scholarly journals Corporatisation of China’s state-owned enterprises and corporate governance

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Jinghan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Critical Issue ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Soft Budget Constraints ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
Liberal Approach

This paper reviews the notable Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs) low efficiency and shows that the agency problems with SOEs constitutes the characteristics of corporate governance - insiders’ control, soft budget constraints, managerial slack and lack of competent managers. It is this corporate governance structure that results in SOEs’ inefficiency. The paper further argues that the current corporatisation of SOEs in China through share issue does not improve corporatised SOEs’ performance because it has not effectively dealt with the agency problems associated with public ownership, and, therefore, falls short in addressing the critical issue of corporate governance. The creation of an effective corporate governance mechanism requires the development of the country’s market-oriented institutions. It is difficult to prescribe what type of governance structure China should adopt, although it is argued that for former SOEs a neo-corporatist approach with a two-tier board structure may have advantage over a neo-liberal approach with a single board. For China, the most important issue is not to find a fixed set of governance models from which to copy, but to develop institutions that are conducive to effective corporate governance.

scholarly journals MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DALAM PERUSAHAAN YANG MENGALAMI PERMASALAHAN KEUANGAN

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Christina Dwi Astuti ◽  
Fajar Eka Yuniarto
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Financially Distressed ◽  
The Difference

<p><em>The objective of this research is analyzing the influence of Corporate Governance mechanism to the probability of financial distressed firms and the difference influence of Corporate Governance' structure between financially and non financially distressed firms in manufacturing companies listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2004 - 2006. This research data obtained 148 companies, in which is consisted of 55 financially distressed firms and 93 non financially distressed firms using judgment purposive sampling method. By</em>a<em>= 5%, this research using Logistic Test and Mann-Whitney Test and One sample T -test to analyze the hypothesis. The result shows that the board of commisioner, board of directors, audit committee, independent commissaries, turnover of directors, institutional ownership, and total asset doesn't have influence to probability of financially distressed firms. Meanwhile to see the difference Corporate Governance structure between financially distressed firm and non financially distressed firm shows that only the size of board directors has significant difference between two groups.</em></p>

scholarly journals The Role of Corporate Governance Mechanism in Optimizing Firm Performance: A Conceptual Model for Corporate Sector of Pakistan

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 109-115
Author(s):  
Ahsan Akbar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Wealth Maximization ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Corporate governance refers to the processes that govern and direct firm managers to take decisions that are in line with the shareholders goal of wealth maximization. Various studies have been conducted in developing countries including Pakistan to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance mostly by using the conventional measures of corporate governance. The result of these studies suggests that corporate governance positively and significantly contributes towards firm performance. The aim of this study is to incorporate some important policy measures related to major players of corporate governance that are of significant importance in establishing an effective corporate governance structure in addition to the conventional measures of corporate governance. Inclusion of these variables will help the firms to create an effective corporate governance system that will lead to an increased firm performance.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Family and Non-family Controlled Firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qaiser Rafique Yasser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

The aim of this study is to scrutinise the impact of corporate governance mechanism on on the performance of family and non-family controlled firms in Pakistan. It has been found that a corporate governance structure influences the performance of both family and non-family controlled companies significantly. However all corporate governance mechanisms are not significant as the significant variables differ between family and non-family controlled companies. Thus, regulators need to be cautious in setting codes for different companies. JEL classification: G34, L21, L25 Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance

scholarly journals Intellectual capital disclosure and corporate governance structure among Malaysian government-linked companies

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 6-17
Author(s):  
Rashidah Abdul Rahman ◽  
Musliha Musman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Content Analysis ◽  
Intellectual Capital ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
The Impact

This study examines the level of intellectual capital disclosure among the 32 Malaysian GLCs by comparing with the Non-GLCs for the period 2007-2009. In addition, this study also investigates the impact of board structure on the intellectual capital disclosure of Malaysian GLCs. The board structure mechanisms comprise; board composition, role duality, board size and cross directorship. The control variables consist of the company-specific characteristics –leverage, profitability and age of the company. The content analysis is used to extract the intellectual capital disclosure items from the annual report. The results show that the GLCs disclosed more intellectual capital information than Non-GLCs. Board size and leverage are significant and positively related to the intellectual capital disclosure of Malaysian GLCs.

scholarly journals Related-Party Transactions, Chaebol Affiliations, and the Value of Cash Holdings

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 699
Author(s):  
Hyunjung Choi ◽  
Jungeun Cho
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Management Decisions ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Related Party Transactions ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Extant Literature ◽  
Value Of Cash

This study examines whether related-party transactions (RPTs) impact the value of firms’ cash holdings. Using a 2011–2018 sample of Korean public firms, we find that greater RPTs lead to lower cash holdings value. In particular, this decline is more pronounced in Korean chaebol firms than in non-chaebol firms. Our findings suggest that a unique and complex corporate governance structure of chaebol firms makes it difficult for outside investors to monitor firms’ internal cash management decisions, resulting in a negative valuation of cash holdings. This study contributes to the extant literature by providing additional evidence that RPTs in chaebol firms with severe agency problems may lower the value of cash holdings.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 19TH CENTURY: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary John Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Review Committee ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Theoretical Structure ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
The U.S

Presenting evidence from a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corporations were established in the U.S. The C&O used a stockholder review committee to review the annual report of the president and directors. The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance structure of the C&O is also viewed from a theoretical structure as espoused by Hart [1995].

THE STOCKHOLDER REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY, 1828–1857: EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

2006 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary J. Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
The Political ◽  
Review Committee ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Form ◽  
The 19Th Century

Canal companies were among the first enterprises to be organized in the corporate form and to require large amounts of capital. This paper examines the stockholder review committee of a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), and discusses how the C&O used this corporate governance structure to monitor and improve financial management and operations. A major strength was the concern and dedication of the stockholders to the company, while a major weakness was the political control exerted by the State of Maryland. The paper provides an historical perspective on corporate governance in the 19th century. This research contributes to the literature by providing detailed workings and practices of a stockholder review committee. The paper documents corporate governance efforts in archival sources that provide an early example of accountability required in a corporate charter and the manner in which the stockholders carried out this responsibility.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document