scholarly journals Daseinsanalyse and the question of being in the early Heidegger. Destruction of Husserl‘s concept of consciousness as the absolute being in the sense of the absolute givenness

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-630
Author(s):  
Zeljko Radinkovic
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
Essential Connection ◽  
Categorial Intuition ◽  
Radical Transformation ◽  
Phenomenological Principle

The text deals with a certain phase of the Heideggerian way of thinking, which had precedes the emergence of ?Being and Time? (1927). Heidegger?s reception, criticism, and transformation of some of the central concepts of Husserlian phenomenology (intentionality, a priori, categorial intuition) is the focus of the reflections. This article shows how this radical transformation of Husserlian phenomenology goes beyond the formal coincidence of the phenomenological principle ?to the things themselves? and points to the essential connection of the question of being and its phenomenological demetalization.

scholarly journals Justifying Unparticipated Causality in Proclus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
University Of Edinburgh ◽  
Separate Source ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
First Cause ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
The University ◽  
Phd Thesis

Proclus introduces the concept of the unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον) (P1) among two other terms— the participated (P2) and participant (P3)—as the first principle (ἀρχή) of any given series of entities or Forms in his metaphysical structure. For instance, the unparticipated monad (P1), Soul, generates all individual, participated souls (P2), which in turn generate the attribute of life in their respective, participating bodies (P3). Proclus looks at (P2) as an efficient cause of (P3), where (P2) must be the attribute in actuality in relation to the attribute it brings about in (P3). At the outset, this suggests that (P2) is necessary and sufficient for (P3), which then implies a problem for positing (P1): if (P2) is doing the causal legwork for (P3), what role does (P1) play? One of Proclus’ main explanations is that (P1) is responsible for ‘unifying’ the multiple participated entities (P2), so that the commonality of the participated entities (P2) must go back to a separate source (P1). However, one could easily respond that this just amounts to a reversion to a priori Platonist principles for transcendent, separate Forms without providing a real justification for the necessity of (P1) as a cause. In my talk, I wish to elaborate on how Proclus thinks about (P1)’s type of causation in relation to (P2) and (P3), particularly showing why (P2) for Proclus is ultimately insufficient as an efficient cause compared to (P1) as the absolute first cause for a given series.[Early work on a PhD thesis chapter — presentation for the University of Edinburgh, July 16, 2017. Any comments or feedback are welcome!]

Historicity and Christian Life-Experience in the Early Philosophy of Martin Heidegger

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-41
Author(s):  
Anna Jani
Keyword(s):  
Life Experience ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Early Christianity ◽  
Religious Life ◽  
Philosophical Question ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Christian Life ◽  
Historical Phenomenon ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Essential Connection

In his early Freiburg lectures on the phenomenology of religious life, published as his Phenomenology of Religious Life, Heidegger sought to interpret the Christian life in phenomenological terms, while also discussing the question of whether Christianity should be construed as historically defined. Heidegger thus connected the philosophical discussion of religion as a phenomenon with the character of the religious life taken in the context of factical life. According to Heidegger, every philosophical question originates from the latter, which determines such questions pre-theoretically, while the tradition of early Christianity can also only be understood historically in such terms. More specifically, he holds that the historical phenomenon of religious life as it relates to early Christianity, inasmuch as it undergirds our conception of the religious phenomenon per se, reveals the essential connection between factical life and religious life. In this way, the conception of religion that Heidegger establishes through his analyses of Paul’s Epistles takes on both theological and philosophical ramifications. Moreover, the historicity of factical life finds its fulfillment in our comprehension of the primordial form of Christianity as our very own historical a priori, determined by our own factical situation. Hence, historicity and factical life belong together within the situation that makes up the foundation of the religious life.

scholarly journals The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger's phenomenological way.

Phainomenon ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-62
Author(s):  
Irene Borges-Duarte
Keyword(s):  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
Conceptual Evolution

Abstract The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s phenomenological way. Heidegger’s phenomenology of Befindlichkeit and the different kinds of affection was initiated still before Being and Time, and developed in its essential features till the end of the 1930’s. The current paper argues that, since its very origins in a philosophical framework, back to the translation of the affectiones in Augustine, the notion of Befindlichkeit sets the beginning of a structural understanding of existence - displayed both at the ontological levei of Grundstimmungen (such as anguish, boredom or reservedness), and at the ontic level of different factual Stimmungen. Any comprehensive analysis of those affections counts on a tripie background with a Wovor, a Worum and the full-fledged exercise (Vollzug) of such and such affective understanding. In Being and Time this analysis is dedicated to fear, in its different nuances. But this phenomenon was already dealt with in Heidegger’s Lectures on Augustine (1921) and will reoccur in the Beiträge (1936-38). A reading of this conceptual evolution will here ground a defense of the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s way of thinking.

“What Is the Human Being?”

2020 ◽  
pp. 143-171
Author(s):  
Mikko Immanen
Keyword(s):  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Inaugural Address ◽  
Popular Opinion ◽  
The Real ◽  
Fundamental Ontology

This chapter talks about Theodor W. Adorno's inaugural address that scrutinized the dominant philosophical trends from scientifically minded positivism of the Vienna Circle and various schools of neo-Kantianism. It examines Adorno's declaration that it is mandatory to reject the illusion that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real. It also details how Adorno challenged the popular opinion that Martin Heidegger's Being and Time marked the beginning of a new concrete philosophy, declaring that Heidegger too aims at ahistorical truth. The chapter discusses Heidegger's rejection of Hegelianism, neo-Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology and his turn toward a worldly Dasein. It cites Adorno's concession that the critique of his habilitation study by the representatives of fundamental ontology forced him to articulate better the philosophical theory that had guided his study.

scholarly journals From the religious a priori to intending the absolute: Reflections on the methodological principles in Otto and Tillich against the backdrop of their historical problematic

2013 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Danz
Keyword(s):  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Performance Bound ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
A Performance

This contribution examines Rudolf Otto’s and Paul Tillich’s theories of religion against the background of the debates around 1900. Beginning with Wilhelm Windelband’s motifs and Ernst Troeltsch’s philosophies of religion, it is shown that Otto and Tillich alike elaborate on a performance-bound conception of religion from transcendental-philosophical and phenomenological motifs. Tillich, following Edmund Husserl, ultimately resolves the idea of a religious a priori as a concept of religion elaborated in terms of the theory of intentionality.

scholarly journals A simple extension of Fourierʼs integral theorem and some physical applications, in particular to the theory of quanta

1921 ◽  
Vol 99 (701) ◽  
pp. 462-471 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Arbitrary Constant ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Absolute Temperature ◽  
Simple Extension ◽  
Integral Theorem ◽  
Constant Multiplier ◽  
Infinite Integral ◽  
The Mean ◽  
The Absolute

(1) Introductory .—In Poincaré’s proof of the necessity of Planck’s hypothesis of quanta, an essential stage of the argument depends on the use of Fourier’s integral theorem to invert a particular infinite integral. In the form used by Poincaré this theorem may be enunciated thus:— Under suitable conditions, if Φ( α ) = ∫ ∞ 0 e – αη w ( η ) dη , (1) then w ( η ) = 1/2 πi ∫ c Φ( α ) e αη dη , (2) where c is a contour in the complex α-plane on which R( α ) > γ > 0 and I( α ) goes from - i ∞ to + i ∞. Poincaré develops an argument which shows that, if w ( η ) dη is the a priori probability that the energy of a resonating electron lies between η and η + dη , then Φ( α ) is such that - d {log Φ( α )}/ dα is the mean energy of the resonator at an absolute temperature C/ α , where C is a known constant. When the mean energy of the resonator (of frequency v ) is known by experiment as a function of the absolute temperature, then Φ( α ) is known, except for an arbitrary constant multiplier. A direct appeal to formula (2) then shows that in these conditions, and with the same exception, w ( η ) is also known and is, in fact, unique. It follows at once, and this is the object of Poincaré’s work, that the known facts can be accounted for by one, and only one, function, w ( η )—that is, in short, by the hypothesis of quanta.

Voltaire and Metaphysics

Philosophy ◽  
1944 ◽  
Vol 19 (72) ◽  
pp. 19-48
Author(s):  
Ian W. Alexander
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Present Writer ◽  
Special Mode ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Definition Of

It is too often assumed that Voltaire is uninterested in metaphysics and that his whole attitude is inimical to such studies. This assumption is of course largely dependent on the definition of the term metaphysics. To modern minds metaphysics tends to imply knowledge of the absolute obtained by some direct intuition of reality, and to the Bergsonian definition of metaphysics as the science which claims to dispense with symbols the present writer would largely subscribe. Given this modern definition of metaphysics, which is also the Kantian one, as a special mode of knowledge, it is an undoubted fact that Voltaire is not in this sense a metaphysical mind; the appeal to any peculiar or specifically a priori mode of thought was, of course, incompatible with his empiricism.

Provincializing Whiteness

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 16-22
Author(s):  
Priya Kapoor
Keyword(s):  
Faculty Of Color ◽  
Communication Studies ◽  
Absolute Power ◽  
Western Modernity ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
Racial Supremacy

Provincializing whiteness—this deconstructing move lays bare the absolute power of racial supremacy that faculty of color housed in communication studies and other departments have faced in US academia. Yet, acts of racial supremacy reveal how provincial that way of thinking is. There is a plethora of her-his-stories that are better suited to coexistence and tolerance without privileging Western modernity.

scholarly journals Dasein and World: Heidegger’s Reconceiving of the Transcendental After Husserl

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-287
Author(s):  
Niall Keane
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Constitutive Relationship ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Early Analysis ◽  
Constitutive Analysis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The One

AbstractThe following examines Heidegger’s analysis of world and Dasein from a transcendental perspective. It is argued that Heidegger’s reflections on the interconnected themes of world and Dasein reveal the tensions that exist between the transcendental claims before and after Being and Time and the analysis of worldliness. It begins by looking at Heidegger’s early analysis of Husserl’s critique of psychologism and naturalism, assessing what this tells us about Heidegger’s analysis of world and nature. It subsequently addresses Heidegger’s transformation of Husserlian phenomenology, and intentionality in particular, arguing against interpreters who claim Heidegger’s interconnected concepts of Dasein and world are reducible to one another and hence phenomenologically problematic. In order to respond to this reading, the article examines the twin themes of, on the one hand, transcendental constitutive analysis in Heidegger’s work, Dasein as disclosive and ‘world entering’, and, on the other hand, the centrality of the world and the realm of nature as always more than Dasein’s constitutive relationship to it. In order to understand what Heidegger means by worldliness, the article will look at Heidegger’s reflections on nature as the world’s other, which nonetheless needs to be understood on the basis of worldliness.

scholarly journals Zagadnienie ‘’zwrotu” w myśli Heideggera w kontekście dziejowości bycia

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 84-93
Author(s):  
Paweł Murzicz ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Way Of Thinking

The article deals with the issue of turning (Kehre) in the thought of Martin Heidegger. I show that, in Being and time the question of being posed from the perspective of a distinguished being as Dasein has led to the objectification of being, thus rather reproducing instead of overcoming, the so far way of thinking that Heidegger named “metaphysical”. The turning in Heidegger’s thought consists in his effort to make being independent from human being, i.e. he tries to go beyond the transcendental and subjectivist point of view of Dasein by placing historicality of Dasein against the background of the very existence of being. It is not Dasein who designs being, but on the contrary, being designs understanding for Dasein. In this context, I show that the thinking of being postulated by Heidegger takes the form of thinking the very process of historical presencing of the historic types of interpretation of being.

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