scholarly journals Severe accident approach - final report. Evaluation of design measures for severe accident prevention and consequence mitigation.

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Tentner ◽  
E. Parma ◽  
T. Wei ◽  
R. Wigeland ◽  
SNL ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
Wang Ziguan ◽  
Lu Fang ◽  
Yang Benlin ◽  
Chen Shi ◽  
Hu Lingsheng

Abstract Risk-informed design approaches are comprehensively implemented in the design and verification process of HPR1000 nuclear power plant. Particularly, Level 2 PSA is applied in the optimization of severe accident prevention and mitigation measures to avoid the extravagant redundancy of system configurations. HPR1000 preliminary level 2 PSA practices consider internal events of the reactor in the context of at-power condition. Severe accidents mitigation and prevention system and its impact on the overall large release frequency (LRF) level are evaluated. The results showed that severe accident prevention and mitigation systems, such as fast depressurization system, the cavity injection system and the passive containment heat removal system perform well in reducing LRF and overall risk level of HPR1000 NPP. Bypass events, reactor rapture events, and the containment bottom melt-through induced by MCCI are among the dominant factors of the LRF. The level 2 PSA analysis results indicate that HPR1000 design is reliable with no major weaknesses.


Author(s):  
Robert J. Lutz ◽  
James H. Scobel ◽  
Richard G. Anderson ◽  
Terry Schulz

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been an integral part of the Westinghouse AP1000, and the former AP600, development programs from its inception. The design of the AP1000 plant is based on engineering solutions to reduce or eliminate many of the dominant risk contributors found in the existing generation of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Additional risk reduction features were identified from insights gained from the AP1000 PRA as it evolved with the design of the plant. These engineered solutions include severe accident prevention features that resulted in a significant reduction in the predicted core damage frequency. Examples include the removal of dependencies on electric power (both offsite power and diesel generators) and cooling water (service water and component cooling water), removal of common cause dependencies by using diverse components on parallel trains and reducing dependence on operator actions for key accident scenarios. Engineered solutions to severe accident consequence mitigation were also used in the AP1000 design based on PRA insights. Examples include in-vessel retention of molten core debris to eliminate the potential for ex-vessel phenomena challenges to containment integrity and passive containment heat removal through the containment shell to eliminate the potential for containment failure due to steam overpressure. Additionally, because the accident prevention and mitigation features of the AP1000 are engineered solutions, the traditional uncertainties associated with the core damage and release frequency are directly addressed.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Philip Short ◽  
Samuel McAlpine ◽  
Michael Tonks ◽  
Aashique Rezwan ◽  
Jinsuo Zhang ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Steven Ford ◽  
Boris Lekakh ◽  
Ed Choy ◽  
Kamal Verma ◽  
Sorin Ghelbereu

The CANDU 6 design includes features, both engineered and inherent, that act as barriers to prevent and mitigate severe accidents at progressive stages of a beyond design basis event such as that which occurred at Fukushima in March 2011. CANDU 6 has ample design margins including multiple layers of defense. Large inventories of water slow down any accident progression to severe accident conditions, even when multiple failures are assumed; giving operations staff more time to manage the event. Ongoing improvements to operating plants, and enhancements made to future evolutions of the CANDU design (including the Enhanced CANDU 6) improve upon these inherent features, further strengthening the CANDU 6 design to withstand severe core damage accidents.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. T. Farmer ◽  
D. J. Kilsdonk ◽  
R. W. Aeschlimann ◽  
S. Lomperski

2017 ◽  
Vol 102 ◽  
pp. 297-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke S. Lebel ◽  
Andrew C. Morreale ◽  
Volodymyr Korolevych ◽  
Morgan J. Brown ◽  
Sam Gyepi-Garbrah

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