Ethical Consideration of Construction Union Strategies in Jurisdictional Disputes Based on an Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) and a Game Theory

Author(s):  
Borinara Park
Author(s):  
Marco Galbiati ◽  
Kimmo Soramäki

Interbank payment systems form the backbone of the financial architecture. Banks need to hold costly funds at the central bank to process interbank payments. Each bank would individually like to hold a low amount of funds and finance its outgoing payments from payments received by other banks during the day. Collectively, however, all banks cannot “free ride” on other banks’ liquidity, which makes bank behavior in interbank payment systems a complex and interesting topic. This chapter investigates the effect of Liquidity Saving Mechanisms (LSM) in interbank payment systems. LSM mechanisms have recently been implemented and proposed in many major interbank payment systems. The chapter applies a novel methodology combining Agent Based Modeling (ABM) and game theory. The authors model a stylized two-stream payment system where banks choose a) how much liquidity to post and b) which payments to route into the each of two “streams”: an RTGS stream and an LSM stream. The authors simulate the systems using realistic settlement processes and solve equilibrium choices for the amount of liquidity to post and the fraction of payments to settle in each stream. The authors find that, when liquidity is expensive, the two-stream system is more efficient than the vanilla RTGS system without LSM. This is because the LSM achieves better co-ordination of payments. When liquidity is inexpensive, the second stream does not add value, as banks find it convenient to ignore it and use the plain RTGS stream. For an intermediate range of cost of liquidity, several equilibria may emerge. Besides a corner equilibrium where all payments are settled via the LSM stream, there are equilibria where both streams are used. Interestingly, some of these may be inefficient, as they involve a (somewhat paradoxical) mix of intensive use of the LSM and high liquidity usage in the RTGS stream. The appeal of the LSM resides in its ability to ease (but not completely solve) strategic inefficiencies stemming from externalities and free-riding.


Author(s):  
Marco Galbiati ◽  
Kimmo Soramäki

Interbank payment systems form the backbone of the financial architecture. Banks need to hold costly funds at the central bank to process interbank payments. Each bank would individually like to hold a low amount of funds and finance its outgoing payments from payments received by other banks during the day. Collectively, however, all banks cannot “free ride” on other banks' liquidity, which makes bank behavior in interbank payment systems a complex and interesting topic. This chapter investigates the effect of Liquidity Saving Mechanisms (LSM) in interbank payment systems. LSM mechanisms have recently been implemented and proposed in many major interbank payment systems. The chapter applies a novel methodology combining Agent Based Modeling (ABM) and game theory. The authors model a stylized two-stream payment system where banks choose a) how much liquidity to post and b) which payments to route into the each of two “streams”: an RTGS stream and an LSM stream. The authors simulate the systems using realistic settlement processes and solve equilibrium choices for the amount of liquidity to post and the fraction of payments to settle in each stream. The authors find that, when liquidity is expensive, the two-stream system is more efficient than the vanilla RTGS system without LSM. This is because the LSM achieves better co-ordination of payments. When liquidity is inexpensive, the second stream does not add value, as banks find it convenient to ignore it and use the plain RTGS stream. For an intermediate range of cost of liquidity, several equilibria may emerge. Besides a corner equilibrium where all payments are settled via the LSM stream, there are equilibria where both streams are used. Interestingly, some of these may be inefficient, as they involve a (somewhat paradoxical) mix of intensive use of the LSM and high liquidity usage in the RTGS stream. The appeal of the LSM resides in its ability to ease (but not completely solve) strategic inefficiencies stemming from externalities and free-riding.


Cities ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 102387 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Kaviari ◽  
M. Saadi Mesgari ◽  
E. Seidi ◽  
H. Motieyan

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diogo Conque Seco Ferreira ◽  
Julian Tejada ◽  
Gehazi Ramiris Santos Bispo

This work proposes filling the gap between cultural behavior analysis and recent computational approaches to the study of social dynamics. We first introduce a game-theory infused understanding of norms and metanorms evolution and how agent-based models are used to simulate and analyze the emergency of normative phenomena. Then we argue that this method is in line with the cultural behavior analysis approach to the evolution of culture, offering a common framework for further theoretical and heuristic developments for researchers in the field. We proceed by outlining Axelrod´s Metanorms Model, followed by a tutorial on its implementation with NetLogo programming language. Finally, two experiments are carried out using this framework, and the implications of the results, along with future direction of research, are discussed from a Skinnerian perspective.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document