scholarly journals A first-order conditional probability logic with iterations

2013 ◽  
Vol 93 (107) ◽  
pp. 19-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milos Milosevic ◽  
Zoran Ognjanovic

We investigate a first-order conditional probability logic with equality, which is, up to our knowledge, the first treatise of such logic. The logic, denoted LFPOIC=, allows making statements such as: CP?s(?, ?), and CP?s(?, ?), with the intended meaning that the conditional probability of ? given ? is at least (at most) s. The corresponding syntax, semantic, and axiomatic system are introduced, and Extended completeness theorem is proven.

2007 ◽  
pp. 141-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoran Ognjanovic ◽  
Nebojsa Ikodinovic

We investigate probability logic with the conditional probability operators This logic, denoted LCP, allows making statements such as: P?s?, CP?s(? | ?) CP?0(? | ?) with the intended meaning "the probability of ? is at least s" "the conditional probability of ? given ? is at least s", "the conditional probability of ? given ? at most 0". A possible-world approach is proposed to give semantics to such formulas. Every world of a given set of worlds is equipped with a probability space and conditional probability is derived in the usual way: P(? | ?) = P(?^?)/P(?), P(?) > 0, by the (unconditional) probability measure that is defined on an algebra of subsets of possible worlds. Infinitary axiomatic system for our logic which is sound and complete with respect to the mentioned class of models is given. Decidability of the presented logic is proved.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Milosevic ◽  
Z. Ognjanovic

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (103) ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
José Alfredo Amor

In this paper I deal with first order logic and axiomatic systems. I present the metalogical results that show the property of satisfying Modus Ponens as a necessary and sufficient condition for the extended completeness of the system, and to the Deduction Metatheorem as a necessary and sufficient condition for the extended correctness of the system. Both supposing that the system satisfies the corresponding restricted properties. These results show that the choice of that rule of inference and of that metatheorem, for any particular axiomatic system, are not a matter of personal liking or of practical convenience, but they play a fundamental role for the extended correctness-completeness properties of the axiomatic system. As a matter of fact, they can be considered as structural properties that characterize the fulfilling of the Extended Correctness and Completeness theorem for the axiomatic system.


1981 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-760
Author(s):  
Grażyna Mirkowska

The aim of propositional algorithmic logic is to investigate the properties of program connectives. Complete axiomatic systems for deterministic as well as for nondeterministic interpretations of program variables are presented. They constitute basic sets of tools useful in the practice of proving the properties of program schemes. Propositional theories of data structures, e.g. the arithmetic of natural numbers and stacks, are constructed. This shows that in many aspects PAL is close to first-order algorithmic logic. Tautologies of PAL become tautologies of algorithmic logic after replacing program variables by programs and propositional variables by formulas. Another corollary to the completeness theorem asserts that it is possible to eliminate nondeterministic program variables and replace them by schemes with deterministic atoms.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 722-742 ◽  
Author(s):  
TAPANI HYTTINEN ◽  
GIANLUCA PAOLINI ◽  
JOUKO VÄÄNÄNEN

AbstractA logical approach to Bell’s Inequalities of quantum mechanics has been introduced by Abramsky and Hardy (Abramsky & Hardy, 2012). We point out that the logical Bell’s Inequalities of Abramsky & Hardy (2012) are provable in the probability logic of Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo (Fagin et al., 1990). Since it is now considered empirically established that quantum mechanics violates Bell’s Inequalities, we introduce a modified probability logic, that we call quantum team logic, in which Bell’s Inequalities are not provable, and prove a Completeness theorem for this logic. For this end we generalise the team semantics of dependence logic (Väänänen, 2007) first to probabilistic team semantics, and then to what we call quantum team semantics.


1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter H. Krauss

This paper is a sequel to the joint publication of Scott and Krauss [8] in which the first aspects of a mathematical theory are developed which might be called “First Order Probability Logic”. No attempt will be made to present this additional material in a self-contained form. We will use the same notation and terminology as introduced and explained in Scott and Krauss [8], and we will frequently refer to the theorems stated and proved in the preceding paper.


1963 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. P. Belluce ◽  
C. C. Chang

This paper contains some results concerning the completeness of a first-order system of infinite valued logicThere are under consideration two distinct notions of completeness corresponding to the two notions of validity (see Definition 3) and strong validity (see Definition 4). Both notions of validity, whether based on the unit interval [0, 1] or based on linearly ordered MV-algebras, use the element 1 as the designated truth value. Originally, it was thought by many investigators in the field that one should be able to prove that the set of valid sentences is recursively enumerable. It was first proved by Rutledge in [9] that the set of valid sentences in the monadic first-order infinite valued logic is recursively enumerable.


1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
James H. Schmerl ◽  
Stephen G. Simpson

The purpose of this paper is to study a formal system PA(Q2) of first order Peano arithmetic, PA, augmented by a Ramsey quantifier Q2 which binds two free variables. The intended meaning of Q2xx′φ(x, x′) is that there exists an infinite set X of natural numbers such that φ(a, a′) holds for all a, a′ Є X such that a ≠ a′. Such an X is called a witness set for Q2xx′φ(x, x′). Our results would not be affected by the addition of further Ramsey quantifiers Q3, Q4, …, Here of course the intended meaning of Qkx1 … xkφ(x1,…xk) is that there exists an infinite set X such that φ(a1…, ak) holds for all k-element subsets {a1, … ak} of X.Ramsey quantifiers were first introduced in a general model theoretic setting by Magidor and Malitz [13]. The system PA{Q2), or rather, a system essentially equivalent to it, was first defined and studied by Macintyre [12]. Some of Macintyre's results were obtained independently by Morgenstern [15]. The present paper is essentially self-contained, but all of our results have been directly inspired by those of Macintyre [12].After some preliminaries in §1, we begin in §2 by giving a new completeness proof for PA(Q2). A by-product of our proof is that for every regular uncountable cardinal k, every consistent extension of PA(Q2) has a k-like model in which all classes are definable. (By a class we mean a subset of the universe of the model, every initial segment of which is finite in the sense of the model.)


Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 263
Author(s):  
Yuri N. Lovyagin ◽  
Nikita Yu. Lovyagin

The standard elementary number theory is not a finite axiomatic system due to the presence of the induction axiom scheme. Absence of a finite axiomatic system is not an obstacle for most tasks, but may be considered as imperfect since the induction is strongly associated with the presence of set theory external to the axiomatic system. Also in the case of logic approach to the artificial intelligence problems presence of a finite number of basic axioms and states is important. Axiomatic hyperrational analysis is the axiomatic system of hyperrational number field. The properties of hyperrational numbers and functions allow them to be used to model real numbers and functions of classical elementary mathematical analysis. However hyperrational analysis is based on well-known non-finite hyperarithmetic axiomatics. In the article we present a new finite first-order arithmetic theory designed to be the basis of the axiomatic hyperrational analysis and, as a consequence, mathematical analysis in general as a basis for all mathematical application including AI problems. It is shown that this axiomatics meet the requirements, i.e., it could be used as the basis of an axiomatic hyperrational analysis. The article in effect completes the foundation of axiomatic hyperrational analysis without calling in an arithmetic extension, since in the framework of the presented theory infinite numbers arise without invoking any new constants. The proposed system describes a class of numbers in which infinite numbers exist as natural objects of the theory itself. We also do not appeal to any “enveloping” set theory.


1968 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richmond H. Thomason

In Kripke [8] the first-order intuitionjstic predicate calculus (without identity) is proved semantically complete with respect to a certain model theory, in the sense that every formula of this calculus is shown to be provable if and only if it is valid. Metatheorems of this sort are frequently called weak completeness theorems—the object of the present paper is to extend Kripke's result to obtain a strong completeness theorem for the intuitionistic predicate calculus of first order; i.e., we will show that a formula A of this calculus can be deduced from a set Γ of formulas if and only if Γ implies A. In notes 3 and 5, below, we will indicate how to account for identity, as well. Our proof of the completeness theorem employs techniques adapted from Henkin [6], and makes no use of semantic tableaux; this proof will also yield a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for the modeling.


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