Financial Decisions, Ownership Structure and Growth Opportunities: An Analysis of Brazilian Firms

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Félix J. López-Iturriaga ◽  
Vicente Lima Crisóstomo
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Rossi ◽  
Robert Boylan ◽  
Richard J. Cebula

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure by using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach The analysis adopts a balanced panel data set of 984 firm-year observations for the period of 2002-2013, with estimation using a generalized method of moments. Findings The results appear to confirm both the hypotheses of the alignment of interests and the entrenchment effect. The entrenchment and alignment effects are not found to be alternatives but rather are found to co-exist. The presence of a coalition of minority shareholders acts as a tool to control agency costs, particularly when the coalition is instrumental in the contestability of corporate control. Practical implications These findings suggest that minority shareholders may have a larger impact than previously identified by strategically aligning with other shareholders to form coalitions. This study provides several practical implications. First, dividend payout is not necessarily a good instrument to control and monitor agency costs. This is because the payout can be used to expropriate benefits from the minority shareholders. Second, high ownership concentration does not always reduce agency costs. Third, a non-collusive coalition can be more useful in the monitoring of agency costs than other tools, such as the debt level. Originality/value This study shows that there is considerable value to the firm when individual blockholders come together in a contestable environment and become instrumental in making business decisions. The results support the contention that contestability is an excellent deterrent to dampen the expropriation of benefits to minority shareholders. This study also provides evidence that cash holding can be a good substitute for dividends and debt in the effort to limit agency costs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 7378-7382
Author(s):  
Nik Anis Idayu Nik Abdullah ◽  
Mazurina Mohamad Ali ◽  
Noor Hasniza Haron

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-68
Author(s):  
Muhammad Sadiq Shahid ◽  

The objective of this study is to examine the impact of financial decisions on the ownership structure. This study adopted two themes of ownership structure (e.g., 25% & 50%) that categorized the family-owned firms (FOF) and non-family firms (NFOF). The data was collected from 286 firms listed at GCC stock exchanges annual reports, stock exchange database, and Data Stream that range from 2010-2016 periods. The findings of this study showed that the FOFs have lesser investment-internal fund sensitivity than NFOFs. Though, there is an insignificant effect of the block holder on investment funds sensitivity. However, the little implication of dividend payout in FOFs as compare to NFOFs was disclosed in the results. Moreover, it wrapped up that there are less agency problems and information asymmetry in FOFs comparatively.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-190
Author(s):  
Indra Siswanti ◽  
Embun Prowanta

This study aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on firm value with financial decisions and investment decisions as intervening variables. This study uses secondary data from financial reports. The population used in this study are manufacturing companies in the consumer goods sector which listed on Indonesian stock exchange 2013-2019 of 35 (thirty five) companies. While the research sample was taken using certain criteria.The number of samples obtained are 7 (seven) companies. Data processing techniques using smartPLS 3.0. The results state: 1) ownership structure has a significant effect on firm value, 2) ownership structure has a significant effect on funding decisions, 3) ownership structure has a significant effect on investment decisions, 4) funding decisions has a significant effect on firm value, 5) investment decisions has a significant effect on firm value, 6) funding decisions mediate the effect of ownership structure on firm value, 7) investment decisions mediate the effect of ownership structure on firm value. The limitation of the results of this study is that the results of this study cannot be generalized because the objects used are limited to manufacturing companies in the consumer goods sub-sector.


2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo de Andrés Alonso ◽  
Félix J. López Iturriaga ◽  
Juan Antonio Rodríguez Sanz

Author(s):  
Wissal Ben Letaifa

Purpose: This paper aims to extend and contributes to prior French research on the determinants of the timing of dividend payment. It seeks to investigate the impact of ownership structure, duality of the manager as chairman and president of the board, liquidity, size and growth opportunities, profitability, variation of the amount of dividend on the real timing of dividend payment.Design/methodology/approach: Using a panel of French listed firms from 2003 to 2008, the paper uses a cox regression to investigate the relationship between the corporate determinants and the timing of dividend payment.Finding: The paper finds that large shareholders influence the timing of dividend payment but there is no significant relationship between the duality of the manager and the fixing of the dividend payment. The finding is consistent with agency theory since rapid dividend payment can be employed for mitigating agency conflict as timing of dividend payment can be substituted for shareholder monitoring. Further, the empirical results reveal that Cox regression is more appropriate in explaining the duration of dividend payment with variables associated to corporate governance and ownership structure.Originality/value: The paper contributes to prior research related to the timing of dividend payment by being the first French study to examine the determinants of the timing of dividend payment for listed companies in CAC 40.


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