scholarly journals Radioactive waste isolation in salt: peer review of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's report on reference conceptual designs for a repository waste package

1985 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.M. Rote ◽  
A.B. Hull ◽  
G.S. Was ◽  
D.D. Macdonald ◽  
B.E. Wilde ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Waste ◽  
Peer Review ◽  
Waste Package ◽  
Conceptual Designs ◽  
Westinghouse Electric

Peer Review of the Waste Package Material Performance Interim Report

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Beavers ◽  
Jr. T. M. Devine ◽  
G. S. Frankel ◽  
R. H. Jones ◽  
R. G. Kelly ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Peer Review ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Waste Package

scholarly journals Radioactive waste isolation in salt: peer review of Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation's Socioeconomic Program Plan

1984 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Winter ◽  
D. Fenster ◽  
M. O'Hare ◽  
D. Zillman ◽  
W. Harrison ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Waste ◽  
Peer Review ◽  
Nuclear Waste ◽  
Program Plan

Development of nuclear criticality safety controls on intermediate-level waste packages

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (8) ◽  
pp. 2949-2956 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. W. Hicks ◽  
P. Wood ◽  
D. Putley ◽  
T. D. Baldwin
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Waste ◽  
Waste Management ◽  
Neutron Transport ◽  
Intermediate Level ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Radioactive Waste Management ◽  
Waste Package ◽  
Operational Phase ◽  
Nuclear Criticality Safety ◽  
Enriched Uranium

AbstractIntermediate-level wastes (ILW) include substantial quantities of fissile material and controls are required to ensure that its storage, transport and disposal does not present a nuclear criticality hazard. This paper describes the Radioactive Waste Management Directorate's research to develop package fissile material limits (in the form of screening levels) for four different categories of ILW, defined according to uranium or plutonium composition: (1) irradiated natural and slightly enriched uranium (uranium containing up to 1.9 wt.% 235U); (2) low-enriched uranium (uranium containing up to 4 wt.% 235U); (3) high-enriched uranium (uranium containing up to 100 wt.% 235U); and (4) separated plutonium (plutonium containing up to 100 wt.% 239Pu).The derivation of package screening levels was supported by neutron transport calculations that addressed conditions during waste package transport to a geological disposal facility (GDF), during the GDF operational phase and after GDF closure. The analysis included consideration of combinations of events and processes that could result in fissile material accumulation and concentration after GDF closure, when waste packages have deteriorated sufficiently for fissile material to be mobilized. The results of the calculations have provided input to Radioactive Waste Management Directorate's decision making on setting waste package screening levels.

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