scholarly journals Electricity Trading in a Successive Oligopoly Market: A Social Welfare Comparison between the Generation and Retail Sectors’ Liberalization

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 307
Author(s):  
Keita Yamane

<p><em>This study models the electricity industry as a successive</em><em> Cournot</em><em> oligopoly market to compare the market performance between the generation and retail sectors’ liberalization. We show that, assuming identical fixed costs on free entry into both generation and retail sectors, liberalization of the retail sector can dominate that of the generation sector with regard to social welfare.</em></p>

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linus Wilson

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><a name="OLE_LINK7"></a><a name="OLE_LINK6"></a><a name="OLE_LINK5"><span style="mso-bookmark: OLE_LINK6;"><span style="mso-bookmark: OLE_LINK7;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that free entry is socially excessive when firms have fixed costs and produce identical goods.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>That is because rival firms fail to externalize the business stealing costs they impose on their rivals.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This paper extends that model by assuming that there are two states of demand.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It is proven that weakly too few firms exit voluntarily when demand realizations are low and some of the fixed costs are recoverable. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;</span>If there is any voluntary exit, social welfare could strictly rise by forcing more firms to exit the industry.</span></span></span></span></a></p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550044
Author(s):  
CHI-CHIH LIN

This paper examines entry deregulation in an industry where natural monopoly and potential competition are vertically related. We find that the upstream fixed cost plays an important role to affect the overall welfare comparison between total and partial deregulation. When the upstream fixed cost is sufficiently large, the number of downstream firms is limited in both situations; in other words, the duplication of downstream fixed costs is relatively irrelevant so that the double markup effect dominates. Consequently, the regulator can only replicate total deregulation to maximize social welfare in the event of partial deregulation. If it is the case, we suggest that total deregulation is superior to partial deregulation since the latter suffers more regulatory cost than that of the former.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emek Basker

Barcodes and barcode scanners transformed the grocery industry in the 1970s. I use store-level data from the 1972, 1977, and 1982 Census of Retail Trade, matched to data on store scanner installations, to estimate scanners' effect on labor productivity. I find that scanners increased a store's labor productivity, on average, by approximately 4.5 percent in the first few years. The effect was larger in stores carrying more packaged products, consistent with the presence of network externalities. Short-run gains were small relative to fixed costs, suggesting that the impediment to widespread adoption of the new technology was profitability, not coordination problems. (JEL J24, L24, L81, O33)


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (54) ◽  
pp. 218-226
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Szczygielski

AbstractProfessions such as doctors and lawyers often enjoy some degree of self-regulation, i.e. they can set the codes of conduct in the market and even determine the rules for joining the profession. We address the problem of the optimal scope of self-regulation. Specifically, we model a profession that can decide about the quality of the service, and we examine if the profession should also be allowed to determine the number of suppliers. We assume that a larger number of professionals reduce the fixed cost of providing quality, and hence the motive to restrict entry is mitigated. Nonetheless, we find that for well-behaved fixed costs functions, the size of the profession preferred by the professionals is smaller than the socially optimal one. Still, if the only alternative to self-regulation is free entry to the profession, then self-regulation is the preferable regime. These findings are relevant for the services that are difficult to substitute by the services produced outside the profession.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasunobu Wakashiro

Abstract Input-output tables are employed to analyze the liberalization of electricity industries around the world. However, the input-output tables do not have sectoral data of the electricity industry in many countries. Electricity industries that consist of an electricity generation, transmission, and retail (and/or distribution) sector have experienced the different degrees of liberalization; the generation and retail sector have experienced liberalization in many countries or regions, while the transmission sector has not faced liberalization. In this study, we estimate the sectoral data of the electricity industry in an input-output table by using annual reports of the electric power companies and also defined the relationship among the sectors. Finally, we find that the data which are analyzed by previous methods can distort policy decisions and that especially the definition of the sectors' intersection in the industry is critical.Category & Number: 5. Industrial Organization and Structural PolicyJEL Classification: C32, C33, Q41, Q48


Author(s):  
Maria Carmen Agnello ◽  

This article analyses therapeutic adherence to the national health system from a multidimensional perspective, through a comparative analysis of regulation and planning at different levels of European, national, regional and corporate governance. This analytical path is oriented to identify the critical issues and possible strategies aimed not only to overcome them, but also to implement the current management through organizational tools and alternative management models. In this evolution, an important role is played by the funding deriving from the PNRR intended to implement both territorial medicine and digital innovation, as main axes of the path to improving therapeutic adhesion. The conclusions concern the application of organizational models ( one health, change management, value based health) able to channel these resources towards this area of therapeutic adherence. In the current phase of planning and financing from PNRR mission 6, italian institutions such as AGENAS and the Ministry of Health have initiated the reform of the D.M. n. 70/2015 through outline the lines of development of social protection to support social assistance adherence therapeutic. This programming path is accompanied by the regulation of local health care characterized by a greater continuity of care between hospital and home and multidisciplinary coordination for a wider take-up.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Wenzel

Abstract This paper studies competition in prices and opening hours in a model with free entry. It is shown that under free competition market failures arise: Entry is excessive and opening hours are under-provided. The larger the demand elasticity, the larger market failures are going to be. Restrictions on opening hours aggravate this failure. We analyze the impact of a liberalization of opening hours. The model predicts that prices will remain constant in the short run but increase in the long run. Concentration in the retail sector will rise. Additionally, employment in the retail sector increases.


2014 ◽  
Vol 60 (No. 7) ◽  
pp. 301-308
Author(s):  
P.-Y. Nie ◽  
Y.-H. Chen

By establishing a dynamic equilibrium model, the paper analyses the equilibrium of the food industry and the equilibrium about the food quality as well as quantity is achieved. Firstly, the study examines the effects of competitions on the price, outputs, profits and social welfare. The authors argue that competition reduces the food quality. Secondly, this paper shows that consumers benefit from the quality regulation while producers undertake a loss. Moreover, social welfare first increases then decreases with the regulation. Thirdly, the optimal quality regulation is presented and a higher quality regulation reduces competition, while the lower quality regulation promotes it. Finally, the effects of fixed costs on the equilibrium number of firms in the corresponding industry are captured. &nbsp;


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Sharat Ganapati ◽  
Rebecca McKibbin

Abstract There is wide dispersion in pharmaceutical prices across countries with comparable quality standards. Under monopoly, off-patent and generic drug prices are at least four times higher in the United States than in comparable Englishspeaking high income countries. With five or more competitors, off-patent drug prices are similar or lower. Our analysis shows that differential US markups are largely driven by the market power of drug suppliers and not due to wholesale intermediaries or pharmacies. Furthermore, we show that the traditional mechanism of reducing market power – free entry – is limited because implied entry costs are substantially higher in the US.


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