scholarly journals Why the Proportional Representation System Fails to Promote Minority Interests?

PCD Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Minna Thaheer

Proportional representation (PR) is favoured as the most suitable form of electoral system for multi-ethnic societes because it allows every vote to be counted. It, therefore, provides a strong incentive for minority parties and other political groups to promote their political articulations. This article examines the PR system in contemporary Sri Lankan politics. It argues that the executive presidential system has negated the efficacy of the PR system in promoting minority parties and has had disastrous consequences in their political fortunes. The PR system has enabled Muslim communities to elect Muslim representatives from their own province. Spesifically, this article emphasizes the dynamics of the political fortunes of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which seeks to give a voice to the minority Muslim communities concentrated in the Eastern Province.

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mahmoud Mahgoub

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system within the period from 1997 to 2017, in which Algeria has experienced five legislative elections regularly every five years by testing a hypothesis about adopting the proportional representation system on the basis of the closed list during the foregoing legislative elections has obviously influenced the exacerbation of the Algerian party system’s fragmentation, compared to other factors. Design/methodology/approach The essence of the theoretical framework of this study is to address the effect of the electoral system as an independent variable on the party system as a dependent variable. The starting point for that framework is to reassess the “Duverger’s law,” which appeared since the early 1950s and has influenced the foregoing relationship, and then to review the literature on a new phase that tried to provide a more accurate mechanism for determining the number of parties and their relative weight, whether in terms of electoral votes or parliamentary seats. This means that researchers began to use a measure called the effective number of parties (ENP) for Laakso and Taagepera since 1979. The study elaborates the general concepts of the electoral system and the party system. It used Laakso, Taagepera index of the “ENP” to measure the phenomenon of fragmentation party during the five legislative elections from 1997 to 2017 in Algeria. Findings The results of the study reveal that the proportional representation electoral system – beside other factors – had clear impacts on the fragmentation of the Algerian party system by all standards, whether on the level of the apparent rise in the number of the parties represented in the Algerian parliament from 10 parties in 1997 election to 36 parties in 2017 election or according to the index of Laakso and Taagepera (ENP). The average number of effective number of electoral parties in the five elections was around 7.66, and the average number of effective number of parliamentary parties in the five elections was around 4.39, which puts Algeria in an advanced degree of the fragmentation of the party system. Originality/value This study about the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the party system, which is one of the new subjects in the field of comparative politics – globally and in the Arab world. Hence, the value of this study aims to shed light on this mysterious area of science, the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system during the period from 1997 to 2017.


1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

Political agreements are an integral part of the political system in Israel. For various reasons — mainly the proportional representation electoral system and the existence of a “third bloc” of religious parties that do no fit into the centre-right and centre-left political alliances — no political party has ever enjoyed an absolute majority in the Knesset. The dominant parties have therefore always had to rely on coalition agreements with smaller parties in order to obtain, and subsequently maintain, the parliamentary majority required for a government to rule under Israel's parliamentary system. A similar situation exists in many municipal councils and in other elected bodies, such as the Bar Council.


Author(s):  
Jørgen Elklit

The system used for electing the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) is a two-tier proportional representation system. It has worked well since its inception in 1920, and there are no plans of changing to another system. The system is seen as complicated by some, but Danish voters turn out in high numbers and do not seem to have problems understanding the basic elements of how the system works. The system is unique in that the individual political parties can each decide on what kind of list system they want to use and how the preferential votes cast for individual candidates will influence the eventual selection of elected candidates. The index of disproportionality shows remarkably low values, partly because the most important formal electoral threshold is only 2 per cent. Election administration is of high quality and scores generated by the Perception of Electoral Integrity project are, therefore, remarkably high.


2020 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Alessandro Chiaramonte

The history of Italy is plenty of reforms of the electoral system. Many are those implemented since the country’s unification: from the majority system to the limited vote, from proportional representation to the majority premium in the liberal era; and, again, in the Republican era, the return to proportional representation and then the use of mixed systems, combining PR with plurality or majority premium. And many other are the reforms which, discussed and sometimes even approved, as in the case of the italicum, have remained dead letter or never saw the light. What explains this Italic obsession with the electoral systems? Why have their reforms been on the parties’ and governments’ political agenda for so long? The goal of this article is to answer these questions. In the end, electoral reforms have played as instruments of coordination and adaptation in the political strategies pursued by the parties in specific time periods and also as substitute instruments of institutional engineering in the absence of broader agreements on major constitutional reforms.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fany Yuval

The relevant literature provides substantial empirical evident supporting the fact that the ability to govern weakens as the degree of representation increases. Democracies use various mechanisms to maintain the balance between stability and representation. Using simulation analysis, this work seeks to understand to what extent the various structures of electoral systems affect the level of governmental stability without excessively undermining the principle of representation. Can electoral systems be differentiated from one another, and which system is most advantageous? To clarify these questions, this work processed the actual results of the three last elections in Israel, for 2003-2009, using the format of various electoral systems. A comparative review of the simulations leads to the conclusion that a mixture of nationwide and regional elections, a small number of constituencies and the single-seat method will moderate the results, providing a better balance between the two democratic—the ability to rule and the degree of representation. The total representation (T.R.) system seems to be best for striking a reasonable balance between regional and national issues. It also offers a simple solution for resolving the disadvantage of majority systems in single-seat constituencies, the lack of representation for the losing votes in the constituencies. In the total representation system, the winners' votes are counted to determine the regional winner, while the losers' votes are totaled on the national party level and awarded proportional representation. This procedure makes the total representation system seem fairer than its competitors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-32
Author(s):  
Raja Sekhar Vundru

The article focuses on the electoral thoughts and ideas of Ambedkar, Gandhi and Patel. Dr Ambedkar’s efforts for the implementation of representative electoral system have been discussed, along with the evolution of electoral methods that determines every election in India. The article highlights the shortcomings of electoral methods adopted in India as socially marginalized groups and classes have always been underrepresented or represented inappropriately. The article also discusses the functioning of different electoral methods such as two round system and proportional representation system. The present electoral system adopted in India needs to be reformed as per Ambedkar’s electoral ideas to ensure representative, inclusive and equitable democracy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172090531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Su-Hyun Lee ◽  
Byungwon Woo

How do International Monetary Fund programs and conditions affect labor rights? Recognizing the diversity of International Monetary Fund conditionality, we argue that the more stringent International Monetary Fund labor market conditionality is, the worse labor rights become. However, this negative effect can be mitigated if there exist domestic political institutions that have incentives and abilities to provide protections over workers: one such case is a closed-list proportional representation system; another case is a leftist government that relies on political supports of workers. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the more labor conditionality a program includes, the worse labor rights the country sustains. In addition, we report that the negative effect is partially mitigated when domestic political circumstances are favorable to the political representation of workers under a proportional representation system or under a leftist government.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 205
Author(s):  
Ridho Al-Hamdi

This article examines the ideological position of Indonesia’s political parties in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold under the open-list proportional representation system. The article aims to determine the political cleavage among Indonesian political parties, whether classified into the ideological spectrum or the organisational degree. From a methodological standpoint, it is qualitative research by employing in-depth interviews and online news collection as a data gathering technique. The study’s finding depicts that the ideological cleavage is no longer relevant under the open-list proportional representation system because political parties eventually have pragmatical orientations rather than ideological onsiderations. It can be proven that the position of nationalist secular parties is not merely in the approval side but also in the denial and dilemma sides. Likewise, the position of nationalist Islamist parties can be found on two sides: denial and dilemma. This finding verifies that Indonesia’s ideological contestation is waning and inactive when political parties cope with power issues. On the contrary, the ideology is revived when it deals with religious and tribal affairs.


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