Determinants of Excess (Credit) Spreads: Evidence from the US Bond Market from 1919 to 2006

Author(s):  
Snorre Lindset ◽  
Sjur Westgaard
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jieyan Fang-Klingler

This paper investigates the impact of annual report readability on the corporate bond market. My findings indicate that in the US corporate bond market, firms with less readable annual reports tend to have higher credit spreads, higher credit spread volatilities, higher transaction costs, higher transaction costs volatility, smaller trade size, higher number of trades and higher number of trades volatility. This paper also provides the first answers to the question as to whether annual report readability matters to international market participants in the corporate bond market. My findings provide evidence that in the EUR corporate bond market, firms with more readable annual reports are associated with lower credit spreads.


2021 ◽  
pp. jfi.2021.1.127
Author(s):  
Lionel Martellini ◽  
Riccardo Rebonato ◽  
Jean-Michel Maeso

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 454-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher L. Culp ◽  
Yoshio Nozawa ◽  
Pietro Veronesi

We present a novel empirical benchmark for analyzing credit risk using “pseudo firms” that purchase traded assets financed with equity and zero-coupon bonds. By no-arbitrage, pseudo bonds are equivalent to Treasuries minus put options on pseudo firm assets. Empirically, like corporate spreads, pseudo bond spreads are large, countercyclical, and predict lower economic growth. Using this framework, we find that bond market illiquidity, investors' overestimation of default risks, and corporate frictions do not seem to explain excessive observed credit spreads but, instead, a risk premium for tail and idiosyncratic asset risks is the primary determinant of corporate spreads. (JEL E23, E32, E44, G13, G24, G32)


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rebecca L. Whitworth

This dissertation examines several themes in applied economics. Specifically, Essay 1 examines the dynamics in an overlapping generations model with three-period lived agents, fiat money, and credit, Essay 2 reviews literature on value-added modeling and discusses a paper previously published, Essay 3 concludes by examining efficiency in the US bond market. While Essay 1 examines dynamics and 2 reviews tools used in estimating panel data, Essay 3 combines elements of both-empirically evaluating the efficiency of the bond market by looking at the movement of prices through time. That is, deriving the integral over t of the bond spread. While opportunities for more work exists, this paper suggests that the US Bond Market (the market for corporate debt) is informationally efficient, though it takes longer to converge than previously reported in the literature.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
Huaili Lyu ◽  
Conghui Yang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the certification and monitoring motivations of third-party underwriting and its effects on credit spreads and earnings management of bank issuers. Design/methodology/approach Ordinary least squares is used to examine the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriting. Furthermore, the Heckman two-stage estimation method is used in controlling the endogeneity of sample selection. Findings The authors find that financial bonds underwritten by third-party underwriters bear lower credit spreads due to their credibly ex ante certification and effectively ex post monitoring compared with self-underwriting. Moreover, the certification of third-party underwriters can help to select good quality bond issuers with lower earnings management, and the monitoring function also plays an essential role in constraining the behavior of earnings management after the bond issues. Research limitations/implications The findings in this study suggest that underwriting types (third-party underwriting) will affect financial bond yields and bank issuers’ earnings management. Practical implications On the one hand, the authors should encourage third-party underwriters to actively promote the certification and monitoring functions. For example, given commercial banks the chance to be underwriters when the bond issuers are investment banks, which is not allowed now in China’s financial bond market. On the other hand, the authors should cut off the quid pro quo relations within third-party underwriting because such relations will reduce the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriters. Originality/value This is the first study to distinguish the certification and monitoring effects by using unique data from China’s financial bond market. And the authors further investigate the adverse effects of quid pro quo relations (hiring each other as lead underwriters) on the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriters.


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