scholarly journals Earnings management practices in the banking industry: The role of bank regulation and supervision

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Ceccobelli ◽  
Alessandro Giosi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Bank Regulation ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
Bank Regulation And Supervision

scholarly journals Does banking oversight make financial statements more reliable? An analysis through countries which are part of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 36-51
Author(s):  
Giacomo Ceccobelli ◽  
Alessandro Giosi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Capital Management ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
Bank Regulation And Supervision

The purpose of this research is to investigate earnings management purposes in the banking industry via loan loss provisions using a sample of 156 banks from 19 European countries under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) over the period 2006-2016. Using regression analysis, banks are tested for income smoothing, capital management, and signaling purposes. This study contributes to the literature exploring the relationship between accounting quality and earnings management objectives by analyzing which one of the latter is the more important determinant. The hypotheses of income smoothing and signaling are strongly approved since loan loss provisions consist as a tool for smoothing the amount of net profit and to convey private information to the market; on the contrary, the capital management purpose is not supported. Additionally, the analysis finds that non-discretionary components of loan loss provisions (essentially non-performing loans) have played an important role, especially during the financial crisis. Furthermore, the research is aimed at investigating the peculiar regulatory and supervisory environment in the banking industry on the basis of a set of indexes included in the “Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey”, carried out by the World Bank. Unlike previous literature, this study takes into account the latest release of the survey, emphasizes the role of an on-site inspection as the main supervisory tool and extends the analysis of the interaction between bank regulation and supervision and earnings management. The results demonstrate that such controls can influence the behaviour of bank managers in terms of income smoothing and signaling practices. Therefore they can be considered as effective instruments for reducing banks’ management accounting discretion, making financial statements more reliable.

Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

scholarly journals Surplus Free Cash Flow, Stock Market Segmentations and Earnings Management: The Moderating Role of Independent Audit Committee

2020 ◽  
pp. 097215092093406
Author(s):  
Ahmad A. Toumeh ◽  
Sofri Yahya ◽  
Azlan Amran
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
The Body ◽  
Moderating Role ◽  
Independent Audit

Management engages in earnings manipulation for different reasons. This article argues that low-growth firms with high free cash flow will opt for income-increasing earnings management in order to obscure the low profits derived from their investments in negative net present value (NPV) projects. On the other hand, we argue that the listed companies might be interested in being listed in the first market due to its privileges and to preserve the competitiveness, through managing their earnings upwardly, so that they can satisfy the condition of achieving a particular earnings limit. This article should advance the body of earnings management literature in the Jordanian context by examining the effect of the moderating role of an independent audit committee (IAC) in the association between surplus free cash flow (SFCF) and income-increasing discretionary accruals (DAC). Further, this is the initial empirical attempt to investigate the moderation effect of IAC between stock market segmentations (SMS) and positive DAC. The results of this current study offer original and beneficial information for the Jordanian government and other countries with a similar institutional environment because the study promotes the application of applying IAC as an efficient tool to constrain management behaviour towards manipulation of the accruals. On top of that, this research offers information concerning the prevailing situation of earnings management practices and corporate governance in Jordan, in which shareholders, local and international investors, policymakers, regulators and academic researchers are interested. Finally, panel data analyses and various statistical techniques are employed to derive conclusions.

scholarly journals Bank regulation and systemic risk: cross country evidence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Chen ◽  
Hui Li ◽  
Frank Hong Liu ◽  
Yue Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Bank Regulation ◽  
Activity Restriction ◽  
Instrumental Variable Analysis ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
Marginal Expected Shortfall ◽  
Bank Regulation And Supervision ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Impact

AbstractUsing data for banks from 65 countries for the period 2001–2013, we investigate the impact of bank regulation and supervision on individual banks’ systemic risk. Our cross-country empirical findings show that bank activity restriction, initial capital stringency and prompt corrective action are all positively related to systemic risk, measured by Marginal Expected Shortfall. We use the staggered timing of the implementation of Basel II regulation across countries as an exogenous event and use latitude for instrumental variable analysis to alleviate the endogeneity concern. Our results also hold for various robustness tests. We further find that the level of equity banks can alleviate such effect, while bank size is likely to enhance the effect, supporting our conjecture that the impact of bank regulation and supervision on systemic risk is through bank’s capital shortfall. Our results do not argue against bank regulation, but rather focus on the design and implementation of regulation.

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