The Contribution of Bilateral Trade or Competition Agreements to Competition Law Enforcement Cooperation between the EU and Mexico

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Marsden ◽  
Peter M. Whelan
Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 7-53
Author(s):  
Victoria Daskalova ◽  

Unfair trading practices (UTPs) imposed by parties with superior power in the context of a vertical relationship are an issue at the periphery of competition law, private law, and, sometimes, sectoral regulation. For a long time, the mainstream competition law approach has been to relegate such issues to other areas of law and regulation. In the EU, where complaints about the prevalence of such practices in the agricultural and food supply chain have been voiced for decades, the approach of the European Commission has been to pursue a strict separation between competition issues and fair-trading issues. This article questions the reasonableness of such a strict division of labour. Taking the sum of various initiatives undertaken to regulate UTPs in the agri-food supply chain as a case study, it argues that the effect of limiting competition law enforcement on this issue has been counterproductive. The article firstly explains the background of the problem and the issue of UTPs in the agri-food supply chain. Secondly, it maps the various legislative developments which have taken place at the EU Member State level. Thirdly, by referring to Grabosky’s (1995) regulatory studies typology of counterproductive regulation, the article focuses attention on some of the perverse side effects which arise when regulation of power imbalances and UTPs occurs at the national level in the context of an integrated market like the EU. In light of the analysis, it expresses doubt that these pitfalls will be fully corrected by Directive 2019/633 on UTPs in the food supply chain. The conclusion is that national legislative developments have not been able to make up for the lack of supra-national enforcement of EU competition law on this issue and have possibly even exacerbated the problem at hand. The article concludes that supranational competition law enforcement can play a key role in addressing the fundamental problems underlying business-to-business unfair trading practices. It argues that this role cannot be played by other instruments in the context of an integrated market with multi-level governance. This article shows that while competition law may not be capable of solving all the problems with UTPs, it remains indispensable in safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal market as well as the interests of consumers and taxpayers.


Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

Competition and Antitrust Law: A Very Short Introduction draws on case studies from across the EU and USA to examine the benefits of competition and the laws which safeguard competitive markets. Competitive markets deliver lower prices, better quality, abundance of choice, and increased innovation. But while competition benefits consumers, it can prove challenging for sellers and producers who may try to dampen the competitive process. This VSI elucidates the key challenges to competition — cartels and anti-competitive agreements, monopolies, and mergers — and looks at the policy considerations which affect competition law enforcement. There exists a delicate relationship between a free market economy and government intervention.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 285-296
Author(s):  
Dragan Gajin

Western Balkan jurisdictions (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia (FYROM)) are often outside the focus of the competition community in the EU. This paper aims to rectify that, by providing an overview of the most interesting competition law developments in these jurisdictions during 2017. The overview will show that, despite similarities in their competition legislation, the observed jurisdictions differ when it comes to their priorities in competition law enforcement: while for some the accent is on merger control, for others it is on antitrust. The paper also highlights certain peculiarities of the observed jurisdictions, even though they are all based on the EU model. These include the existence of a notification system with respect to individual exemptions of restrictive agreements in three out of the four observed jurisdictions.


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