New Vs. Old Economy: Trends and Determinants of Executive Compensation

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Paulo Vieito ◽  
Antonio Melo Cerqueira ◽  
Elísio Brandão ◽  
Walayet A. Khan
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Old Economy

Executive Compensation: New vs. Old Economy and the Impact of NASDAQ Crash and Sarbanes Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Paulo Vieito ◽  
Antonio Melo Cerqueira ◽  
Elísio Brandão ◽  
Walayet A. Khan
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Old Economy ◽  
The Impact

U.K. Executive Compensation Practices: New Economy versus Old Economy

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Stathopoulos ◽  
Susanne Espenlaub ◽  
Martin Walker
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
New Economy ◽  
Financial Policy ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Size Growth ◽  
Old Economy ◽  
Almost All

This paper examines the executive compensation practices of listed U.K. retailing companies. We compare “New Economy” retailers (e-commerce/dot-coms) to more traditional retailers operating in the “Old Economy.” We also discriminate between recently floated retailers and their more seasoned counterparts. Using a sample of remuneration contracts for 549 directors in 72 listed U.K. companies in the New and Old Economies, we investigate the structure and level of executive (and nonexecutive) compensation defined as the sum of salary, annual bonus, and the values of executive stock options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). We investigate the extent to which the contract features are determined by firm characteristics, economic sector, and governance/ownership factors. In contrast to the U.S., where almost all executive stock options are issued at the money, there is a greater variety of practice in the U.K. with some options being granted substantially in the money. We therefore pay special attention to this U.K. institutional feature by producing a model designed to explain the crosssectional variation in the moneyness of stock options at the date of issue. We also examine the determinants of a number of other contract features. These are: the time to maturity of the executive stock options, the leverage of the compensation package, the ratio of long-term pay relative to short-term pay, and pay performance sensitivity. We find that differences in compensation arrangements can be explained to a significant extent by differences in firm size, growth/growth opportunities, firm financial policy, ownership characteristics, and governance arrangements. We also find some systematic differences between the compensation arrangements of CEOs and other executives.

UK Executive Compensation Practices: New Economy vs. Old Economy

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Stathopoulos ◽  
Susanne K. Espenlaub ◽  
Martin Walker
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
New Economy ◽  
Old Economy

scholarly journals News insights on executive compensation

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-24
Author(s):  
João Paulo Vieito
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
New Economy ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Old Economy ◽  
Changes Over Time ◽  
Industry Sectors

This paper aims to examine executive compensation structure and determinants on a panel of the socalled “new economy” and “old economy” firms in the USA over the period 1992-2004. The results reveal that executive compensation structure in new versus old economy firms is different and more importantly, it changes over time. Additionally, our results document that the factors explaining executive compensation of new and old economy are different, and also that stock options, despite the problems that have been related with these compensation components in the past, are still the most important ones, both in new and old economy firms. Our results imply that different reward structures exist for different industry sectors at different stages in their development and companies must readjust compensation structures frequently to provide incentive for their top executives.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

ANALISIS FAKTOR PENENTU KOMPENSASI EKSEKUTIF DAN HUBUNGAN KOMPENSASI EKSEKUTIF DENGAN KINERJA PERUSAHAAN

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dyan Vidyatmoko ◽  
Bunasor Sanim ◽  
Hermanto Siregar ◽  
M. Said Didu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Equation Model ◽  
Product Diversification ◽  
Learning Performance ◽  
Market Area ◽  
Job Complexity ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Volume Output

The objectives of this research were (1) to analyse determinants of the influencing factors of the Indonesian Estate State-owned enterprises’ executive compensations; and (2) to analyse the relationship between compensation executive and firm performances. Statistical methods used for analysing these objectives were Structural Equation Model (SEM), contingency analysis, regresion analysis and qualitative analysis. The study found out that from all identified variables, executive decision mechanism, job complexity, firm size, firm ability to pay compensation, and product diversification and market expansionhad positive correlation and significant influenced to executive compensation. Human capital, business risk, executive employment market had significant correlations to executive compensation. The research had also shown a result that executive compensation provide positive correlation and significant influence towards financial performance (EBIT), customer performance (sales volume, output price, market area), internal process performance (OER target, OER realisation), and growth and learning performance (number of training investment, number of employees participated intraining). However, executive compensation did not give positive correlation and significant influenced towards financial performance (ROE) and customer performance(market share). This research also showed that direction of executive compensation was heading to company’s performance and not the opposite way.

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