scholarly journals Underpricing and corporate governance-Evidence from Taiwan securities market

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tzong-Huei Lin

To enhance the corporate governance of listed firms, Taiwan prescribes that the initial public offerings (IPOs) after February 19, 2002, have to set up at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor who posses financial or accounting expertise. The corporate governance reform of Taiwan offers an opportunity to investigate the effect of corporate governance on IPOs market. Using data from Taiwan’s initial public offerings (IPOs), this study documents evidence that the magnitudes of under-pricings of IPOs after 2002 are significantly smaller than those of before. This shows that the corporate governance can reduce the investors’ uncertainty about the IPOs. The empirical evidence also indicates that the percentage of shares holdings owned by directors/supervisors is demonstrated to have negative relationship with the underpricing of the IPOs. This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, as Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest that future progress in the IPO underpricing literature will mainly come from agency conflict explanation, this study provides evidence about the effect of corporate governance on IPOs market. Second, as for the issue about the policy implication of the SFB 2002’ rules, this study provides the empirical evidence. Third, whether the government should prescribe the firms to set up independent directors? This study offers a direction for future discussion.

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Angelo O. Burdeos

Prior studies examined the effect of corporate governance variables on discretionary current accrual, the most widely used measurement of earnings management. The principal-agent conflict implies that the size of the board, the percent of independent directors, CEO duality, and auditor prestige limit discretionary current accruals (DCA). This paper extends past studies by examining the effect of ownership structure on discretionary current accruals. The study determines the level of income-increasing earnings management of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Philippines and the factors that explain it. Particularly, the paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and largest shareholder ownership on discretionary current accruals. The study uses a final sample of 105 IPO firms in Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) from 2008 to 2018. Employing the modified Jones’s (1991) model to measure discretionary current accrual and multiple regression analysis, the study finds -4.19% discretionary current accrual on the average. It also reveals that the 2002 Philippine Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) is ineffective in curbing earnings management. In addition, there is an insignificant relationship between the size of the board, CEO duality, ownership concentration, largest shareholder ownership and auditor prestige, and earnings management. Furthermore, the paper finds a significant relationship between the percent of independent directors, industry sector, return on assets (ROA) and cash flow from operations and earnings management.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-930
Author(s):  
Norliza Che Yahya ◽  
Ruzita Abdul Rahim

This article examines the moderating effect of information asymmetry on the relationship between parameters of lockup provision and flipping activity of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs). While the main purpose of lockup provision is to promote commitment of major shareholders for the well-being of the IPO issuing companies at least throughout the lockup period, its role could also extend as a signalling device. Information asymmetry is prevalent in the context of IPOs because information on the issuing firms is normally very limited that the evaluation of the firms’ true value becomes difficult. This study postulates that the lockup provision has a greater influence on flipping activity in higher information asymmetry companies than in lower ones. Using data from 370 Malaysian IPOs issued from January 2000 to December 2012, the results of the multiple regression analyses show that both lockup ratio and lockup period have significantly negative impacts on flipping activities. Since lockup period is uniformly longer (1 year) prior to the 2008 Equity Guidelines revision, the results imply that investors have a greater tendency to flip during the post-2008 revision period when major shareholders are perceived to be less strongly accounted for their firms’ performance. The results also show that information asymmetry moderates the negative relationship between lockup provision and flipping activity, specifically, in regard to lockup period.


2007 ◽  
Vol 46 (4II) ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Muhammad Faisal Rizwan ◽  
Safi-Ullah Khan

The private sector had its major share in the economic development of the country in the early years of its independence in the 1950s. However, the private sector suffered a set back in the early 1970s, when a huge process of nationalisation of a large number of private industrial units was undertaken by the then government. Over the decades these enterprises were not professionally managed and the political influences in the management and running of these enterprises played havoc with them and consequently the experiment proved to be a failure. Attending to the weaknesses and inefficiencies inherent in the public sector enterprises, privatisation was systematically initiated by the then government in the early 1990s. Various privatisation commissions were set up in subsequent years and the privatisation process got some momentum during the present government and many large and profitable firms were privatised in the last few years, particularly at a time when the overall climate in the country was responsive and conducive for investment. The government, however, privatised many enterprises through public offerings on individual-case basis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
SMRK Samarakoon ◽  
KLW Perera

The short-run price performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) indicates that the prices are often underpriced which is widely documented as a universal phenomenon. Corporate governance refers to the set of systems, principles and processes by which a company is governed. Establishing good corporate governance system in an IPO company makes good decisions which attract more outside investors. Therefore, this study examines whether there is any impact of corporate governance practices on short-run price performance of Sri Lankan IPOs. Study examined 44 fixed price IPOs which were listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) during the period of 2003 – January to 2015- December. The study found that Sri Lankan IPOs underprice by 30% on AR, which is statistically significant at 5% level. Further, it found that block holder ownership (ownership concentration), CEO duality and existence of the non-executive directors in the board are positively related to the short-run underpricing, which are statistically significant at 5%. But, the board size has a significant negative impact on underpricing. These relationships are in line with the international literature which confirms that the corporate governance practices have significant impact on short-run price performance of IPOs in Sri Lanka. These findings also support the agency and signaling theories.


2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 352-362
Author(s):  
Lalith P. Samarakoon ◽  
Palani-Rajan Kadapakkam

We study the relation between initial IPO underpricing and two-tier board structure in the Vienna Stock Exchange of Austria, where a two-tier board is mandatory for listed companies. The board ratio, defined as the size of the supervisory board to the management board, is used to capture the effect of two-tiered board on underpricing. The results show that the board ratio is negatively related with underpricing, consistent with the agency theory which predicts that more effective monitoring implied in a relatively larger supervisory board will lead to lower agency costs, and thus lower underpricing. The results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and suggest that firms seeking to raise external capital will be helped by adopting strong corporate governance standards.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 1542-1562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Price ◽  
Charles Harvey ◽  
Mairi Maclean ◽  
David Campbell

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to answer two main research questions. First, the authors ask the degree to which the UK corporate governance code has changed in response to both systemic perturbations and the subsequent enquiries established to recommend solutions to perceived shortcomings. Second, the authors ask how the solutions proposed in these landmark governance texts might be explained.Design/methodology/approachThe authors take a critical discourse approach to develop and apply a discourse model of corporate governance reform. The authors draw together data on popular, corporate-political and technocratic discourses on corporate governance in the UK and analyse these data using content analysis and the historical discourse approach.FindingsThe UK corporate governance code has changed little despite periodic crises and the enquiries set up to investigate and make recommendation. Institutional stasis, the authors find, is the product of discourse capture and control by elite corporate actors aided by political allies who inhabit the same elite habitus. Review group members draw intertextually on prior technocratic discourse to create new canonical texts that bear the hallmarks of their predecessors. Light touch regulation by corporate insiders thus remains the UK approach.Originality/valueThis is one of the first applications of critical discourse analysis in the accounting literature and the first to have conducted a discursive analysis of corporate governance reports in the UK. The authors present an original model of discourse transitions to explain how systemic challenges are dissipated.


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