The Influence of Institutional Investors Over CEO Turnover in the UK

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Strivens ◽  
Susanne K. Espenlaub ◽  
Martin Walker
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
The Uk

Voting with their Feet or Activism? Institutional Investors' Impact on CEO Turnover

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Helwege ◽  
Vincent Intintoli ◽  
Andrew (Jianzhong) Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Ceo Turnover

14. Meetings and investor engagement

Company Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 339-374
Author(s):  
Lee Roach
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Majority Vote ◽  
General Meeting ◽  
Annual General ◽  
Annual General Meeting ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Class Meeting ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Uk

This chapter examines the role and importance of general meetings, the significant body of procedural rules by which general meetings are run, and the extent to which a company's members actually engage with general meetings. Members make decisions in one of two ways: through a resolution or by unanimous assent. A resolution is simply a vote that requires a specified majority vote in its favour in order to be passed. The resolutions of public companies must be passed at meetings, whereas resolutions of private companies can be passed at meetings or via a written resolution. Two forms of general meeting existed: the annual general meeting and extraordinary general meetings. In some cases, however, companies are required to hold a class meeting in which only one class of member is entitled to attend. To encourage institutional investors to engage more, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has published the UK Stewardship Code.

6. Company Management and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-120
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

Institutional Investor Stewardship in the UK and Malaysia: Functionally Similar, Contextually Challenged

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-304
Author(s):  
Petrina Tjin Yi TAN
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Investment Companies ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

AbstractInstitutional investors are acknowledged as an influential force in markets worldwide. As a result of increased focus on the impact from the investing and shareholding practices of institutional investors, stewardship codes were first introduced in the UK, followed by Malaysia. This article evaluates the theory and practice of institutional investor stewardship in Malaysia through functional and contextual lenses, as juxtaposed against the more established position of stewardship in the UK. Notwithstanding an analogous legal framework for shareholder rights and the textual similarities of the UK Stewardship Code and Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors, the dominance of government-linked investment companies and government-linked companies in Malaysia results in a distinct set of issues in relation to institutional investor stewardship. This article then argues that the stewardship codes are in themselves insufficient in increasing the quality and scope of institutional investor engagement as they fail to address the underlying agency conflicts between the institutional investors and ultimate beneficiaries or clients. In learning from the UK's experience, it is important that Malaysian policymakers pay attention to the overarching structural factors and incentives driving institutional investor engagement alongside the development and take-up of the stewardship code.

scholarly journals The “invisible” hand: views from UK institutional investors

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 1074-1088
Author(s):  
Deborah Allcock
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
General Meeting ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Share Price ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Telephone Interviews ◽  
Company Value ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Public Criticism

PurposeInvestors are called to be good stewards/trustees of their investments, often on behalf of third parties. In light of this fiduciary responsibility, and the conundrum of public criticism potentially impacting on share price, this paper aims to use the basis of the UK governance code to explore what important dialogue investors really have with their holdings to support good governance.Design/methodology/approachSemi-structured telephone interviews with eight institutional investors explore governance issues and investor company dialogue, giving insights into the aspects of the importance of their part in the UK corporate governance code.FindingsRather than being sleeping lions, investors positively engage with companies, with regular communication being high on their agenda and not always via the annual general meeting. There is a preference to engage directly with the company rather than in public view or via share dumptin. Thus, we often do not see their actions around their fiduciary duties as often they avoid public criticism or any visibility that could do reputational harm and decrease company value.Research limitations/implicationsThis dialogue was just before the point of the exposure of the financial crisis; however, it shows the importance that investors give to taking their responsibilities seriously. Importantly, it provides a springboard for further debate following the financial crises and the updates of the financial environment.Practical implicationsEven though policy seeks engagement, the nuances of the investor dialogue are under explored compared to visible quantitative metrics. This dialogue assures that investors are active, even if their engagement is not public and can be deemed as hidden.Originality/valueComplementing quantitative studies, this paper explores a qualitative approach, uniquely sharing insights into a hidden and little explored world of fiduciary dialogue.

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