scholarly journals Corporate governance and firm valuation – the case of China

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ohannes George Paskelian ◽  
Stephen Bell
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
High Government ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings ◽  
Strong Inverse Relationship

We examine the determinants and implications of Chinese corporate cash holdings in the 1993- 2006 period. Agency theories assert that firms with a large controlling shareholder have relatively large cash holdings because of the greater ability of the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits from the cash holdings. Our findings show a very strong inverse relationship between cash holdings and firm valuation in high government ownership firms. Also, we find that in firms with high government ownership, dividend payouts are highly valued. We conclude that Chinese investors see government ownership as a factor that reduces firm value. They prefer relatively higher dividends from firms having high government ownership. Conversely, investors assign much higher value to firms with relatively low government ownership and they tend to be neutral about the dividends payouts of such firms. Also, investors value highly the presence of foreign investors in Chinese firms and tend to be neutral about dividend payouts of firms with high foreign ownership concentration.

Corporate cash holdings and their implications on firm value in family and founder firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Lau ◽  
Joern H. Block
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Interaction Effect ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Positive Interaction ◽  
Superior Knowledge ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings

This research investigates whether the presence of controlling founders and families has significant impact on the level of cash holdings, and their implications on firm value. The agency cost of cash holdings in founder firms is arguably less severe than family firms, due to founders’ economic incentives, strong psychological commitment and superior knowledge, whereas family firms are exposed to adverse selection and moral hazard as a result of altruism. Results indicate that founder firms hold a significantly higher level of cash holdings than family firms. In addition, there is a positive interaction effect between founder management and cash holdings on firm value, suggesting the presence of founders as managers helps to mitigate the agency costs of cash holdings.

scholarly journals Family Control And The Value Of Cash Holdings

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Imen Derouiche ◽  
Majdi Hassen
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Firm Resources ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Excess Cash ◽  
Cash Reserves ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings

The present study investigates the effects of family control on the value of corporate cash holdings. Using a large sample of French listed firms, the results show that the value of excess cash reserves is lower in family firms than in other firms, reflecting investors concern about the potential misuse of cash by controlling families. We also find that the value of excess cash is lower when controlling families are involved in management and when they maintain a grip on control, indicating that investors do not expect the efficient use of cash in these firms. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the extent to which excess cash contributes to firm value is lower when dominant shareholders are likely to expropriate firm resources. Overall, family control seems to be a key determinant of cash valuation when ownership is concentrated.

Firm Value, Corporate Cash Holdings and Financial Constraint: A Study from a Developing Market

2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Lien Hoa Nguyen ◽  
Le Ngan Trang Nguyen ◽  
Thi Phuong Vy Le
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Financial Constraint ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings

Family control, agency conflicts, corporate cash holdings and firm value

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruchi Moolchandani ◽  
Sujata Kar
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Indian Family ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Cash Reserves ◽  
Corporate Cash Holdings

PurposeThis paper examines whether family control exerts any influence on corporate cash holdings in Indian listed firms. It also examines how this accumulated cash of family firms impacts firm value.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses dynamic panel data regression estimated using two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) on S&P BSE 500 firms during 2009–2018 for testing the repercussions of family control on the cash levels of a firm. Further, fixed effects regression has been employed for the valuation analysis.FindingsEstimation results showed that family control negatively impacts cash holdings in Indian firms. Further, the cash accumulation by family firms adversely affects the market valuation of the firm. These findings signal a principal–principal (P-P) agency conflict in Indian family firms, i.e. friction between family owners and minority shareholders' interests. Minority shareholders fear that a part of the cash reserves will be used by family members for personal benefits. Thus, they discount cash reserves in family firms.Originality/valueThe study adds to the determinants of corporate cash holdings in emerging markets. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study from India investigating family control as a determinant of cash policy. It sheds light on the P-P agency conflict in Indian family firms. P-P agency conflict is less researched in cash holdings literature as opposed to the principal–agent managerial disputes. Also, the study uses a more comprehensive definition of family control rather than just considering the ownership as used in prior cash holding research.

scholarly journals Firm valuation, performance and origin of controlling shareholder in Brazil

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Bruno ◽  
Andre Carvalhal
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Significant Relation ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Lower Valuation

This study analyzes if the origin of the controlling shareholder influences firm value and performance in Brazil. Although there is a vast literature on this topic, the results vary significantly and, in some cases, are even inconclusive. Our analysis of 407 Brazilian companies from 2002 to 2009 provide evidence that firms controlled by families and government have lower valuation. There is no significant relation between origin of control and firm performance.

The Effect of Underreaction and Overreaction of Firm Stocks to Firm Valuation: Data from the Indonesian Stock Exchange

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yohanes Indrayono
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Finance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Intangible Assets ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Investor Sentiment ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Good News ◽  
Industrial Sectors ◽  
Tangible Assets ◽  
Firm Profitability

<p>This study contributes to the on-going studies on behavioral finance by providing a case study on underreaction and overreaction of firm stocks to firm valuation. We use the Model of Investor Sentiment (Barberis et al., 2005) to evaluate underreaction and overreaction behavior and reflect on specific findings in the Indonesian market. The result of the study is most of the stocks in the Indonesian Stock Exchange are more overreaction to the news of firm financial statements. Firms on the industry with more intangible assets measure more overreaction than firms on industries with more tangible assets. For stocks with overreaction, the stock firm value is positively affected by a change in the total assets and profitability, but not by change of book value. The result concretized no evidence that firm stocks overreacted to the news more than underreacting. In stock industrial sectors, the financial institutions and wholesale industry stocks demonstrated remarkable overreactions. Nonetheless, automotive, building construction, food and beverage as well as cement evidenced more underreaction. For better return in financial markets, investors may buy stocks of the firm on industry with more tangible assets when there is no good news about the increasing firm profitability and sales; nonetheless, they should buy stocks of the firm on industry with more intangible assets when there is no lousy news about the increasing firm profitability and sales. </p>

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