The Great Powers, Sovereign Equality and the Making of the United Nations Charter

2000 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerry Simpson
1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander W. Rudzinski

The veto question, one of the most controversial problems facing the United Nations, has several aspects of unequal importance. First, there is the great political problem of the relations between the great Powers on the one hand, and the small and middle-sized states on the other, as well as of their role in an international organization. This problem, being a political one, is reflected in the whole constitutional structure and functions of the organs of the United Nations. Second, there is the well-established traditional legal principle of equality of states, big and small, mighty and weak. This principle was reiterated in the United Nations Charter in Article 2 (1), which reads: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Both these aspects of the veto question are well known and have been discussed to such an extent as to be entirely left aside in these remarks.


1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-231
Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Finkelstein

The special provision in Article 109, paragraph 3, on review of the United Nations Charter resulted from the concern of many states that the five great powers, working in harness, would excessively dominate the organization. Most of the conference members at San Francisco resented the implication of permanent inferiority reflected in the great powers' special voting position in the Security Council. Although they feared that the Charter permitted too wide an application of the veto power, they nevertheless accepted it as necessary within limits.


1967 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Hudson

Relations between Australia and Indonesia became strained within months of Indonesia's attainment of independence, deteriorating as conflict developed first on the question of West Irian and then as a result of Indonesia's hostility towards Malaysia. For many years, it seemed ironical that Australia should have played a major part in the emergence of a neighbour whose external policies and internal trends endangered rather than safeguarded Australian interests. But there is more involved here than historical irony in the context of Australian-Indonesian relations. Sufficient time has now elapsed for Australian policy on the Indonesian independence question to be seen in the wider context of the whole postwar phenomenon of decolonisation. For it is not merely of interest that Australia should have assisted neighbouring Asian rebels against a European colonial Power (remembering that Australia herself was, and is, a European colonial Power) and should then have been embarrassed by the activities of the rebels coming to office. It is of greater interest that, of the immense number of colonial issues anxiously engaging the attention of international society in the 1940s and 1950s, the years which saw the virtual demise of western colonialism, this was the one issue on which Australia took up the rebel cause. Throughout this period and irrespective of the complexion of the parties in power in Canberra, Australia persistently jeopardised her regional objective of friendly relations with anti-colonial Asia by opposing strongly and, at times, bitterly the anti-colonial cause in the United Nations. If nothing else, the United Nations has provided a forum in which each year Australia and other members have been forced to declare themselves on colonial questions. And, until the 1960s when Australia switched policy, Australia fought against all the anti-colonial Powers' largely successful attempts to have developed a system of international control over colonies under the authority of Chapter XI (“Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories”) of the United Nations charter, to tighten the trusteeship system of supervision erected under Chapters XII and XIII of the charter, and to involve the United Nations in particular disputes so as to meet alleged threats to peace — all of them being attempts, however indirectly, to hasten the attainment of independence by dependent territories. Thus, Australia supported South Africa on South-West Africa, the Netherlands on West New Guinea, the British on Southern Rhodesia and Oman, the Portuguese on their African territories, the French on Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. But Australia opposed the Netherlands on the Indonesian question.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis O. Wilcox

On August 2, 1946, the United States Senate approved the Morse resolution by the overwhelming vote of 62-2, thereby giving its advice and consent to the acceptance on the part of the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was the same Senate which, just one year and one week earlier, had cast a vote of 89-2 in favor of the United Nations Charter. On August 26 Herschel Johnson, acting United States representative on the Security Council, deposited President Truman’s declaration of adherence with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At long last the United States assumed far-reaching obligations to submit its legal disputes to an international court.


ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Otto Spijkers

AbstractA constitution defines the values of a particular community, and establishes institutions to realize these values. In defence of the argument that the United Nations Charter is the world’s constitution, I will try to show that it contains the shared values and norms of the international community, and that the UN’s organs are tasked with the promotion and protection of the shared values and norms as defined in the UN Charter. The focus is on the values of human dignity and peace and security.


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