Efficient Market Testing of the Korean Foreign Exchange Market During the Global Financial Crisis

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Yoonmin Kim ◽  
Yoonseock Lee
2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deok Ryong Yoon

The global financial crisis hit the Korean economy in two ways. First, the sudden reversal of capital flow dried up the domestic and international liquidity. Second, the global contraction of demand reduced Korea's export by over 40 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. Consequently, the Korean currency depreciated sharply and the economic growth rate fell drastically. Even though Korea could not prevent the 2008 crisis, it was the first OECD country to escape the negative economic growth zone, possibly because of three reasons. First, Korea might have had better initial conditions than other economies thanks to the reform measures after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. Second, the Korean government has had significant experience in dealing with crises. Third, Korea had an international network of cooperation to establish swap arrangements of US$ 90 billion to stabilize foreign exchange market. Even though the Korean economy has become more resilient to future financial crises by learning from the crisis in 1997, the small open economy still has limited capacity to stabilize the financial market. Korea now faces a new issue, which is to learn from the global crisis on how to stabilize the foreign exchange market.


Author(s):  
Assaf Razin

The global financial crisis generated the deepest and longest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The defining event of the 2008 global financial crisis was a “hemorrhagic stroke”: a paralytic implosion of the loanable funds markets. Depression forces such as they exist in the US, Europe, or Japan, do not appear to hold in the case of Israel. Its resilience to the external financial shock during the global crisis is rooted in (a) the absence of credit boom in the wake of the crisis, and (b) the relatively small commercial banks' exposure in terms of toxic assets that for the European countries played a major role. Reacting to the global trade-diminishing shocks, policy makers’ concern was three-fold: First, banks exposures to toxic assets such as mortgage based securities and foreigners’ debt obligations. Partly because Israel skipped the credit bubble, and bank regulations were relatively tight, Israel showed a sound resilience to the global financial shock. Second, Israel export markets softened and demand conditions deteriorated. Third, Israel domestic currency got strengthened. Bank of Israel addressed the last two issues by a massive foreign exchange market intervention to weaken the value of the domestic currency, and stimulate exports. The need to prolong the stimulus policies dissipated relatively fast.


Author(s):  
Lesia Tyshchenko ◽  
Atilla Csajbok

In this paper, we develop a daily Financial Stress Index (FSI) for the comprehensive quantitative measurement of the degree of stress in Ukraine’s financial system. We use 14 individual indicators grouped into four sub-indices – the banking sector, corporate debt, government debt, and the foreign exchange market – to construct the FSI. The index measures the level of stress and vulnerability of the financial sector and enables to compare this level at current moment with its dynamic in the past. The FSI can signal the start of a financial crisis and can be used to assess the effectiveness of anti-crisis measures.


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