Determinants of Performance of Closely-Held (Family) Firms after Going Public: The Role of the Ownership Structure, Economy, Changes in Top Management, Partial Sale, Equity Concentration after the IPO and Shareholders in Management

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joss Vaz Ferreira
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Manuel Bernardo Vaz Ferreira

When a closely-held (family) company goes public, there are very specific and particular determinants that have crucial influences on the post-going public operational, social and financial performance of those firms. We investigate why firms decline significantly their profitability, efficiency, employment and activity levels, and show an increase on sales and capital investment when there is a transition from private to public ownership. We conclude that this decrease in performance is significantly higher, when one or more than one of the following facts happen after firms going public: first, when there are not shareholders in management, what implies increased agency costs; secondly, when the level of equity concentration after going public is low; in third place, when the level of equity retention by the founding shareholder is low; fourth, when the economy health during the timing of the sale is not in good shape; and lastly, when the old CEO is changed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-259
Author(s):  
Cristina Quintana-García ◽  
Carlos A. Benavides-Velasco ◽  
Vanesa F. Guzmán-Parra

Author(s):  
Denise Fischer-Kreer ◽  
Andrea Greven ◽  
Isabel Catherine Eichwald ◽  
David Bendig ◽  
Malte Brettel

AbstractOrganizational psychological capital—comprising hope, confidence, resilience, and optimism—is a vital resource for family firms in times of stress. Surprisingly, whether and how family firm idiosyncrasies impact organizational psychological capital remains unclear. Considering the theoretical paradigm of socio-emotional wealth, we investigate two important family firm characteristics as antecedents of organizational psychological capital: the family involvement in the top management team and the generation of the family firm. We further propose that these relationships are moderated by a board of directors’ tenure. Based on an empirical analysis of listed U.S. family firms, our results confirm a negative relationship between family membership in the top management team and organizational psychological capital. In addition, we find that descendant family firms exhibit higher levels of organizational psychological capital than founder family firms. The results also confirm the moderating role of board tenure. This study works toward a more holistic view of family firm heterogeneity and specifically how different types of family involvement shape a firm’s positive strategic resources.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 405-426
Author(s):  
Laura García-García ◽  
Macarena Gonzalo Alonso-Buenaposada ◽  
M. Elena Romero-Merino ◽  
Marcos Santamaria-Mariscal

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the ownership structure and the investment in research and development (R&D) for a sample of listed Spanish companies.Design/methodology/approachFollowing the agency theory and the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective, the authors propose that R&D investment is affected by ownership structure, specifically by the identity of the controlling owner (family firms and firms with an institutional investor) and the level of contestability by other shareholders. In order to test these hypotheses, the authors build an original database identifying, at a 10% threshold, the ultimate shareholders of a sample of 96 Spanish firms listed during 2008–2018 (1,002 obs).FindingsThe results show that there is no significant relationship between the ownership concentration and the R&D investment. Only when the authors consider the nature of the main shareholder, the authors find that in family firms there is an inverted U relationship between ownership and R&D, so that at low levels of ownership, the R&D increases, while at high levels of ownership (that we compute around 54%) the R&D decreases. Also, when the main shareholder is an institutional investor, the greater its ownership, the higher the R&D investment. Finally, the authors test that, contrary to what mainstream suggests, contestability in family firms is higher when ownership in the hands of other family shareholders increases.Originality/valueThe work uses an original database to test a nonlinear relationship between ownership and R&D investment in family firms. Also, the study addresses a topic hardly ever discussed in the literature about R&D as it is the role of the contestability by other controlling shareholders.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-423
Author(s):  
Nadine Kammerlander ◽  
Holger Patzelt ◽  
Judith Behrens ◽  
Christian Röhm

Organizational ambidexterity is vital for family firms’ long-term success, yet we still lack sufficient insights into the role of family involvement in top management in this context. Building on research on family firm innovation and diversity, we argue there are curvilinear relationships between family involvement in top management and exploration, exploitation, and organizational ambidexterity. We further propose that these (inverse) U-shaped relationships are affected by family CEOs’ family-centered noneconomic goals. Multisource data on 109 family-managed firms support most of our hypotheses and provide a nuanced understanding of how diversity within top management affects family firms’ innovative behavior.


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