scholarly journals 'Spirit' and 'Letter' of the moral law: Text and commentary in the hermeneutics of German idealism II

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-165
Author(s):  
Vladimir Milisavljevic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Moral Norm ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Previous Issue ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Mosaic Law ◽  
Religious Origins ◽  
Final Consequence

The first part of this paper, published in the previous issue of the review was intended to expose the religious origins of the duality between 'Spirit' and 'Letter' as well as its meaning in the general philosophical context of early German idealism. This second and final part of the paper is focused on the ethical implications of this question, since the opposing of the 'Spirit' of Kant's System to its 'Letter', backed by frequent references to the Christian fulfillment of the Mosaic Law through love or faith, represented one of the principal resources of contemporary critiques of his moral philosophy. The final consequence of this line of criticism of Kant lies in the suppression of the authority of a transcendent moral norm. This step which at the same time abolishes the authority of the text, and hence the reverent attitude of the commentary as a literal genre, can be observed as early as in Hegel's theological youth writings, which advocate the suppression of the transcendent moral law by means of its integration in free subjectivity which exists in the community of believing Christians.

scholarly journals The 'spirit' and the 'letter' of the moral law: Text and commentary in the hermeneutics of German idealism, I

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-157
Author(s):  
Vladimir Milisavljevic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Historical Origins

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on different aspects of the hermeneutical problem in post-Kantian philosophical 'constellation'. In this domain, the problem of the relationship between the text and its commentary is theorized in terms of the antithesis between 'Spirit' and 'Letter', which clearly has religious roots. Therefore, the first part of the paper examines the historical origins of this antithesis, as well as its application in philosophical discussions which developed by the end of the 18th century about the problem of finding the 'true' interpretation to Kant's philosophy. The second part of the text, which is to be published in the next issue of this review, brings the duality of spiritual and literal interpretation into closer connection with the topics of Kant's moral philosophy.

Kant's Justification of Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen Ware
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Critical Methodology ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Historical Contextualization ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Moral Normativity ◽  
Moral Requirements

Kant’s arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, leaving Kant’s project of justification exposed to conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this major re-reading of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant’s mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law’s primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant’s arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant’s critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today.

The Un/Acceptability of Virtual Moral Practices

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-76
Author(s):  
Katleen Gabriels
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Second Life ◽  
Computer Ethics ◽  
Research Participants ◽  
Ethical Implications

This article conjoins a foundation in moral philosophy with an empirical study on the un/acceptability of moral practices in ‘Second Life’ (SL). SL-residents were asked to rank morally charged SL-scenarios in a classification from ‘(most) unacceptable’ to ‘(most) acceptable’ and, while doing so, to reason out loud about their ranking. The analysis presented here focuses on their converging and diverging arguments. Regarding converging arguments, there was consensus on the unacceptability of six scenarios. Research participants believed these scenarios transcend the merely virtual and they subsequently grounded their argumentation in actual principles. They further agreed upon seven scenarios as acceptable; these scenarios were considered as typical features of SL and subsequently were not morally problematized. Regarding other scenarios, no consensus was reached. The author discusses these findings in terms of their ethical implications and in light of current approaches in the field of ‘computer ethics’.

scholarly journals Cultivating Virtue: Moral Progress and the Kantian State

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris W. Surprenant
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Political Society ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Apparent Paradox ◽  
Moral Cultivation

After examining the ethical and political writings of Immanuel Kant, one finds an apparent paradox in his philosophy as his perfectionist moral teachings appear to be linked to his anti-perfectionist political theory. Specifically, he writes that the perfection of moral character can only take place for an individual who is inside of civil society, a condition where no laws may legitimately be implemented expressly for the purpose of trying to make individuals moral. Kant believes that living in civil society is a necessary condition for an individual to refine his talents and reason completely, a process required by morality. I believe, however, that the connection between his moral and political theory runs much deeper than simply facilitating the refinement of talents. Kant's moral theory focuses on an individual's cultivation of virtue, but this cultivation cannot be most satisfactorily completed unless that individual is a member of civil society. Put differently, civil society plays a necessary role in cultivating an individual's character so that he is able to act from maxims consistent with the moral law, out of the respect for the law itself. However, because he believes that civic laws primarily intended to encourage moral cultivation cannot be implemented legitimately, it seems curious that this condition should play such a significant role in Kant's moral philosophy. Through this examination of Kant's moral and political theory, it will be shown that Kant's political society establishes a condition necessary for an individual's complete cultivation of virtue, not by implementing laws that make men moral but by weakening the forces of heteronomy, thereby removing barriers to moral action.

scholarly journals The Consumer Ideology and the Truth about Man

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Adrian J. Reimers
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Pope John Paul Ii ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
John Paul Ii ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Philosophical Writings

The formation of the human conscience is a controverted question in both philosophical ethics and moral philosophy. Conscience refers to one’s conception and understanding of the moral good. An especially significant manifestation of the problem of conscience in the 20th and 21st centuries is the impact of ideology on the individual person’s moral sense. This article considers the impact of two 19th century philosophies―Mill’s utilitarianism and Marxism―on contemporary moral thought insofar as the interaction of these two produce a powerful materialist ideology to determine the modern European and American conscience. We then turn to the thought of Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła), who in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor and in his earlier philosophical writings developed an account of moral truth by which the dangers of materialistic ideology can be overcome. It is argued, with John Paul II, that only in the context of truth can a coherent account of freedom of conscience under the moral law be developed.

Kant’s Ethics

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Moral Behavior ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
General Account ◽  
Sources Of Knowledge ◽  
Reason And Faith ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines Immanuel Kant's ethics, and particularly his views on reason and faith. According to Thomas Aquinas, there were two avenues whereby men could come to possess knowledge: the way of reason and the way of faith, of faith in revelation. Unlike Aquinas, Kant entertains not two faculties, but a single faculty in two employments. The chapter considers Kant's motives, and what he advanced as justifications, for treating the sources of knowledge and of moral behavior not as two separate faculties, but as different employments of a single faculty, reason. It offers a general account of Kant's moral philosophy, and more specifically his account of reason and his argument that men are obliged to obey the moral law. It also suggests that the duality of obligation and motivation is present in Kant's ethics and compares Kant's ideas with those of Richard Peters regarding human behavior.

Reflection, Nature, and Moral Law: The Extent of Catharine Cockburn's Lockeanism in her Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay

Hypatia ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Sheridan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Intellectual Independence

This essay examines Catharine Cockburn's moral philosophy as it is developed in her Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. In this work, Cockburn argues that Locke's epistemological principles provide a foundation for the knowledge of natural law. Sheridan suggests that Cockburn's objective in defending Locke's moral epistemology was conditioned by her own prior commitment to a significantly un-Lockean theory of morality. In exploring Cockburn's views on morality in terms of their divergence from Locke's, the author hopes to underscore the extent of Cockburn's intellectual independence and her philosophical creativity.

Interpreting Kant's Theory of Divine Commands

2005 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 128-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Kain
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Theology ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Positive Law ◽  
Autonomy Of Ethics ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
Rule Out

Kant rejected ‘theological morality’, insisting that no one, including God, can be the ‘author’ of the moral law because the moral law is a categorically necessary, non-positive law. Kant was also no religious enthusiast and clearly intended to rule out certain kinds of dependence of ethics on theology. Such considerations make it tempting to suggest that Kant was fully committed to what has been called the ‘autonomy of ethics’ from theology. Yet an observant reader of Kant's corpus is constantly confronted with passages in which Kant discusses philosophical theology, connections between moral philosophy and theology, and even argues that we should ‘recognize all our duties as divine commands’ (KpV, 5: 129).

A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Stark
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Optional Extra

AbstractInspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian moral outlooks: namely, is feeling the correct emotions necessary to virtue or is it an optional extra, which is permitted but not required. I argue that there are good reasons for siding with the Aristotelians: virtuous agents must experience the emotions appropriate to their situations. Moral virtue requires a change of heart.

Autonomy

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Stacey Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Hybrid Combination ◽  
Considerable Debate ◽  
Internal Coherence ◽  
City States

In recent years the concept of autonomy has risen to prominence both in action theory and moral philosophy. The term “autonomy” stems from two Greek roots, autos (“self”) and nomos (“rule”), and originally applied to self-ruling city-states. This term is now more usually applied to self-ruling persons, although precisely what it is for a person to be “self-ruling” is a matter for considerable debate. Yet, while the concept of autonomy has really risen to prominence only since the early 1970s, it has a respectable historical pedigree. The first major philosopher in whose work this concept was prominent was Immanuel Kant, who argued that a person was autonomous only when she acted from the essential nature of her will. Thus, since a person’s desires are not part of this, a person will be autonomous only when she is motivated by impersonal considerations—when she acts out of respect for the moral law. In contrast to Kant’s impersonal account of moral autonomy, most current writers focus on what is required for a person to be autonomous in the sense of directing her own life in accordance with her own desires and values. This approach has primarily focused on what criteria must be met for a person’s desires and values to be her “own” in the sense required for her to be autonomous with respect to them, rather than to be alienated from them or else merely possessing them agentially, as a small child might possess her desires. Various analyses have been offered here, including those that focus on the agent’s endorsement of her desires, those that focus on the historical process by which she came to have them, and those that focus on their internal coherence. More recently, writers have addressed the role that a person’s social environment might play in determining whether or not she is autonomous with respect to her desires. The debate over what is required for a person to be autonomous is accompanied by a debate over how autonomy is to be valued: whether intrinsically, instrumentally, or some hybrid combination of the two. It is, however, generally agreed that autonomy is valuable, and this is reflected in the prominence of this concept in current discussions of moral and political philosophy, ranging from bioethical discussion of the moral basis of informed consent to issues in political liberalism.

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