Tacit Collusion and the Boundaries of Competition Law:

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-10
Author(s):  
J. Weche ◽  
T. Weck
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Collective Dominance

This chapter describes how competition law addresses oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. This chapter is concerned with the related topics of oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. This chapter begins with discussion of the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and of the possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’. It then considers the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Concerted Practice ◽  
Collective Dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

scholarly journals Remedies for algorithmic tacit collusion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Beneke ◽  
Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt
Keyword(s):  
Machine Learning ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Learning Technology ◽  
Social Harm ◽  
Learning Methods ◽  
Machine Learning Methods ◽  
The Social ◽  
Use Efficiency

Abstract There is growing evidence that tacit collusion can be autonomously achieved by machine learning technology, at least in some real-life examples identified in the literature and experimental settings. Although more work needs to be done to assess the competitive risks of widespread adoption of autonomous pricing agents, this is still an appropriate time to examine which possible remedies can be used in case competition law shifts towards the prohibition of tacit collusion. This is because outlawing such conduct is pointless unless there are suitable remedies that can be used to address the social harm. This article explores how fines and structural and behavioural remedies can serve to discourage collusive results while preserving the incentives to use efficiency-enhancing algorithms. We find that this could be achieved if fines and remedies can target structural conditions that facilitate collusion. In addition, the problem of unfeasibility of injunctions to remedy traditional price coordination changes with the use of pricing software, which in theory can be programmed to avoid collusive outcomes. Finally, machine-learning methods can be used by the authorities themselves as a tool to test the effects of any given combination of remedies and to estimate a more accurate competitive benchmark for the calculation of the appropriate fine.

9. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 642-702
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Collective Dominance

This chapter examines how EU competition law applies both to undertakings operating cartels and to undertakings that tacitly coordinate their behaviour on a market. It starts by looking at the difference between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ collusion in the light of the theory of games and the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The chapter then deals with cartels and other agreements akin to cartels, or which may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion on a market. Next, it considers the problem of tacit collusion and whether, in particular, Articles 101 and 102 operate as effective mechanisms for dealing with the oligopoly problem. The chapter also considers other options that EU competition law might offer to deal with tacit collusion, either ex ante or ex post, such as the use of the concept of collective dominance and sector enquiries under Regulation 1/2003, art 17.

9. Cartels and Oligopoly

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter examines how EU competition law applies both to undertakings operating cartels and to undertakings that tacitly coordinate their behaviour on an oligopolistic market. It starts by looking at the difference between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ collusion. The chapter then deals with cartels and other agreements that may be used to bolster cartels, or which may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion on a market. Next, it considers the problem of tacit collusion and whether, in particular, Articles 101 and 102 operate as effective mechanisms for dealing with the problem. The chapter also considers other options that EU competition law might offer to deal with tacit collusion, eitherex anteorex post.

Modernization of Antimonopoly Policy in Russia (Economic Analysis of Proposed Changes in the Competition Law)

2005 ◽  
pp. 100-116
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
A. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Commodity Markets ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Per Se

The article is devoted to the analysis of the draft law "On Protection of Competition", which must substitute the laws "On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Commodity Markets" and "On Protection of Competition on the Financial Services Market". The innovations enhancing the quality of Russian competition law and new norms providing at least ambiguous effects on antimonopoly regulation are considered. The first group of positive measures includes unification of competition norms for commodity and financial markets, changes of criteria and the scale of control of economic concentrations, specification of conditions, where norms are applied "per se" and according to the "rule of reason", introduction of rules that can prevent the restriction of competition by the executive power. The interpretation of the "collective dominance" concept and certain rules devoted to antimonopoly control of state aid are in the second group of questionable steps.

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