scholarly journals The left, the right and the sequential topology on Boolean algebras

Filomat ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (14) ◽  
pp. 4451-4459
Author(s):  
Milos Kurilic ◽  
Aleksandar Pavlovic

For the algebraic convergence ?s, which generates the well known sequential topology ?s on a complete Boolean algebra B, we have ?s = ?ls ? ?li, where the convergences ?ls and ?li are defined by ?ls(x) = {lim sup x}? and ?li(x) = {lim inf x+}? (generalizing the convergence of sequences on the Alexandrov cube and its dual). We consider the minimal topology Olsi extending the (unique) sequential topologies O?s (left) and O?li (right) generated by the convergences ?ls and ?li and establish a general hierarchy between all these topologies and the corresponding a priori and a posteriori convergences. In addition, we observe some special classes of algebras and, in particular, show that in (?,2)-distributive algebras we have limOlsi = lim?s = ?s, while the equality Olsi = ?s holds in all Maharam algebras. On the other hand, in some collapsing algebras we have a maximal (possible) diversity.

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (13) ◽  
pp. 3389-3395
Author(s):  
Milos Kurilic ◽  
Boris Sobot

The games G2 and G3 are played on a complete Boolean algebra B in ?-many moves. At the beginning White picks a non-zero element p of B and, in the n-th move, White picks a positive pn < p and Black chooses an in ? {0,1}. White wins G2 iff lim inf pin,n = 0 and wins G3 iff W A?[?]? ? n?A pin,n = 0. It is shown that White has a winning strategy in the game G2 iff White has a winning strategy in the cut-and-choose game Gc&c introduced by Jech. Also, White has a winning strategy in the game G3 iff forcing by B produces a subset R of the tree <?2 containing either ??0 or ??1, for each ? ? <?2, and having unsupported intersection with each branch of the tree <?2 belonging to V. On the other hand, if forcing by B produces independent (splitting) reals then White has a winning strategy in the game G3 played on B. It is shown that ? implies the existence of an algebra on which these games are undetermined.


Think ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (31) ◽  
pp. 21-26
Author(s):  
Renée Smith

Philosophers typically distinguish between a priori and a posteriori beliefs, knowledge, justification, and propositions. A belief is a priori if it is derived from reason, and it is a posteriori if it is derived from sense experience. Similarly, we would say that we know a priori that ‘a closed, n-sided figure has n interior angles’ because our knowledge is derived from reason in that we understand the concept of a closed, n-sided figure and thus know the statement is true. On the other hand, we know a posteriori that ‘Americans drive on the right’ because in justifying this belief, we appeal to sense experience; perhaps we have seen for ourselves that Americans drive on the right or we've read about it in a book or seen it in a movie.


2008 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 1433-1457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miloš S. Kurilić ◽  
Boris Šobot

AbstractThe game is played on a complete Boolean algebra , by two players. White and Black, in κ-many moves (where κ is an infinite cardinal). At the beginning White chooses a non-zero element p ∈ . In the α-th move White chooses pα ∈ (0, p) and Black responds choosing iα ∈{0, 1}. White winsthe play iff . where and .The corresponding game theoretic properties of c.B.a.'s are investigated. So, Black has a winning strategy (w.s.) if κ ≥ π() or if contains a κ-closed dense subset. On the other hand, if White has a w.s., then κ ∈ . The existence of w.s. is characterized in a combinatorial way and in terms of forcing. In particular, if 2<κ = κ ∈ Reg and forcing by preserves the regularity of κ, then White has a w.s. iff the power 2κ is collapsed to κ in some extension. It is shown that, under the GCH, for each set S ⊆ Reg there is a c.B.a. such that White (respectively. Black) has a w.s. for each infinite cardinal κ ∈ S (resp. κ ∉ S). Also it is shown consistent that for each κ ∈ Reg there is a c.B.a. on which the game is undetermined.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
JOE MILBURN

Abstract In this article, I respond to Stephen Law's evil god challenge (EGC) to traditional theism. I argue that while there are credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, there are no credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-evil. Because of this, theists have a reason for explaining away the a posteriori evidence against theism. The hypothetical evilist, on the other hand, does not. Thus, while the problem of the good makes it absurd to believe in evilism, the problem of evil does not make it absurd to believe in theism.


Dialogue ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 759-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marceline Morais

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to discuss the transcendental status of Kant's moral philosophy. Despite what is usually thought among scholars, we intend to demonstrate that morality for Kant is not part of transcendental philosophy. We shall at first recall the reasons that have driven Kant to separate morality from the transcendental philosophy. Kant's position seems both firm and clear: morality, although involving a priori concepts such as the moral law, is not a transcendantal knowledge because its major concept, the will, is not pure enough; it refers somehow to experience. On the other hand, after considering the positions of renowned scholars such as Gueroult, Delbos, and Höffe, who claim that Kant's morality became partially or totally transcendantal since the writing of the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, we suggest that Kant had then found the right way to establish on a critical basis a future metaphysics of morals.


GEOgraphia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (14) ◽  
Author(s):  
Márcio Piñon de Oliveira

A utopia do direito à cidade,  no  caso específico do Rio de Janeiro, começa, obrigatoriamente, pela  superação da visão dicotômica favela-cidade. Para isso, é preciso que os moradores da favela possam sentir-se tão cidadãos quanto os que têm moradias fora das favelas. A utopia do direito à cidade tem de levar a favela a própria utopia da cidade. Uma cidade que não se fragmente em oposições asfalto-favela, norte-sul, praia-subúrbio e onde todos tenham direito ao(s) seu(s) centro(s). Oposições que expressam muito mais do que diferenças de  localização e que  se apresentam recheadas de  segregação, estereótipos e  ideologias. Por outro  lado, o direito a cidade, como possibilidade histórica, não pode ser pensado exclusivamente a partir da  favela. Mas as populações  que aí habitam guardam uma contribuição inestimável para  a  construção prática  desse direito. Isso porque,  das  experiências vividas, emergem aprendizados e frutificam esperanças e soluções. Para que a favela seja pólo de um desejo que impulsione a busca do direito a cidade, é necessário que ela  se  pense como  parte da história da própria cidade  e sua transformação  em metrópole.Abstract The right  to the city's  utopy  specifically  in Rio de Janeiro, begins by surpassing  the dichotomy approach between favela and the city. For this purpose, it is necessary, for the favela dwellers, the feeling of citizens as well as those with home outside the favelas. The right to the city's utopy must bring to the favela  the utopy to the city in itself- a non-fragmented city in terms of oppositions like "asphalt"-favela, north-south, beach-suburb and where everybody has right to their center(s). These oppositions express much more the differences of location and present  themselves full of segregation, stereotypes and ideologies. On  the other  hand, the right to  the city, as historical possibility, can not be thought  just from the favela. People that live there have a contribution for a practical construction of this right. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 328-341
Author(s):  
Rifki Ismal ◽  
Nurul Izzati Septiana

Purpose The demand for Saudi Arabian real (SAR) is very high in the pilgrimage (hajj) season while the authority, unfortunately, does not hedge the hajj funds. As such, the hajj funds are potentially exposed to exchange rate risk, which can impact the value of hajj funds and generate extra cost to the pilgrims. The purpose of this paper is to conduct simulations of Islamic hedging for pilgrimage funds to: mitigate and minimize exchange rate risk, identify and recommend the ideal time, amount and tenors of Islamic hedging for hajj funds, estimate cost saving by pursuing Islamic hedging and propose technical and general recommendations for the authority. Design/methodology/approach Forward transaction mechanism is adopted to compute Islamic forward between SAR and Rupiah (Indonesian currency) or IDR. Findings – based on simulations, the paper finds that: the longer the Islamic hedging tenors, the better is the result of Islamic hedging, the decreasing of IDR/USD is the right time to hedge the hajj funds and, on the other hand, the IDR/SAR appreciation is not the right time to hedge the hajj funds. Findings Based on simulations, the paper finds that: the longer the Islamic hedging tenors, the better is the result of Islamic hedging, the decreasing of IDR/USD is the right time to hedge the hajj funds and, on the other hand, the IDR/SAR appreciation is not the right time to hedge the hajj funds. Research limitations/implications The research suggests the authority to (and not to) hedge the hajj fund, depending on economic conditions and market indicators. Even though the assessment is for the Indonesian case, other countries maintaining hajj funds might also learn from this paper. Originality/value To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first paper in Indonesia that attempts to simulate the optimal hedging of hajj funds.


1978 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-208
Author(s):  
Dennis A. Rubini

William of Orange tried to be as absolute as possible. Inroads upon the power of the executive were fiercely resisted: indeed, William succeeded in keeping even the judiciary in a precarious state of independence. To maintain the prerogative and gain the needed supplies from parliament, he relied upon a mixed whig-tory ministry to direct court efforts. Following the Glorious Revolution, the whigs had divided into two principle groups. One faction led by Robert Harley and Paul Foley became the standard-bearers of the broadly based Country party, maintained the “old whig” traditions, did not seek office during William's reign, tried to hold the line on supply, and led the drive to limit the prerogative. The “junto,” “court,” or “new” whigs, on the other hand, were led by ministers who, while in opposition during the Exclusion crisis, held court office, aggressively sought greater offices, and wished to replace monarchy with oligarchy. They soon joined tory courtiers in opposing many of the Country party attempts to place additional restrictions upon the executive. To defend the prerogative and gain passage for bills of supply, William also developed techniques employed by Charles II. By expanding the concept and power of the Court party, he sought to bring together the executive and legislative branches of government through a large cadre of crown office-holders (placemen) who sat, voted, and directed the votes of others on behalf of the government when matters of importance arose in the Commons. So too, William claimed the right to dissolve parliament and call new elections not on a fixed date, as was to become the American practice, but at the time deemed most propitious over first a three-year and then (after 1716) a seven year period.


Open Theology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 430-450
Author(s):  
Kristóf Oltvai

Abstract Karl Barth’s and Jean-Luc Marion’s theories of revelation, though prominent and popular, are often criticized by both theologians and philosophers for effacing the human subject’s epistemic integrity. I argue here that, in fact, both Barth and Marion appeal to revelation in an attempt to respond to a tendency within philosophy to coerce thought. Philosophy, when it claims to be able to access a universal, absolute truth within history, degenerates into ideology. By making conceptually possible some ‚evental’ phenomena that always evade a priori epistemic conditions, Barth’s and Marion’s theories of revelation relativize all philosophical knowledge, rendering any ideological claim to absolute truth impossible. The difference between their two theories, then, lies in how they understand the relationship between philosophy and theology. For Barth, philosophy’s attempts to make itself absolute is a produce of sinful human vanity; its corrective is thus an authentic revealed theology, which Barth articulates in Christian, dogmatic terms. Marion, on the other hand, equipped with Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, highlights one specific kind of philosophizing—metaphysics—as generative of ideology. To counter metaphysics, Marion draws heavily on Barth’s account of revelation but secularizes it, reinterpreting the ‚event’ as the saturated phenomenon. Revelation’s unpredictability is thus preserved within Marion’s philosophy, but is no longer restricted to the appearing of God. Both understandings of revelation achieve the same epistemological result, however. Reality can never be rendered transparent to thought; within history, all truth is provisional. A concept of revelation drawn originally from Christian theology thus, counterintuitively, is what secures philosophy’s right to challenge and critique the pre-given, a hermeneutic freedom I suggest is the meaning of sola scriptura.


Grotiana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-353
Author(s):  
Dire Tladi

Abstract The concept of a Grotian moment remains rather obscure in international law. On the one hand, it can refer simply to an empirical fact which galvanises the ordinary law-making processes, whether treaty-making or State practice, resulting in major shifts in international law. On the other hand, a Grotian moment might be seen as an event so significant that it results in an extraordinary shift in international law without full adherence to the processes for law-making. The former understanding has little legal significance, while the latter, which would be legally significant, would be controversial and without legal basis. Against this background the article discusses the intersections between peremptory norms and Grotian Moments. It does this by looking at the intersection between the two concepts as well as the intersection between Grotian Moments, on the one hand and, on the other hand, particular jus cogens norms. With respect to the former, for example, the article will consider whether the high threshold of peremptory status facilitates and hinders Grotian moments. With respect to the latter, the article will consider particular norms that have been said to have shifted on account of the Grotian moments, namely the right to use of force in self-defence as well humanitarian intervention.


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