scholarly journals Financial and economic approach: Financial & banking sector development pact from the perspective of the euro area European economic policy

2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (163) ◽  
pp. 51-62
Author(s):  
Theodore Theodoropoulos ◽  
Borut Vojinovic

Powerful obstacles to the further integration of repot, bond and equity markets remain the still fragmented securities settlement industry in Europe, which charges much higher fees for cross border transactions than for domestic transactions, and differences in legal systems. This paper describes the main developments in the euro area financial markets before and after the introduction of the single currency. It looks at the evolution of the euro area financial structure in the last few years. Interestingly in various dimensions the financial structure of euro area countries seems to become more diverse over time. We assess the progress towards financial integration in the most important euro-area financial segments, namely money and equity markets, as well as banking. The available data suggest that the unsecured money market strongly integrated with the introduction of the euro, as the single currency and related euro-area-wide large-value payment systems link the different countries well. Also, some progress occurred in the integration of euro-area equity markets, as stock exchanges in a few countries merged to form Euronext and professional asset managers replaced country allocation by sector allocation strategies. Overall, while asset holdings have become more international in the euro area since the introduction of the single currency, securities markets are still much less integrated than in the US. In the area of retail banking the increased homogeneity of interest rates seems to be driven more by macroeconomic convergence than by market integration. In addition we consider a wide range of other determinants, such as foreign debt or net foreign assets, terms of trade, government debt and regulated prices.

1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-319
Author(s):  
A.D. Wilkie

ABSTRACTThis paper forms notes for discussions about the European single currency at the Institute of Actuaries and the Faculty of Actuaries. The author assumes (and hopes) that the single currency will start on time in 1999, with most of the Member States of the European Union included. The key dates are 1 January 1999, when the exchange rates between currencies will become irrevocably locked and become conversion rates, and 2002, when euro notes and coins will be introduced, and the retail banking sector will convert to euros. The advantages of a single currency are potentially very great; the costs are also considerable. Governments of Member States will no longer be able to get a competitive advantage by devaluing their currency, or be able to choose an inflation rate that is different from that of the E.U. as a whole. The key document is the Maastricht Treaty, and the conversion criteria included therein are discussed. The author concludes that, if governments choose to interpret the criteria leniently, all countries, except possibly Greece, will be included in 1999, with Greece joining a year or two later. Some of the practical considerations for actuaries, including life insurance, general insurance, pensions, banking and investment are mentioned. The paper is not comprehensive, and is a personal contribution to stimulate discussion.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Valiante

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the impact of the single currency on the institutional design of the banking union, through evidence on the financial integration process. Design/methodology/approach – Data analysis uses multiple sources of data on key drivers of financial fragmentation. The paper starts from a snapshot the status of financial integration and then identifies the main components of this trend. Findings – Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area between 2010 and 2014 retrenched at a quicker pace than outside the monetary union. Home bias persisted. Under market pressures, governments compete on funding costs by supporting “their” banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feed the risk-aversion loop. This situation intensifies frictions in credit markets, thus hampering the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. Taking stock of developments in the euro area, this paper discusses the theoretical framework of a banking union in a single currency area with decentralised fiscal policy sovereignty. It concludes that, when a crisis looms over, a common fiscal backstop can reduce pressures of financial fragmentation, driven by governments’ moral hazard and banks’ home bias. Research limitations/implications – Additional research is required to deepen the empirical analysis, with econometric modelling, on the links between governments’ implicit guarantees and banks’ home bias. This is an initial data analysis. Originality/value – Under market pressure, governments in a single currency area tend to be overprotective (more than countries with full monetary sovereignty) towards their own banking system and so trigger financial fragmentation (enhancing banks’ home bias). To revert that, a common fiscal backstop is an essential element of the institutional design. The paper shows empirical evidence and theory, as well as it identifies underlying market failures. It links the single currency to the institutional design of a banking union. This important dimension is brought into a coherent framework.


Subject Financial markets turmoil and negative interest rates. Significance Global stocks are down 11.7% year-to-date in dollar terms and the yield on benchmark ten-year US Treasury bonds has hit a low of 1.66%. The turmoil in financial markets since the beginning of this year is partly attributable to investors' waning confidence in the effectiveness of central bank policy, and, in particular, that negative interest rate policies are exacerbating weaknesses in the banking sector. This is reducing the scope for a rally in equity markets, which have been overly reliant on the flow of cheap money from central banks. Impacts The strong yen will pose a severe challenge to the Japanese government's reflationary programme. While stock markets will remain sensitive to monetary policy, investors will perceive central banks as sources of volatility. The European financials sell-off stems from concerns about their earnings and business models, as opposed to a full-blown liquidity crisis.


Author(s):  
Massimo Rostagno ◽  
Carlo Altavilla ◽  
Giacomo Carboni ◽  
Wolfgang Lemke ◽  
Roberto Motto ◽  
...  

That the euro area economy had switched over into the second regime described in Chapter 3 became more evident in the last phase of the crisis. In this chapter, we describe the landscape facing the ECB in 2013 and 2014, with disinflationary demand shocks replacing inflationary cost-push shocks as the dominant force in the economy. With conventional policy unavailable, we outline the series of unconventional policies launched by the European Central Bank (ECB) to avert a multi-year depression and the deflation scenario that would have accompanied it. We chart the evolution from a policy of ‘separation’ to one of ‘combination’, with different policies seen as mutually reinforcing in fighting deflation risks. We illuminate how the ECB responded to key obstacles such as breaking through the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates and implementing liquidity policies in a deleveraging banking sector.


2021 ◽  
pp. 170-180
Author(s):  
Eniko Korcsmaros ◽  
Renata Machova ◽  
Zoltan Seben ◽  
Tibor Zsigmond

The introduction of the euro in Europe is subject to several criteria. In 1979, the European Community created the «European Exchange Rate Mechanism» (ERM). On 16 April, 2003, Slovakia, together with nine other countries, signed the EU Accession Treaty in Athens. These countries promised to adopt the single currency (the euro). It has been 10 years since the introduction of the euro in Slovakia. It stands to highlight factors that have contributed to the economic, innovation development experienced in recent years regarding introducing a single currency. This article aims to briefly introduce the euro area and present each country's accession in historical order. the authors presented the general conditions for introducing the euro and then went on to the events related to the regional innovations governance of Slovakia. Using the data from the statistical site Eurostat, the Pearson correlation coefficient was used to indicate the closeness of relationships between the average values of inflation and government deficit and the average values of inflation and the public debt. The limitations of the research are that Eurostat's values are only indicative and, in the event of a possible accession, EU bodies would certainly use other, more reliable data. Furthermore, the ERM II criterion for joining the euro area cannot be examined due lack of statistics available on the Slovak koruna's value after the introduction. Another limitation is that the EU sometimes makes adjustments to calculating inflation and average nominal long-term interest rates. There is a lack of a significant relationship between the examined variables in the case of Slovakia. Based on the 2018 inflation rate, the introduction would not have been possible, as it was slightly higher (2.5 per cent) than the limit (2.23 per cent). Therefore, the authors assumed that Slovakia had adopted the euro on time, as if it had not done so on 1 January 2009, it would probably have had to wait a few years for the new opportunity. Although their results are only indicative and not decisive without taking ERM II into account, it is possible to do without specific indicators.


1998 ◽  
Vol 37 (4I) ◽  
pp. 125-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohsin S. Khan

The surge of private capital flows to developing countries that occurred in the 1990s has been the most significant phenomenon of the decade for these countries. By the middle of the decade many developing countries in Asia and Latin America were awash with private foreign capital. In contrast to earlier periods when the scarcity of foreign capital dominated economic policy-making in these countries, the issue now for governments was how to manage the largescale capital inflows to generate higher rates ofinvestrnent and growth. While a number of developing countries were able to benefit substantially from the private foreign financing that globalisation made available to them, it also became apparent that capital inflows were not a complete blessing and could even turn out to be a curse. Indeed, in some countries capital inflows led to rapid monetary expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation, fmancial sector difficulties, widening current account deficits, and a rapid build-up of foreign debt. In addition, as the experience of Mexico in 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated, financial integration and globalisation can cut both ways. Private capital flows are volatile and eventually there can be a large reversal of capital because of changes in expected asset returns, investor herding behaviour, and contagion effects. Such reversals can lead to recessions and serious problems for financial systems. This paper examines the characteristics, causes and consequences of capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s. It also highlights the appropriate policy responses for governments facing such inflows, specifically to prevent overheating of the economy, and to limit the vulnerability to reversals of capital flows.


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