scholarly journals Controlling shareholders and corporate valuation in Brazil

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-141
Author(s):  
Ricardo P. C. Leal ◽  
Andre Carvalhal da Silva
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Valuation ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure, valuation and performance of Brazilian companies. The results show that large shareholders keep control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights. The evidence also indicates that non-voting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. There is some evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration, and that foreign-owned firms perform the best while government-owned firms perform the worst.

scholarly journals Ownership, control, valuation and performance of Brazilian corporations

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 300-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Luiz Carvalhal da Silva ◽  
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Control Structure ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Indirect Control ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This paper analyzes the ownership and control structure of Brazilian companies and the effect of cash flow and voting rights on firm valuation and performance. Ownership is quite concentrated in Brazil with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that non-voting shares and indirect control structures are largely used to concentrate control with reduced overall investment in the company. Our results support the hypothesis that firm valuation and performance are positively related to cash flow concentration, and negatively related to voting concentration and to the separation of voting from cash flow rights. Moreover, firm valuation and performance are relatively higher for firms with controlling shareholders when compared to firms without controlling shareholders.

scholarly journals Corporate ownership and control: New evidence from Taiwan

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yin-Hua Yeh
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Management Participation ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Recent empirical literature on corporate governance has demonstrated that companies’ shares are generally concentrated in the hands of particular families or wealthy investors. Claessens et al. (2002) analyzed the ownership structure in East Asian eight countries, but misestimated the Taiwanese condition that made them not find the positive incentive or negative entrenchment effects in Taiwan. This study tries to clear the ultimate control in Taiwan, use the detailed data to better understand the ownership structure in Taiwan and investigates the determinants for deviation of control from cash flow rights. Based on the findings, the companies’ shares are common concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder. We find that the deviation of control from cash flow rights is greater in the family-controlled companies than other type companies. Also the controlling shareholders use more pyramids and cross shareholding to increase their control rights that accompanies with deeply management participation. On the average, the controlling shareholders hold more than half board seats and usually occupy the chairman and general manger to enhance their control power in family-controlled companies. No matter in all sample or family-controlled companies, the controlling shareholders owns significantly less cash flow rights, occupy more board seats in deviation group companies than those without deviation. Corporate valuation is significantly lower in the companies with the divergence of control from cash flow rights than non-deviation companies.

The Effect of Large Controlling Shareholder’s Presence and Board of Directors on Firm Value

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 180
Author(s):  
Aymen Jebri
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Positive Effect

This study investigates the effect of large controlling shareholder’s presence and board of directors on firm value.The empirical results, based on a unique database of French firms, show a positive effect of cash-flow rights held by the largest controlling shareholders suggesting that an increase in cash-flow ownership makes the controlling shareholder’s interest more closely aligned with other shareholders and incited to create value.Our results also reveal that the wedge between voting and cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders have a negative effect on firm value.Finally, our empirical evidence shows a positive but not significant effect of the board structure on firm value. In fact, efficient boards should have a majority of independent directors able to monitor and advice managers since the more directors are independent the more they are likely to provide a valuable contribution to firm valuation. However, if a board appoints busy directors, controlling and advisory capabilities on managers’ decisions will be limited since there is no sufficient time. We should therefore expect to see resource diversion and decreased firm value.

scholarly journals The Effects Of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders On Debt Maturity Structure

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Su ◽  
Peng Li
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Debt Maturity ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Debt Maturity Structure ◽  
Maturity Structure ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Agency Costs Of Debt

Using a balanced panel data of 915 Chinese listed firms, this paper studies the effect of ultimate controlling shareholders on debt maturity structure by adopting random effect model. Our results show: the larger the ultimate controlling shareholders cash flow rights, the higher the cost of expropriating outside investors by ultimate controlling shareholder, and can reduce the agency costs of debt financing, so banks are willing to provide more long term debt funds for the firms. Ultimate controlling shareholders cash flow rights are positively related to debt maturity structure. The larger the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders control rights and cash flow rights, the more likely of ultimate controlling shareholder to expropriate outside investors, and this increase the agency conflicts between firms and creditor, which leading to higher agency costs of debt financing, so banks tend to provide more short term funds for firms to constrain the ultimate controlling shareholder. The divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders controlling rights and cash flow rights are negatively related to debt maturity structure.

scholarly journals IMPACT CASH FLOW RIGHT LEVERAGE OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER ON PERFORMANCE IN INDONESIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
I Putu Sugiartha Sanjaya
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Financial Service Authority ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of cash flow rights leverage of controlling shareholder on performance. The ownership of common stock has some rights such as control rights and cash flow rights. Control rights are the rights of common shareholders to elect board of directors and other company’s policies, such as the issuence of securities, stock split and substansial changes in company’s operation (Du and Dai, 2005). Cash flow rights are the financial claims of shareholders on the companies (La Porta et al., 1999). Case in Indonesia, commonly there are differences between control rights and cash flow rights. It  is called cash flow right leverage. The large leverage indicates the large agency conflict between controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholders. The low leverage indicates the low agency conflict. It will impact on performance. If the control rights are greater than cash flow rights, it indicates the larger agency problem. It indicates that the power of the controlling shareholder in the company is larger than claim to the firm. It is incentive for a controlling shareholder to expropriate non-controlling shareholders through utilizing assets of company for his/her private benefit. This study uses the sample of the manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the period 2001-2007. Performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA). The results of this study show that the cash flow right leverage of controlling shareholder has negative impacts on performance. It means the large agency conflict (cash flow right leverage) between controlling and non-controlling shareholders reduce performance. The results of this study can give contribution for Indonesia Financial Service Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK)) to monitor public companies in Indonesia. This institution more focus for companies which has large cash flow right leverage. Because, it indicates the large agency problem between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.

scholarly journals Evolution of ownership and control in Italian IPO firms

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Rigamonti
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This article examines the evolution of ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights of firms that went public in Italy over the period 1985-2005. At the IPO, the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one. Even 10 years after the flotation, the initial ultimate shareholder retains the majority of voting rights. Though control is valuable, original owners do not systematically set up structures that dissociate cash flow from voting rights.

scholarly journals Impact of Mode of Payment and Insider Ownership on Target and Acquirer's Announcement Returns in India

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bikram Jit Singh Mann ◽  
Reena Kohli
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Group Company ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Acquisition Period ◽  
Tunnelling Effect ◽  
Maximum Value ◽  
Announcement Returns ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

This paper examines the effect of mode of financing employed in mergers and acquisitions on the announcement period returns of the acquiring and the target companies' shareholders in India. The study is divided into two sections. The first section analyses the announcement returns of both the acquiring as well as the target companies� shareholders with the help of market model. It has been found that maximum value has been created for the shareholders of the target companies engaged in cash offers followed by the shareholders of acquiring companies engaged in cash offers, target companies engaged in stock offers, and lastly, for acquiring companies engaged in stock offers. However, in contrast to the results of prior research, the study shows that the within-group stock offers have created positive wealth for acquiring companies� shareholders that have generally lost value in stock offers. To discern the probable reasons for the positive value being created in within-group stock offers especially for the acquiring companies� shareholders, the second section analyses the interaction between the announcement returns of the acquiring and the target companies engaged in stock offers and insiders'/promoters' ownership level. This is so because the review of literature highlights two views regarding value creation in within-group stock offers. One view relates to the tunnelling effect whereas the other relates to the value added effect. The tunnelling effect states that within group acquisitions by the acquiring companies with controlling shareholders are aimed at shifting the resources from one group company where the acquiring company has lower cash flow rights to another group company where it has higher cash flow rights or to itself for maximizing the benefits of the controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. The value added view states that within-group acquisitions by the acquiring companies with controlling shareholders are aimed at creating various financial and economic synergies by pooling the resources of both the companies in the post- acquisition period. The analysis reveals that the within-group stock offers have created value with increase in level of ownership with maximum value being created when controlling shareholders' ownership reaches the highest level (the category OWN> 49%). Likewise, not only acquiring companies' but the target companies' shareholders have gained positive returns. It means the stock market has reacted positively to the news of stock offers when these are undertaken by companies belonging to the same group as well as when the ownership is concentrated in the hands of promoters. Thus, we deduce that in India, within-group stock offers are not aimed at tunnelling of resources by the acquiring companies; rather these are aimed at creating value by providing an internal market where the group companies can pool their resources and hence can create various kinds of synergies in the post-acquisition period. Hence, the results are in consonance with the value added view. Thus, in the world of information asymmetry, the mode of financing along with ownership structures are the signals through which the stock market assesses the value creating potential of an acquisition.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and performance: Empirical evidence from Chilean firms

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisca Silva ◽  
Nicolás Majluf ◽  
Ricardo D. Paredes
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Business Group ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Year 2000 ◽  
Majority Shareholder

This paper analyses the effect of ownership structure (represented by the concentration of the economic rights of the majority shareholder, and the affiliation to a business group) on performance. From a crosssection of publicly traded Chilean firms in the year 2000, we find evidence that the effects on performance depend on ownership concentration in a non-linear way, showing the changing balance of two opposing economic forces: value creation and value expropriation by the controlling shareholder. For the entire sample, the mere fact that a firm is owned by a business group does not affect performance

Ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from the subprime crisis period

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamduh M. Hanafi ◽  
Bowo Setiyono ◽  
I Putu Sugiartha Sanjaya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Subprime Crisis ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

Purpose This paper aims to compare the effect of ownership on firm performances in the 1997 and 2008 financial crises. More specifically, it investigates the effect of cash flow rights, control rights and cash flow rights leverage on firm performance. Two conditions motivated the study. First, the 2008 financial crisis happened quickly, so it was endogenous for firms. This setting is ideal to deal with endogeneity problems in a study that involves ownership and performance. Second, during the 2000s, awareness and implementation of corporate governance increased significantly. The authors believe that the markets learn these changes and incorporate them into prices, as suggested by an efficient market hypothesis. Design/methodology/approach The paper investigates and compares the effect of ownership structure on firm performance in the 2008 subprime crisis period to that in the 1997 financial crisis. Both crises happen unexpectedly, so the authors can expect that the crises are exogenous to firms. The authors use cash flow rights, control rights and cash flow right leverage for the ownership structure dimension. They also study time-series data to investigate the effect of ownership on a firm’s value. Findings The study finds that cash flow right and cash flow right leverage did not affect stock performance during the subprime crisis of 2008. It also finds that cash flow right leverage and cash flow right affected stock performance during the financial crisis of 1997. The study attributes this finding to the learning process and improvement of corporate governance during the period of the 2000s. Using time-series data, it finds that cash flow rights positively affect firm performance, suggesting an alignment effect. Ownership concentration improves firm performance. When the study split its sample, it found that the effect ownership on firms’ value is stronger for large firms. Research limitations/implications The study’s main limitation is that it does not test directly the learning process hypothesis. The study contributes to the current literature by presenting more recent evidence on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance in a developing country. The authors argue that markets learn the improvement of corporate governance and incorporate this development into prices. Extending this research to other markets will provide confirmation whether the learning process is an international phenomenon. Practical implications The awareness and implementation of corporate governance should be maintained at least at this level. The positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance suggests that concentrated ownership performs monitoring more effectively. Investors should pay attention to ownership concentration. Social implications The finding that prices already reflect corporate governance may suggest that market is monitoring this issue. This seems to be a good finding. Markets can be expected to discipline companies in the implementation of corporate governance. The awareness and implementation of corporate governance should be maintained at least at the current level. Originality/value The study contributes to the current literature by presenting additional evidence on the effect of ownership (using cash flow rights, control rights and cash flow right leverage) on firms’ performance in a more recent period and in a developing country. This period is characterized by a significant increase in awareness and the implementation of good corporate governance.

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