scholarly journals Wang Yangming’s Notions of Primary Knowledge and Primary Ability

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-196
Author(s):  
Margus Ott
Keyword(s):  

Rad najprije utvrđuje da iz pojma prvobitnog znanja (liangzhi 良知) Wanga Yangminga王陽明 (1472. – 1529.) ne slijedi subjektivni idealizam te da je vezan za transcendentalnu subjektivnost u smislu fenomenologije. Zatim, raspravlja se o pitanju ima li Wang pojam prvobitne sposobnosti (liangneng 良能). Argumentira se da se može naći u dvije glavne Wangove teme – »znanje i radnja jedno su« (zhixing heyi 知行合一) te »razmatrati Nebo i Zemlju i mnoštvo stvari kao jedno (rizomatično) tijelo« (以天地萬物為一體) ili ih smatrati »izvorno jednim s mojim (rizomatičnim) tijelom« (本吾一體). Pokazuje se da su prvobitno znanje i sposobnost dva aspekta isto fenomena. Istinito je na razini virtualnog »rizomatskog tijela« (ti 體), a ne na razini stvari razmatranih kao potpuno oblikovane i aktualizirane (xing 形), kako se pojavljuju u empirijskom umu, zamagljeni žudnjama (yu 欲) koje postaju fiksirane na razini aktualnog. Te se žudnje mogu razriješiti putem »proširenja (prvobitnog) znanja« zhi (liang)zhi 致(良)知. Usporedni pojam »proširenja (prvobitne) sposobnosti« (zhi liangneng 致良能), koji Wang Yangming ne koristi, može se unijeti u sustav.

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Lawrence Israel

ABSTRACTAfter being recalled to Beijing in 1510 for evaluation and reassignment in the wake of his two-year exile to Guizhou and his period of service as a magistrate, Wang Yangming was assigned to a succession of posts at the capital that kept him there through 1512. During that short time, he remained disillusioned with the Ming court and high politics and chose to put his energies into fostering a philosophical movement. He believed that by restoring the “way of master-disciple relations and friendship,” he could help propagate the learning of the sages. To that end, he heldjiangxuegatherings with colleagues and friends and carried on an active correspondence. In those venues, Wang Yangming engaged others with his ideas about the goal of sagehood, the obstacles to attaining it, and the methods for overcoming those obstacles. The following article reconstructs this critical period in Wang Yangming's philosophical development and the intellectual movement he sought to foster, as well as the status of his philosophy as of this point in time.


2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-339
Author(s):  
Lauren F. Pfister

After introducing some scholarship on the value of Mao Qiling’s (1623–1713) works, we present an account of canonization processes in order to understand the hermeneutic context of Mao’s battle with the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy. His work is an attempt to decanonizing Zhu Xi’s Four Books, preferring instead an alternative relying on the Old Texts of the Taixue/Daxueand Zhongyong . Mao argues against Zhu Xi’s textual changes and interpretations on a number of bases, producing a hermeneutics of suspicion against the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy. Instead, Mao offers an alternative account of the sagely way, following precedents of Wang Yangming.


Author(s):  
Ying-shih Yü

This essay examines how the most notable Neo-Confucian scholar Wang Yangming (1472-1529) re-oriented his Confucian project in the context of Ming despotism. It argues that Confucianism took a decidedly new turn in the sixteenth century and that Wang Yangming was at the center of this development from the sixteenth century to the early decades of the eighteenth. Details how Wang shifted the earlier central role of Confucian intellectuals in implementing reforms under the imperial support to enlightening the ordinary Chinese people, specifically including the merchant class, that they could realize the Dao or the Moral Way in their daily lives. This shift not only led to a new era of social and political thinking in the history of Confucianism, but also to the rise of the merchant class to unprecedented social and cultural prominence in the 16th century.


Dangerous Art ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 100-121
Author(s):  
James Harold

This chapter begins with a relativist challenge: it is not clear that every philosophical tradition recognizes a clear distinction between aesthetics and morality. The chapter includes a discussion of ancient Greek, classical Chinese, and Yoruban conceptions of the relationship between moral and aesthetic judgment, as well as some familiar relativist arguments. Then it develops Alain Locke’s response to the relativist challenge: an expressivist account of different modes of valuing. Finally, the chapter draws on Wang Yangming to make an argument about the link between feeling and value. The chapter concludes that expressivism explains the variation in value at least as well as relativism does.


Author(s):  
Peter Nosco

Confucian philosophy is said to have arrived in Japan as early as the third century ad, but it did not become a subject of meaningful scholarly inquiry until the seventh century. The ‘Confucianism’ to which Japanese elites and scholars were first attracted represented fields of knowledge concerned more with ontology and divination than with social ethics and politics. Because of the priority given to birth over talent in official appointments, Confucianism in Japan remained more a gentlemanly accomplishment and never approached the status it had in China, where mastery of its teachings represented a gateway to officialdom. Intellectually, Confucian philosophy was overshadowed both in Japan and on the continent at this time by the teachings of Buddhism, which provided answers both to spiritual and metaphysical concerns. Confucianism in China was refashioned in the eleventh and twelfth centuries by a number of scholars, of whom Zhu Xi was the most prominent. He revised the curriculum, restored social and ethical concerns to positions of centrality within the tradition and formulated a new rationalistic ontology. His teachings won a broad following among intellectuals in China and eventually earned the government’s endorsement as the official interpretation for China’s examination system. From the seventeenth century onwards, Zhu Xi’s teachings reached a comparably distinguished position within scholarly circles in Japan, though the government’s endorsement of the Hayashi family as official interpreters of Zhu Xi’s teachings was the limit of the official authorization of that philosophy in Japan. Though the idealistic Wang Yangming school challenged Zhu Xi’s teachings in Japan as it had in China, the more effective challenge was mounted by the classicist teachings known as Ancient Studies. These scholars, of whom the best known was Ogyū Sorai, sought the ‘true message of the sages’ by emphasizing direct study of the ancient core texts of Confucianism rather than the exegesis on those classics by Zhu Xi and others. Confucian philosophy contributed to the rationalism, humanism, ethnocentrism and ‘historical mindedness’ of Tokugawa Japan. The teachings were also responsible for changing fundamental ontological and epistemological assumptions, while also opening intellectual circles to unprecedented pluralism and diversity. Towards the end of the Tokugawa period in the mid-nineteenth century, Confucian philosophy (particularly in the variety fashioned by Wang Yangming) also provided inspiration and justification for those activist reformers who succeeded in overthrowing the old order. During the modern period, Confucian philosophy has been identified with the Tokugawa tradition which has been at times idealized and and at other times vilified. Nonetheless, a number of the assumptions central to Confucian philosophy continue to characterize much popular and intellectual thought in contemporary Japan, as well as those ethics that tend to be most admired, even though actual knowledge of Confucian philosophy does not appear to be widespread any longer in Japan.


Author(s):  
Shun Kwong-Loi

Wang Yangming was an influential Confucian thinker in sixteenth-century China who, like other Confucian thinkers, emphasized social and political responsibilities and regarded cultivation of the self as the basis for fulfilling such responsibilities. While sometimes drawing on ideas and metaphors from Daoism and Chan Buddhism, he criticized these schools for their neglect of family ties and social relations. And, in opposition to a version of Confucianism which emphasized learning, he advocated directly attending to the mind in the process of self-cultivation.


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