scholarly journals Guideline for Evaluating Analytical Chemistry Capabilities and Recommending Upgraded Methods and Instrumentation for Nuclear Material Control and Accountability at Russian Nuclear Facilities

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
G P Russ
Keyword(s):  
Analytical Chemistry ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Material Control

scholarly journals Analytical chemistry of nuclear material: case studies from Los Alamos National Laboratory

2018 ◽  
Vol 318 (3) ◽  
pp. 1697-1712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin N. Cross ◽  
Kevin J. Kuhn ◽  
David J. Kunsberg ◽  
John H. Matonic ◽  
Angela C. Olson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Analytical Chemistry ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Alamos National Laboratory ◽  
Los Alamos ◽  
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Development of Testing Methodologies for Onsite Radioactive Material Storage Containers

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew R. Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Development Effort ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Los Alamos National Laboratory ◽  
Oak Ridge ◽  
Transportation Technologies

Based on a recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance (HS-21) has recently issued DOE Manual 441.1-1 entitled Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. This manual provides guidance regarding the use of non-engineered storage media for all special nuclear material throughout the DOE complex. As part of this development effort, HS-21 has funded the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Transportation Technologies Group (TTG) to develop and demonstrate testing protocols for such onsite containers. ORNL TTG to date has performed preliminary tests of representative onsite containers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper will describe the testing processes that have been developed.

Muon Tomography for Measuring Amount of Nuclear Materials in Fuel Debris

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsukasa Sugita ◽  
Haruo Miyadera ◽  
Kenichi Yoshioka ◽  
Naoto Kume
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Cosmic Ray ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Material Control ◽  
Nuclear Disaster ◽  
Muon Tomography ◽  
Debris Removal ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi ◽  
Near Future

A method to measure an amount of nuclear materials in fuel debris by using muon tomography has being developed for proceeding with decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. As a result of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the molten fuels were mixed with reactor structures and accumulated as fuel debris in the reactor buildings. There is still a large amount of fuel debris remained in each reactor. Fuel debris removal is planned in the near future and the debris will be taken out in this process. The debris need to be inspected from a viewpoint of nuclear material control. Since the debris is a mixture of fuel and other structures, it is hard to quantitate nuclear materials in debris by existing measurement method. Muons are cosmic-ray particles which have high energies, therefore, they are highly penetrative. This feature makes muon tomography sensitive to find heavy materials such as uranium or plutonium. We conducted a simulation study of applying muon tomography to measure fuel debris by using a Monte-Carlo method. A simulation model which includes muon detectors, shielding container and fuel debris was constructed to reproduce a measurement situation at the site. In conclusion, muon tomography quantitate the nuclear materials, therefore, this method should be useful for the fuel debris removal of Fukushima Daiichi reactors.

scholarly journals The Efficacy of the Global Nuclear Security Legal Regime and States’ Implementation Capacity in Light of the Forthcoming Development of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies

Nuclear Law ◽  
2022 ◽  
pp. 161-171
Author(s):  
Bonnie Denise Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Physical Protection ◽  
Regulatory Standards ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Implementation Capacity

AbstractThe forthcoming arrival of small modular reactors and other advanced nuclear reactor technologies can be an immensely beneficial development in the world’s collective pursuit of energy security and meeting climate change objectives. The key question is whether or not these new reactor technologies significantly alter the fundamental premises underlying the existing nuclear security legal regime. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment (A/CPPNM) are the only legally binding international instruments governing the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Together the A/CPPNM and the international guidance on nuclear security comprise the current legal framework for nuclear security. This chapter examines whether the A/CPPNM adequately covers advanced reactor technologies; and whether the States that are interested in acquiring these new reactor technologies have the capacity to effectively implement the associated legal requirements, regulatory standards, and international guidance that comes along with such technologies. The analysis touches upon the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance, and issues of cybersecurity.

Countering the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Arising from Malicious Insiders

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Swini Adikari
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Force ◽  
Threat Assessment ◽  
Nuclear Material ◽  
Insider Threat ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Insider Threats ◽  
Force Structure ◽  
Malicious Insiders

Nuclear theft from malicious insiders is a significant threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Pakistan is a member of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which is an international agreement that adheres to the protection of nuclear materials and the recovery of stolen nuclear materials. However, this agreement does not specifically take into account the risk of security breaches arising from malicious insiders due to Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. The purpose of this paper is to examine the heightened risk of insider threats in conjunction with Pakistan’s increasing nuclear force structure. The first section of the paper examines the history of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and discusses Pakistan’s current nuclear force structure. The second section examines the international and domestic policies that Pakistan follows to address the issue of insider threats to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The final section proposes two policy alternatives to address Pakistan’s growing insider threat risks and outlines how the Design Basis Threat assessment is the most effective solution for Pakistan’s growing insider threat.

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