scholarly journals Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization: Report of the On-Site Inspection Workshop-5-Planning Examination of Inspection Phases

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
V Krioutchenkov ◽  
V Shchukin ◽  
A Davies ◽  
J J Sweeney
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Test ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

scholarly journals On site inspection for nuclear test ban verirication

1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. D. Marschall
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
The Political ◽  
Chemical Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Chemical Weapon Convention ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

The problem of verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty is mainly a technical one. However the problem of detecting, locating and identifying nuclear explosions has, since the late 1950s, been intimately involved with the political problems associated with negotiating a treaty. In fact there are few other areas in which policy, diplomacy and science have been so interwoven. This paper attempts to illustrate how technology can. be applied to solve some of the political problems which arise when considering the role of an On Site Inspection (OSI) to determine whether or not a nuclear explosion, in violation of a treaty, has occurred or not. It is hoped that the reader, with a scientific background, but with little or no experience of treaty negotiations, will gain an. insight as to how technical matters can interact with political requirements. The demands made on scientists to provide technical support for negotiating and rnonitoring compliance of a treaty have increased significanfly over the last 40 years. This is a period in which a number of major treaties have contained a significant technical component e.g. the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Threshold Treaty) and the Chemical Weapon Convention. This paper gives an indication of some of the political decisions which will have to be made and suggests some of the technical methods which are of value in the identification of a clandestine nuclear explosion.

CTBT On-Site Inspection: A Special Case of Post-Agreement Negotiation

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mordechai (Moti) Melamud
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Executive Council ◽  
Unique Character ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

Abstract This article examines negotiations expected to be conducted during actual implementation after entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It analyzes the negotiations to be undertaken with regards to on-site inspection (OSI) procedures, and their unique character as post-agreement negotiations (PAN) is identified. In particular, the OSI negotiations will be conducted at the Executive Council (EC) level and will analyze whether violations of the treaty have occurred. This discussion further explores another level of negotiation that will occur during the OSI, between the inspected state and the inspection team, concerning the technical details of implementation. Our analysis demonstrates how these inspection negotiations will likely have an impact, well beyond the OSI itself, on the PAN in the EC regarding OSI, and further on PAN in policymaking organs, and thus on regime evolution.

Nuclear Powers' Disarmament Obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Interactions between Soft Law and Hard Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALESSANDRA PIETROBON
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Legal Obligation ◽  
Hard Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

AbstractThe Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will not be effective until all the 44 states listed in its Annex 2 ratify it. A special link has been established between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the CTBT. The disarmament obligation set by Article VI of the NPT, which has not yet been complied with, remains highly controversial. The relevant subsequent practice of the states parties to the NPT shows that the ratification of the CTBT is to be considered the first of the practical steps towards compliance with Article VI. However, as the practical steps do not set any legally binding norms, there is no legal obligation to ratify the CTBT, not even for the 44 states listed in Annex 2 whose ratification is essential. The paper deals with the position of nuclear powers party to the NPT that have not yet ratified the CTBT (most prominently the US and China) and demonstrates that these states should at least provide detailed motivation for their conduct. Otherwise, other states parties to the NPT could consider them as not complying in good faith with Article VI of the NPT and invoke the inadimplenti non est ademplendum rule to justify breaches of their own obligations under the same treaty.

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