scholarly journals The Fixed-Date Election Law: Constitutional Convention or Conventional Politics?

2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Hawkins

On September 17, 2009, Justice Michel Shore of the Federal Court of Canada refused a request from Duff Conacher and Democracy Watch, applicants, to declare "that a constitutional convention exists that prohibits a Prime Minister from advising the Governor General to dissolve Parliament except in accordance with Section 56.1 of the Canada Elections Act."1 That section, known as the "fixed-date election law," received Royal Assent on May 3, 2007. The court application was triggered by Prime Minister Harper’s September 7, 2008 request to Governor General Michaëlle Jean asking her to dissolve Parliament and call a "snap" election. The resulting election, held on October 14, 2008, returned another Conservative minority government, albeit a stronger one.

2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2010
Author(s):  
Andrew Heard

Given the fundamental role that conventions play in the Canadian constitution, it is not surprising that litigants try from time to time to engage the courts in defining or even enforcing the terms of a particular convention. The Federal Court’s September 2009 decision in Conacher v. Canada (Prime Minister)1 is the latest high-profile example. Duff Conacher, Coordinator of Democracy Watch, had launched a court case that challenged the 2008 federal election call as contravening either the provisions of the government’s fixed-date election law (Bill C-16,2 passed in 2007), or conventions supporting the law. The Federal Court rejected Conacher’s application, holding among other things that there was no constitutional convention constraining the prime minister from advising an election before the October 2009 date prescribed in the statute. Conacher’s appeal was also rejected. In May 2010, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision, stating that "no such convention exists" based on the evidentiary record.3 For many observers, the Conacher decision may seem unsurprising and solidly based on the existing jurisprudence dealing with constitutional conventions.


Author(s):  
Huang-Ting Yan

Abstract This article answers why intra-executive conflict varies across semi-presidential democracies. The literature verifies that intra-executive competition tends to be higher when the president holds less power to dismiss the cabinet, coexists with a minority government, or the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. This paper, therefore, integrates these factors to construct an index of prime ministerial autonomy, proposing that its relationship with the probability of intra-executive conflict is represented by an inverted U-shaped curve. That is, when the prime minister is subordinated to an elected president, or conversely, enjoys greater room to manoeuvre in the executive affairs of the government, the likelihood of conflict is low. In contrast, significant confrontation emerges when the president claims constitutional legitimacy to rein in the cabinet, and controls the executive to a certain degree. This study verifies hypotheses using data on seventeen semi-presidential democracies in Europe between 1990 and 2015.


Author(s):  
Michael Murphy

Abstract The prosecutorial independence of the Attorney General (AG) is a firmly established constitutional convention in Canada, but it is also an evolving convention, subject to ongoing contestation and debate. This article is a contribution to that debate. It defends a normative constitutional framework wherein the AG’s authority to make final decisions in matters of criminal prosecution is balanced against a corresponding duty to consult with cabinet and the prime minister on the public interest implications of prosecutorial decisions when the circumstances warrant. Within this normative framework, respectful contestation and debate amongst ministers, the prime minister, and the AG in determining the public interest merits of prosecution is welcomed, even encouraged, and if conducted with the requisite integrity, objectivity, and transparency, it is regarded not as a threat but as a valuable check and balance on AG independence and an indispensable form of quality control on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 155
Author(s):  
Nazri Muslim ◽  
Osman Md Rasip ◽  
Khairul Hamimah Mohammad Jodi ◽  
Abdullah Ibrahim ◽  
Otong Rosadi

In Malaysia, there is no one institution that can outdo the supremacy of the Federal Constitution. Even the three government bodies that refer to the power separation doctrine which is the legislative, judiciary and executive bodies even the Yang di-Pertuan Agong are under this Federal Constitution. The constitution can be divided into two, written and non-written constitution. The written constitution is the form of constitution that is gathered and arranged in one document. The non-written counterpart encompasses all of the constitutional principles not compiled in one document such as the law endorsed by the Parliament and the verdicts of the court such as in the United Kingdom. Other than the constitution, there are certain practices that are thought to be part of the principles of the constitution. This is known as the Constitutional Convention or the customary practice of the Constitution. Constitutional convention is a non-legislative practice and it is similar to the political ethics and not enforced in court. Although it seems trivial, it is important for this practice to be complied with, otherwise it is difficult for the constitution to work successfully as the constitutional convention cannot be brought to court and forced to be obeyed. Thus, the discussion of this article rests on the constitutional convention in terms of the social contract, the appointment of the Prime Minister, the appointment of the country’s main positions and collective responsibility.


Significance The unexpected departure of a popular prime minister opens up more space for opposition parties in the next election due by early November 2017. On Key’s watch, New Zealand weathered the 2007-09 global financial crisis, rebuilt from the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, strengthened public finances and kicked off negotiations for the now moribund Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal to tie its export-driven economy to growing markets on the Pacific Rim. Impacts A re-elected National coalition or minority government reliant on New Zealand First would lead to greater policy instability. The next prime minister could inherit the problem of rising interest rates hitting leveraged homeowners. US President-elect Donald Trump’s positions on security, trade and climate policy could see Wellington focus more on ties with Asia.


Significance His parliamentary approval only succeeded thanks to abstentions by the Socialist Party (PSOE). He will now form a minority government with the weakest parliamentary support for any prime minister since competitive elections returned to Spain in 1977. Impacts Tax rises, possibly in combination with spending cuts, may trigger a revival of social tensions. In the absence of major policy initiatives, economic growth is likely to slow down in 2017. Rajoy's dependence on PSOE and Citizens collaboration to pass a budget for 2017 by end-November will give them some leverage.


Subject Canada's federal political outlook. Significance Canada’s three main parties have all selected the leaders with which they will contest the 2019 federal election. New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jagmeet Singh, Conservative leader Andrew Scheer and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of the Liberal Party now have two years in which to define themselves for the electorate and make a case for their parties to assume or resume control of government. Impacts Fallout from fundraiser links to the Paradise Papers tax avoidance controversy could undercut Trudeau’s Liberals. Trudeau’s strong Quebec ties will help him hold off the NDP, but Ontario losses could leave a Liberal minority government. Ontario’s 2018 provincial election will offer an early indication of the strength of Trudeau’s federal opponents.


Author(s):  
Mann F A

By the law of the United Kingdom the conclusion of a treaty at all its stages is a matter of the prerogative, so that the Executive alone, that is Her Majesty the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister, a Minister of the Crown, an Ambassador, or other officials have the power to conclude, that is to sign and ratify it, and thus to bind the United Kingdom in the sense of international law, though by the so-called Ponsonby rule, as a matter of constitutional convention, the Executive will not normally ratify a treaty until twenty-one parliamentary days after the treaty has been laid before both Houses of Parliament. In order to be unquestionably cognizable by an English court a treaty has to be the object of the established legislative process, that is to say, it has to have the sanction of a statute passed by Parliament.


Significance The poll follows the collapse of the minority government led by President Francisco Guterres’s and Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri’s Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin). A parliamentary grouping led by Xanana Gusmao’s National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) had blocked Fretilin’s budget, with the CNRT now leading a Change for Progress Alliance (AMP). Impacts If Fretilin’s support drops below 30%, Alkatiri may come under pressure to relinquish leadership of the party. The dominance in East Timorese politics of resistance-era political elites will increase. Given Australia’s closer relations with ASEAN, the boundary treaty with East Timor will add to Canberra’s growing influence in the region.


Significance The party almost won the last election, reducing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberals to a minority government. However, Trudeau’s party is now gaining popularity due to the government’s response to COVID-19. Impacts The Conservatives will struggle to make inroads in Quebec, especially if their new leader is not French-speaking. If the Conservatives stay in opposition, dissatisfaction and separatist sentiment in western provinces will grow. Most provincial premiers’ popularity been boosted by their response to COVID-19.


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