Rebuild America Clean and Green

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-156
Author(s):  
Leo W. Gerard
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Carbon Leakage ◽  
Emissions Reductions ◽  
Domestic Industry ◽  
Climate Change Policies

The testimony of International President Leo Gerard of the United Steelworkers before a House subcommittee on trade in March addressed how to minimize “carbon leakage” between nations—when emissions reductions in one country lead to increased emissions in another that has strict climate change policies—in a manner that will sustain existing U.S. jobs and keep domestic industry competitive.

The Controllability Precautionary Principle: Justification of a Climate Policy Goal Under Uncertainty

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugen Pissarskoi
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Policy Goal ◽  
The Precautionary Principle ◽  
Climate Change Policies

How can we reasonably justify a climate policy goal if we accept that only possible consequences from climate change are known? Precautionary principles seem to offer promising guidelines for reasoning in such epistemic situations. This chapter presents two versions of the precautionary principle (PP) and defends one of them as morally justifiable. However, it argues that current versions of the PP do not allow discrimination between relevant climate change policies. Therefore, the chapter develops a further version of the PP, the Controllability Precautionary Principle (CPP), and defends its moral plausibility. The CPP incorporates the following idea: in a situation when the possible outcomes of the available actions cannot be ranked with regard to their value, the choice between available options for action should rest on the comparison of how well decision makers can control the processes of the implementation of the available strategies.

Comparing respondents who passed versus failed an Instructional Manipulation Check: A case study about support for climate change policies

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 408-415
Author(s):  
Maria Rubio Juan ◽  
Melanie Revilla
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Manipulation Check ◽  
Climate Change Policies ◽  
Instructional Manipulation ◽  
Using Data

The presence of satisficers among survey respondents threatens survey data quality. To identify such respondents, Oppenheimer et al. developed the Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC), which has been used as a tool to exclude observations from the analyses. However, this practice has raised concerns regarding its effects on the external validity and the substantive conclusions of studies excluding respondents who fail an IMC. Thus, more research on the differences between respondents who pass versus fail an IMC regarding sociodemographic and attitudinal variables is needed. This study compares respondents who passed versus failed an IMC both for descriptive and causal analyses based on structural equation modeling (SEM) using data from an online survey implemented in Spain in 2019. These data were analyzed by Rubio Juan and Revilla without taking into account the results of the IMC. We find that those who passed the IMC do differ significantly from those who failed for two sociodemographic and five attitudinal variables, out of 18 variables compared. Moreover, in terms of substantive conclusions, differences between those who passed and failed the IMC vary depending on the specific variables under study.

scholarly journals Converging Agendas? Energy and Climate Change Policies in the UK

2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Lovell ◽  
Harriet Bulkeley ◽  
Susan Owens
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Change Policies ◽  
The Uk

Comments: Carbon Tariffs - Fair Incentives for Change?

2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Carbon Price ◽  
Carbon Leakage ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Trading Systems ◽  
Climate Policies ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Carbon Tariff

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.

From Statements of Intent to Institutionalised Practice: What Makes Climate Change Policies Stick?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangeetha Chandrashekeran ◽  
Bronwen Morgan ◽  
Kim Coetzee ◽  
Dr Lucy Baker
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Change Policies
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