social como obras pedagógicas de Rousseau; em seguida, mostra a utilização que o autor faz dos conceitos experiência, liberdade e vontade geral, enquanto categorias que dão sustentação a esta pedagogia política. Na primeira linha de reflexão, afirma-se que o próprio fato do Contrato Social estar contido no Emílio indica a vontade instrutora do autor de ensinar as regras básicas para que o cidadão insira-se na sociedade. O Contrato Social visa instruir: Rousseau instrui-se através dele, instrui também Emílio e todo cidadão. A questão pedagógica por excelência é a explicitação da natureza do poder político. No segundo eixo temático, afirma-se que há em Rousseau uma intencionalidade educativa onde a relação entre liberdade e autoridade é uma das tensões que ocorre. Da concepção de natureza humana exposta em sua exterioridade, Rousseau extrai o critério de construção do essencial no humano, o que tem valor permanente e substantivo, que é necessário. Nesta perspectiva de formação e educação há um elemento que se destaca, sem o qual o homem perde a dimensão que o distingue: a liberdade, não ilimitada, mas regulada pela necessidade, pela autoridade da vontade geral. Palavras-chave: Rousseau; pedagogia política; liberdade; necessidade; vontade geral Abstract The paper encompasses two paths of argumentation. First, it brings forward both Rousseau’s Emile and The Social Contract as educational works; next, it shows the way the author makes use of concepts such as experience, freedom and general will as categories that provide support to his political pedagogy. In the first argumentative path, it is stated that the very fact that The Social Contract is contained inside Emile indicates the author’s will of teaching the basic rules for a citizen to join society. The Social Contract aims at instructing: through it, Rousseau instructs himself, as well as he instructs Emile, and every citizen. The pedagogical question by excellence is the explanation of the political power. In the second argumentative path, it is stated that there is in Rousseau an educational intentionality in which takes place a tension between freedom and authority. Rousseau brings out from the concept of human nature the criterion for the construction of what is essential in human beings, of what has lasting and substantial worth, of what is necessary. In such a perspective of formation and education, it is freedom that is uplifted, and without it, man loses what makes him different from other beings. But it is not unlimited freedom that distinguishes man; instead, it is freedom ruled by necessity, in other words, by the authority of general will. Keywords: Rousseau; political pedagogy; freedom; necessity; general will


Problemata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 255-271
Author(s):  
Eduarda Santos Silva

Given the union of individuals by a convention, as idealized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The social contract, the political body that is formed will be directed by the general will, which gives unity to the people, considering the person of each associate, their assets and their freedom. Although the general will is the foundation for the maintenance of citizens' political freedom, it is possible to ask whether it will really prevail in all spheres of civil society, if the individuals who deliberate in the exercise of sovereignty are sufficiently informed about what is good common, or if they are led to accept what suits the Legislator, that is, if the general will is not manipulated, corrupted or deceived by this extraordinary figure, considered a guide endowed with superior intelligence to better lead citizens to pass good laws and preserving the common good. We are interested, then, in contrasting the very important issue of the popular participation of individuals in public subjects, highlighted by Rousseau, with the apparent limits that such participation would encounter in a republican state, and its consequences for political freedom.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 155
Author(s):  
Nazri Muslim ◽  
Osman Md Rasip ◽  
Khairul Hamimah Mohammad Jodi ◽  
Abdullah Ibrahim ◽  
Otong Rosadi

In Malaysia, there is no one institution that can outdo the supremacy of the Federal Constitution. Even the three government bodies that refer to the power separation doctrine which is the legislative, judiciary and executive bodies even the Yang di-Pertuan Agong are under this Federal Constitution. The constitution can be divided into two, written and non-written constitution. The written constitution is the form of constitution that is gathered and arranged in one document. The non-written counterpart encompasses all of the constitutional principles not compiled in one document such as the law endorsed by the Parliament and the verdicts of the court such as in the United Kingdom. Other than the constitution, there are certain practices that are thought to be part of the principles of the constitution. This is known as the Constitutional Convention or the customary practice of the Constitution. Constitutional convention is a non-legislative practice and it is similar to the political ethics and not enforced in court. Although it seems trivial, it is important for this practice to be complied with, otherwise it is difficult for the constitution to work successfully as the constitutional convention cannot be brought to court and forced to be obeyed. Thus, the discussion of this article rests on the constitutional convention in terms of the social contract, the appointment of the Prime Minister, the appointment of the country&rsquo;s main positions and collective responsibility.


2017 ◽  
pp. 215
Author(s):  
Nicolás Fleet

ResumenEste artículo desarrolla, en tres pasos, una perspectiva original de la teoría de la dominación de Max Weber. El primer paso establece un vínculo necesario entre las formas típicas de dominación política y los intereses sociales, de modo que toda acción política debe legitimarse ante el interés general. El segundo paso explica las crisis de legitimación como una respuesta a cambios de identidad en la base social de la dominación política, de tal forma que se introduce un concepto dinámico de legitimidad. El tercer paso establece que los valores que habitan en las formas legitimas de dominación política son usados como orientaciones simbólicas por parte de intereses sociales y acciones políticas particulares, de manera que toda forma de legitimación de la autoridad encierra, en sus propias premisas, los argumentos que justifican luchas políticas hacia la modificación de los esquemas de dominación.Palabras clave: legitimidad, dominación, acción política, democratización.Abstract This article develops, in three steps, an orignal perspective of Weber’s legitimacy theory. The first one, establishes a necessary link that exists between the typical forms of legitimate domination and the social interests, in such a way that every political action that purse the realization of its interests has to legitimate itself before the general will. The second explains the legitimation crises as a response to indentity changes at the social base of the political domination and, in so doing, it introduces a dinamic concept of legitimacy. The third step states that the values that dwell in legitimate forms of political domination are used as symbolic orientations by particular social intersts and political actions, in a way that each form of authority legitimation encapsulate, in its own premises, the arguments that justify political struggles aiming toward the modification of the domination schemes.Key words: legitimacy, domination, political action, democratization.


Author(s):  
Zoe Beenstock

As a sociable being that is barred from society, Frankenstein’s monster presents a sustained engagement with social contract theory’s major dilemma of whether individualism can produce sociability. The male creature’s isolation and inner disunity suggest that contract theory displaces men and is unable to concatenate even those members that should be eligible for full citizenship. Shelley focuses on the gender inequality of contract theory through her different creation stories of the creatures’ bodies. In Victor’s decision not to complete the female creature she rejects Wollstonecraft’s revisionist approach to Rousseau, and demonstrates that social contract theory cannot be rewritten to include women. Women are not defined as political subjects but do have independent wills. Therefore, they are potentially resistant to contract and a threat to political control. Contending with Wollstonecraft and Rousseau, and also Coleridge and Godwin, Shelley suggests that intertextual relations produce unpredictable results. The creatures are test cases for the social contract’s respective failures in terms of social cohesion and gender.


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