scholarly journals The contstructivistic defence of the objectivity of moral standards and natural law that does not require the debate on moral realism

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 653-663
Author(s):  
Slavenko Sljukic
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Social Fact ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Theories Of Justice

The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal?s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author?s disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates? question to Euthyphro: ?Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?? Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can be found in both Hume?s and Kant?s theories. The main point of this stance is that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact (that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On the other hand, Kant?s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume?s in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific moral criterion - a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume?s and Kant?s theories of justice.

From 'Convention' to 'Ethical Life': Hume's Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Modern Natural ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractHume and contemporary Humeans contend that moral sentiments form the sole and sufficient basis of moral judgments. This thesis is criticized by appeal to Hume's theory of justice, which shows that basic principles of justice are required to form and to maintain society, which is indispensable to human life, and that acting according to, or violating, these principles is right, or wrong, regardless of anyone's sentiments, motives or character. Furthermore, Hume's theory of justice shows how the principles of justice are artificial without being arbitrary. In this regard, Hume's theory belongs to the unjustly neglected modern natural law tradition. Some key merits of this strand in Hume's theory are explicated by linking it to Kant's constructivist method of identifying and justifying practical principles (à la O'Neill), and by showing how and why Hegel adopted and further developed Kant's constructivism by re-integrating it with Hume's central natural law concern with our actual social practices.

scholarly journals Universal Moral Standards and the Problem of Cultural Relativism in Hume's ‘A Dialogue’

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik Bohlin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Cultural Relativism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Standards

AbstractAn interpretation and critical re-construction is offered of David Hume's argument on cultural relativism in the essay ‘A Dialogue’ (1751). For any issue of moral disagreement, Hume contends, either one side can be shown right and the other wrong, or imprecision in moral principles leaves room for more than one reasonable view, or the disagreement concerns a morally indifferent aesthetic matter, or it is caused by ‘artificial’ moral sentiments. In each case, relativism is the wrong view. Following an analysis of each disagreement type, and the crucial notion of ‘artificial’ views, it is concluded that Hume's anti-relativist argument is sound.

scholarly journals Justice at Sport Clubs According to the Theory of Utilitarianism and Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-60
Author(s):  
Róbert G. Zimányi ◽  
Gábor Geczi
Keyword(s):  
Quality Factor ◽  
Social Processes ◽  
The Other ◽  
Competitive Sport ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Complex Activity ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Sport Clubs

Abstract Today’s sport clubs are exposed to turbulently changing circumstances to which they must adapt. If we want to talk about quality sport clubs, we have to find the qualitative criterion that justifies them. This must then be accepted by society as well. Such aspects of quality and evaluation may show justice. Only one truth exists. Thus the question is how and by what principles we should interpret it. Justice can play a key role in the operation of sport clubs as a moral element. This justice must not necessarily be linked to equality. The goal of this study is to interpret justice as a quality factor in sport clubs. The other goal of the study is to present some theories of justice related to sport. The study examines Bentham’s utilitarianism, Mill’s higher pleasures, and the ideas of libertarianism concerning justice. The theories of justice in addition to social processes also play a key role in today’s sport clubs. During the interpretations, it is important to distinguish between competitive and non-competitive sport clubs in relation to justice. It also depends on the practical applicability of the theory of justice. The practical application of theories of justices should be thoroughly investigated in the life of sport clubs. Then the sport clubs’ management must decide which theory of justice should be introduced. The key question concerns how to apply it consistently in practice while taking into account the interests of existing and prospective members. Finding the potential qualitative key factors for the sport clubs’ qualification is a complex activity. Besides happiness and justice, many other ancient and presently valued virtues can be relevant qualities and distinctive aspects among sport clubs.

Global Justice in Lutheran Political Theology

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-58
Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Political Theology ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Influential Theory

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.

“Ambiguist” Statesmanship

Worldview ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
pp. 7-8
Author(s):  
Will Herberg
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Actual Situation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Mixed Feelings ◽  
Rational Mind ◽  
The One

John Courtney Murray's writing cannot fail to be profound and instructive, and I have profited greatly from it in the course of the past decade. But I must confess that his article, "Morality and Foreign Policy" (Worldview, May), leaves me in a strange confusion of mixed feelings. On the one hand, I can sympathize with what I might call the historical intention of the natural law philosophy he espouses, which I take to be the effort to establish enduring structures of meaning and value to serve as fixed points of moral decision in the complexities of the actual situation. On the other hand, I am rather put off by the calm assurance he exhibits when he deals with these matters, as though everything were at bottom unequivocally rational and unequivocally accessible to the rational mind. And I am really distressed at what seems to 3ie to be his woefully inadequate appreciation of the position of the "ambiguists," among whom I cannot deny I count myself.

scholarly journals When good art is bad: Educating the critical viewer

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-150
Author(s):  
Laura D’Olimpio
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Oscar Wilde ◽  
Aesthetic Education ◽  
The Other ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Ethical Criticism ◽  
Aesthetic Value ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Educational Implications ◽  
Wayne Booth

There is a debate within philosophy of literature as to whether narrative artworks should be judged morally, for their ethical value, meaning and impact. On one side you have the aesthetes, defenders of aestheticism, who deny the ethical value of an artwork can be taken into consideration when judging the work’s overall aesthetic value. Richard Posner backs artists such as Oscar Wilde who famously wrote, ‘there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all’. On the other side of the debate are proponents of ethical criticism such as Martha Nussbaum, Wayne Booth, Noël Carroll and Mary Devereaux. This article examines the educational implications of each position and ultimately defends the importance of moral education alongside aesthetic education. Given artworks are powerful vehicles for moral sentiments and meaning, it is important that viewers are taught to engage critically with art’s ethical features as well as aesthetic features. In this way, educational concerns pose a challenge to the position of aestheticism.

Individualisation as a social-cultural process and morality

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
Janusz Mariański
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Cultural Process ◽  
Self Development ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Moral Choices ◽  
Individual Human

In this article, the issue of structural individualisation, which is one of the results of social modernisation, is adopted as the subject-matter. In the processes of individualisation, it is, first and foremost, the importance of an individual human being and matters relevant to their life, including the obligation to make constant choices in all the aspects of life, that is placed emphasis upon. In the aspect of values, the process of individualisation means transfer from values seen as responsibilities (related to duties) to values connected with self-fulfilment (self-development). The consequence of individualisation is the significant changes in the realm of morality: departing from traditional moral values and standards, permissivism and moral relativism, the destruction of normativity, and the secularisation of morality. On the other hand, it creates the opportunity to determine one's own moral choices and shapean autonomous moral personality.

Calvin and Equity

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-87
Author(s):  
Alexander Batson
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Training

This chapter argues that the concept of equity plays a crucial role in Calvin’s early writings, especially in the Commentary on Seneca and the 1536 edition of the Institutes. Calvin embraces two distinct yet inseparable meanings of the term ‘equity’. One sense is as an interpretative principle of natural law, and the goal at which all civil law aims. The other sense is an application of the interpretative sense, in which a ruler or judge amends a civil law that is too strict or too general to take into account all the particularities of a certain case. Calvin’s concept of equity displays both his humanist legal training as well as the critical place of natural law in his theology.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

scholarly journals Ethics of identity in the time of big data

First Monday ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Brusseau
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Real World ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Question ◽  
Human Relationships ◽  
The Real ◽  
Ethical Frameworks ◽  
Big Data Technology

Compartmentalizing our distinct personal identities is increasingly difficult in big data reality. Pictures of the person we were on past vacations resurface in employers’ Google searches; LinkedIn which exhibits our income level is increasingly used as a dating web site. Whether on vacation, at work, or seeking romance, our digital selves stream together. One result is that a perennial ethical question about personal identity has spilled out of philosophy departments and into the real world. Ought we possess one, unified identity that coherently integrates the various aspects of our lives, or, incarnate deeply distinct selves suited to different occasions and contexts? At bottom, are we one, or many? The question is not only palpable today, but also urgent because if a decision is not made by us, the forces of big data and surveillance capitalism will make it for us by compelling unity. Speaking in favor of the big data tendency, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg promotes the ethics of an integrated identity, a single version of selfhood maintained across diverse contexts and human relationships. This essay goes in the other direction by sketching two ethical frameworks arranged to defend our compartmentalized identities, which amounts to promoting the dis-integration of our selves. One framework connects with natural law, the other with language, and both aim to create a sense of selfhood that breaks away from its own past, and from the unifying powers of big data technology.

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