scholarly journals Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the resistance movements in Yugoslavia, 1941

Balcanica ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 339-366
Author(s):  
Kosta Nikolic

During the Second World War a brutal and distinctly complex war was fought in Yugoslavia. It was a mixture of an anti-fascist struggle for liberation as well as an ideological, civil, inter-ethnic and religious war, which witnessed a holocaust and genocide against Jews and Serbs. At least a million Yugoslavs died in that war, most of them ethnic Serbs. In their policies towards Yugoslavia, each of the three Allied Powers (the United States of America, the Soviet Union and Great Britain) had their short-term and long-term goals. The short-term goals were victory over the Axis powers. The long-term goals were related to the post-war order in Europe (and the world). The Allies were unanimous about the short-term goals, but differed with respect to long-term goals. The relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were especially sensitive: both countries wanted to use a victory in the war as a means of increasing their political power and influence. Yugoslavia was a useful buffer zone between British and Soviet ambitions, as well as being the territory in which the resistance to the Axis was the strongest. The relations between London and Moscow grew even more complicated when the two local resistance movements clashed over their opposing ideologies: nationalism versus communism. The foremost objective of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was to effect a violent change to the pre-war legal and political order of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

While Hitler’s Germany in the 1930’s has received abundant attention, this chapter begins earlier in the interwar period. Throughout the 1920’s, Europe’s great powers debated how to manage a defeated Germany that had the latent power potential to again become a great power. This chapter traces how Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union addressed this challenge. It argues that all three of these European powers preferred to cooperate with Germany in the short-term rather than paying the high cost of competing with Germany when it had uncertain long-term intentions. This explanation based on time horizons is superior to alternative explanations based on either buckpassing or engagement.


1977 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Alexandroff ◽  
Richard Rosecrance

Rather than a case where deterrence was not tried, 1939 is a case where deterrence failed. As such, it has important implications for deterrence theory. Mutual deterrence must operate on roughly the same time perceptions. Britain felt impelled to deter Germany after Prague, but could offer only a long-term deterrent. Germany's short term appeared so favorable that the long-term uncertainties posed by Britain and France failed to restrain her. The experience of 1939 also underlines the importance of political factors, particularly realignment in mutual deterrence. The Russo-German Pact tipped the balance toward war. In the contemporary setting, calculations of time perspectives between the Soviet Union and the United States are important for mutual deterrence, especially in Europe. Changes in the Sino-Soviet split hold further implications for contemporary deterrence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-31
Author(s):  
Jakub Majkowski

This essay will firstly address the extent of Stalin’s achievements in leading the course for domestic policy of the Soviet Union and its contribution towards maintaining the country’s supremacy in the world, for example the rapid post-war recovery of industry and agriculture, and secondly, the foreign policy including ambiguous relations with Communist governments of countries forming the Eastern Bloc, upkeeping frail alliances and growing antagonism towards western powers, especially the United States of America.   The actions and influence of Stalin’s closest associates in the Communist Party and the effect of Soviet propaganda on the society are also reviewed. This investigation will cover the period from 1945 to 1953. Additionally, other factors such as the impact of post-war worldwide economic situation and attitude of the society of Soviet Union will be discussed.    


1983 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leszek Buszynski

Southeast Asia in United States policy fell from a region of high priority during the Vietnam war to become, after the fall of Indochina, an area of relatively minor interest. For the United States, Southeast Asia evoked memories of misperception, intensified over-commitment, and simplistic assumptions that characterized the American effort to defeat local Vietnamese national communism. Since the formulation of the Nixon doctrine of disengagement in 1969, United States policy towards Southeast Asia has been undergoing a process of long-term readjustment in recognition of the exaggerated significance that the region had assumed in American thinking. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was a major stimulus to this readjustment as it gave the Americans compelling reasons to anticipate a reassertion of Soviet influence in the region. Successive American administrations attempted to place the region in a wider global context to avoid the dangers of extreme reaction to local national communism while developing the flexibility to coordinate a response to the Soviet Union at a global level. The main concern of American policy was to remove the basis for direct United States involvement in the region in a way that would satisfy post-Vietnam war public and congressional opinion and the demands of strategic planners for greater freedom of manoeuvre against the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

This chapter traces the deterioration of Soviet-American relations at the end of World War II and into the beginning of the cold war. While the United States and the Soviet Union found common cause during World War II in defeating Hitler’s Germany, their relationship began to deteriorate as the eventual defeat of Germany became more certain. The chapter emphasizes that it was growing beliefs about malign Soviet intentions, rather than changes in Soviet capabilities, that fuelled the origins of the cold war. In particular, the chapter details crises in Iran, Turkey, and Germany that contributed to U.S. beliefs about long-term Soviet intentions. As uncertainty evaporated, the enmity of the cold war took hold.


1979 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 297-298
Author(s):  
C. T. Bolton

A coordinated campaign of radio, optical, and x-ray observations of the bright x-ray source Cygnus X-1 took place August 7–21, 1977 under sponsorship of Commission 42 of the International Astronomical Union. Radio flux measurements, optical spectra, photometry, and polarimetry were obtained during this period by ten groups from Canada, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The x-ray flux was monitored continuously by the SAS-3 satellite between August 11.0 and 17.0.


Polar Record ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 5 (39) ◽  
pp. 427-436 ◽  

The Three-Power Conference on Aid to Russia between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union opened in Moscow on 29 September 1941. The British and American missions, headed respectively by Lord Beaverbrook and Averill Harriman, travelled in H.M.S. London which left Scapa Flow on 22 September and arrived at Arkhangel'sk five days later.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
Larissa S. Ruban ◽  
Wong Qu

The author shows how the post-war world order was formed and what role the countries that were allies of the anti-Hitler coalition (the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom) played in this process. The development of the Charter and procedures for the activities of the United Nations, which took place at the meeting Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill at the Yalta conference in February 1945 in the Crimea, is discussed in detail. Describing the current situation in the context of globalization, the author leads the discussion of Russian and foreign scientists about the vision of the modern world.


2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID REYNOLDS

This review examines some of the recent British, American, and Russian scholarship on a series of important international transitions that occurred in the years around 1945. One is the shift of global leadership from Great Britain to the United States, in which, it is argued, the decisive moment was the fall of France in 1940. Another transition is the emergence of a wartime alliance between Britain and America, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, followed by its disintegration into the Cold War. Here the opening of Soviet sources during the 1990s has provided new evidence, though not clear answers. To understand both of these transitions, however, it is necessary to move beyond diplomacy and strategy to look at the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of the Second World War. In particular, recent studies of American and Soviet soldiers during and after the conflict re-open the debate about Cold War ideology from the bottom up.


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