scholarly journals The monitoring role of nonexecutive directors in Vietnam from a return-volatility perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (224) ◽  
pp. 29-51
Author(s):  
Anh To ◽  
Quoc Tran ◽  
Thi Tran ◽  
Kim Thai ◽  
Thi Ho
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
Alternative Measures

This study examines the relevance of board independence to stock return volatility for a sample of 160 companies listed on the Vietnamese stock market over ten years (2008-2017). After controlling for potential endogeneity, we find that the presence of non-executive directors on the board tends to increase firm risk. The results indicate that non-executive directors do not play a supervisory role under the agency theory. Our findings remain robust when we apply alternative measures of the dependent variable.

scholarly journals The risk management role of nonexecutive directors: from capital expenditure perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tho Anh To ◽  
Yoshihisa Suzuki ◽  
Hong Thu Thi Ho ◽  
Siem Thi Tran ◽  
Tuan Quoc Tran
Keyword(s):  
Stock Return ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Stock Return Volatility

PurposeThis study investigates the impact of board independence on firm risk of Vietnamese listed firms and the moderating effect of capital expenditure on this relationship.Design/methodology/approachThis paper applies fixed effects and dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) models to examine hypothesized associations between the proportion of nonexecutive directors and stock return volatility, as well as the moderating effect of capital expenditure. The robustness tests are implemented by applying alternative measures of overinvestment and firm risk.FindingsThe results show that the presence of nonexecutive directors on board increases firm risk. However, the combination of nonexecutive ratio and capital expenditure ratio has a significant negative impact on firm risk. The result is also confirmed by the difference between the monitoring role of nonexecutive directors in overinvesting and underinvesting firms.Research limitations/implicationsThe results imply that Vietnamese listed firms take stock return volatility into consideration before nominating and appointing nonexecutive directors into their board, especially in overinvesting firms. From another perspective, the shift toward having a majority of nonexecutive directors on boards can play a significant role in pursuing a stable or risky business strategy.Originality/valueThis paper investigates the influences of nonexecutive directors on firm risk in the context of Vietnam.

scholarly journals THE VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION OF MAIN GLOBAL STOCK'S RETURN TO INDONESIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-256
Author(s):  
Linda Karlina Sari ◽  
Noer Azam Achsani ◽  
Bagus Sartono
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Stock Markets ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Symmetric Model ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
Volatility Transmission ◽  
The Impact

Stock return volatility is a very interesting phenomenon because of its impact on global financial markets. For instance, an adverse shocks in one country’s market can be transmitted to other countries’ market through a particular mechanism of transmission, causing the related markets to experience financial instability as well (Liu et al., 1998). This paper aims to determine the best model to describe the volatility of stock returns, to identify asymmetric effect of such volatility, as well as to explore the transmission of stocks return volatilities in seven countries to Indonesia’s stock market over the period 1990-2016, on a daily basis. Modeling of stock return volatility uses symmetric and asymmetric GARCH, while analysis of stock return volatility transmission utilizes Vector Autoregressive system. This study found that the asymmetric model of GARCH, resulted from fitting the right model for all seven stock markets, provides a better estimation in portraying stock return volatility than symmetric model. Moreover, the model can reveal the presence of asymmetric effects on those seven stock markets. Other finding shows that Hong Kong and Singapore markets play dominant roles in influencing volatility return of Indonesia’s stock market. In addition, the degree of interdependence between Indonesia’s and foreign stock market increased substantially after the 2007 global financial crisis, as indicated by a drastic increase of the impact of stock return volatilities in the US and UK market on the volatility of Indonesia’s stock return.

scholarly journals Foreign Ownership and Stock Return Volatility in Vietnam: the Destabilizing Role of Firm Size

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-377
Author(s):  
Anh Tho To ◽  
Yoshihisa Suzuki ◽  
Bao Ngoc Vuong ◽  
Quoc Tuan Tran ◽  
Khoa Do
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Alternative Measure ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
One Year

This study aims to examine the relevance of foreign ownership to stock return volatility in the Vietnam stock market over ten years (2008 - 2017). After applying the fixed effects regressions and the extended instrumental variable regressions with fixed effects, we find that foreign ownership decreases the volatility of stock returns. However, the stabilizing impact of foreign ownership on stock return volatility becomes weaker in large firms since the coeffcient of the interaction term between firm size and foreign ownership turns out to be significantly positive. The estimated results remain robust when we use the future one-year volatility, other than the current one, as an alternative measure of the dependent variable.

scholarly journals Value and risk effects of financial derivatives: Evidence of corporate governance on hedging, speculation and selective hedging strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rubeena Tashfeen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Ceo Age ◽  
Speculative Behavior

<p>This study investigates whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, whether corporate governance influence in firms impacts the association between derivatives and firm value, and whether corporate governance influence affects the association between derivatives and cash flow volatility, stock return volatility and market risk. This study uses two different data samples of publicly traded firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The first sample comprises a panel of 6900 firm year observations and the other consists of a panel of 6234 firm year observations both over the eight-year period from 2004-2011.  With regard to whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, the findings from the empirical results show that corporate governance does influence derivatives and therefore is an important determinant in the firm’s decisions to use derivatives. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined, board size, institutional shareholders, CEO age, CEO bonus, CEO salary, insider shareholders and total CEO compensation show significant association with derivatives.  This study finds that derivative users exhibit higher firm value on account of the corporate governance influence, which is correspondingly largely insignificant for derivative non-users. Further the research indicates that the impact of corporate governance varies according to the different types of risks examined. Generally, the board of directors and CEO governance mechanisms reduce stock return volatility to achieve hedging effectiveness. This supports the view that directors and management take actions to reduce stock return volatility to protect their personal portfolios without having to bear the costs of hedging themselves.  With respect to cash flow volatility, the board of directors and CEO related corporate governance mechanisms largely exhibit increased risk to show evidence of speculative behavior. It supports the perceptions that managers and directors have a strong motivation to show higher earnings to protect jobs and reputation and to enhance compensation.  All the shareholder governance mechanisms encourage risk taking with respect to stock return volatility, without any increase in firm value. This is in line with research findings of market granularity by institutional and other larger block holders to indicate that these investors increase stock price volatilities and play the markets for their own financial gain. Besides they have little interest in diversifying firm risk as they already have well protected portfolios and would not want to incur additional costs of hedging.  The study finds evidence of association between corporate governance and hedging, speculation and selective hedging. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined in the study board diversity consistently shows hedging effectiveness, with accompanying increase in firm value. While board meetings, institutional shareholders, block shareholders, CEO age, CEO base salary and CEO compensation exhibit exclusive speculative behavior. The remaining corporate governance mechanisms: board size, insider shareholding, CEO tenure, CEO bonus and audit committee size, show evidence of selective hedging behavior.  The concurrent hedging and speculative behavior evidenced in this study supports literature in respect of selective hedging by non-financial firms. It also validates the idea that corporate governance delves in risk allocation strategies that have been evidenced by past research. The results remain unchanged, after using alternative measures for firm value and firm risk, and alternative methods of analyses.</p>

scholarly journals Value and risk effects of financial derivatives: Evidence of corporate governance on hedging, speculation and selective hedging strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rubeena Tashfeen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Ceo Age ◽  
Speculative Behavior

<p>This study investigates whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, whether corporate governance influence in firms impacts the association between derivatives and firm value, and whether corporate governance influence affects the association between derivatives and cash flow volatility, stock return volatility and market risk. This study uses two different data samples of publicly traded firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The first sample comprises a panel of 6900 firm year observations and the other consists of a panel of 6234 firm year observations both over the eight-year period from 2004-2011.  With regard to whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and derivatives, the findings from the empirical results show that corporate governance does influence derivatives and therefore is an important determinant in the firm’s decisions to use derivatives. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined, board size, institutional shareholders, CEO age, CEO bonus, CEO salary, insider shareholders and total CEO compensation show significant association with derivatives.  This study finds that derivative users exhibit higher firm value on account of the corporate governance influence, which is correspondingly largely insignificant for derivative non-users. Further the research indicates that the impact of corporate governance varies according to the different types of risks examined. Generally, the board of directors and CEO governance mechanisms reduce stock return volatility to achieve hedging effectiveness. This supports the view that directors and management take actions to reduce stock return volatility to protect their personal portfolios without having to bear the costs of hedging themselves.  With respect to cash flow volatility, the board of directors and CEO related corporate governance mechanisms largely exhibit increased risk to show evidence of speculative behavior. It supports the perceptions that managers and directors have a strong motivation to show higher earnings to protect jobs and reputation and to enhance compensation.  All the shareholder governance mechanisms encourage risk taking with respect to stock return volatility, without any increase in firm value. This is in line with research findings of market granularity by institutional and other larger block holders to indicate that these investors increase stock price volatilities and play the markets for their own financial gain. Besides they have little interest in diversifying firm risk as they already have well protected portfolios and would not want to incur additional costs of hedging.  The study finds evidence of association between corporate governance and hedging, speculation and selective hedging. Of the thirteen corporate governance variables examined in the study board diversity consistently shows hedging effectiveness, with accompanying increase in firm value. While board meetings, institutional shareholders, block shareholders, CEO age, CEO base salary and CEO compensation exhibit exclusive speculative behavior. The remaining corporate governance mechanisms: board size, insider shareholding, CEO tenure, CEO bonus and audit committee size, show evidence of selective hedging behavior.  The concurrent hedging and speculative behavior evidenced in this study supports literature in respect of selective hedging by non-financial firms. It also validates the idea that corporate governance delves in risk allocation strategies that have been evidenced by past research. The results remain unchanged, after using alternative measures for firm value and firm risk, and alternative methods of analyses.</p>

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