A Balancing Act? The Implications of Mixed Strategies for Performance Measurement System Design

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henri C. Dekker ◽  
Tom Groot ◽  
Martijn Schoute
2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henri C. Dekker ◽  
Tom Groot ◽  
Martijn Schoute

ABSTRACT This paper examines how firms design performance measurement systems (PMSs) to support the pursuit of mixed strategies. In particular, we examine the implications of firms' joint strategic emphasis on both low cost and differentiation for their use of performance measurement and incentive compensation. Analysis of survey data of 387 firms shows that more than half of the sample to some extent or fully mixes strategic priorities, while strategic priorities resembling strategic archetypes (primarily low cost or differentiation) populate only 36 percent of the sample. Our analyses support that, as compared to archetypal strategies, pursuing mixed strategies elicits design of more comprehensive and complex PMSs that are aimed at balancing effort and decisions toward the multiple strategies pursued.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vittorio Chiesa ◽  
Federico Frattini ◽  
Valentina Lazzarotti ◽  
Raffaella Manzini

1996 ◽  
Vol 46-47 ◽  
pp. 423-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Neely ◽  
John Mills ◽  
Ken Platts ◽  
Mike Gregory ◽  
Huw Richards

2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (10) ◽  
pp. 1119-1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Neely ◽  
John Mills ◽  
Ken Platts ◽  
Huw Richards ◽  
Mike Gregory ◽  
...  

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Kruis ◽  
Sally K. Widener

ABSTRACT: Extant literature holds that business unit (BU) managers' influence in the design of their performance measurement system (PMS) is beneficial; however, empirical evidence is mixed. Using survey data from 293 BU managers, we study their perception that the PMS fails to support their decision-making. The findings indicate that, on average, managerial influence in PMS design decreases the perception of PMS failure and hence indeed seems to be beneficial. However, importantly, the effect differs depending on the situation. For instance, when there are higher levels of information asymmetry between managers and superiors, lower levels of interdependencies, or lower levels of information asymmetry between employees and managers, managerial influence in PMS design decreases failure. To the contrary, when there are lower levels of information asymmetry between managers and superiors, higher levels of interdependencies, or higher levels of information asymmetry between employees and managers, influence in PMS design increases PMS failure.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 155-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsetio . ◽  
Amarulla Octavian ◽  
Siswo Hadi Sumantri ◽  
Ahmadi . ◽  
Rajab Ritonga ◽  
...  

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